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MOOD AND FUNCTION: A PRAGMATIC STUDY OF A FRIDAY SERMON

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Abstract

This study investigates moods and functions in a Friday sermon using a pragmatic approach. This investigation is equally concerned with checking whether we can consider a Friday sermon as a single speech act that belongs to the directive category. The study also aims to study the illocutionary and the perlocutionary goals in the sermon and whether they have been achieved or not. Furthermore, it aims to argue that for a happy performance of illocutionary acts in the sermon, the uptake must be secured. Finally, the notions of politeness and cooperative principle are dealt with in terms of their relevance to the Friday sermon under study.

The results revealed that there is no correspondence between moods and functions of the Arabic sentences in the sermon. They also revealed that we can consider the Friday sermon as a single speech act whose illocutionary force is 'sermonizing' which belongs to the directive category. In addition, the illocutionary goals can be counted in the sermon if we assume that the uptake is secured; therefore, a happy performance of illocutionary acts necessitates the securing of the uptake. Concerning the perlocutionary acts, it is difficult to check whether they have been achieved or not. As far as the cooperative principle is concerned, it has been found that it is observed in the sermon in two ways: deliberately (directly) and balantly (via raising conversational implicatures). Finally, politeness plays an important role in the sermon in that the speaker uses politeness strategies to minimize the positive and the negative face threatening acts.

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List of Arabic Phonetic Symbols Used in Transliteration

Consonants

Arabic Letter	Phonetic description	Symbol Used	Examples
أ	Voiced glottal stop	ʔ	/ʔasmaa/ : most sublime
ب	Voiced bilabial stop:	b	/baθθa/ : spread
ت	Voiceless dento-alveolar stop	t	/tanmuu/ : is growing
ث	Voiceless interdental fricative	θ	/baθθa/ : spread
ج	Voiced post-alveolar fricative	j	/jaaʔa/ : came
ح	Devoiced pharyngeal fricative	h	/ruuh/ : spirit
خ	Voiceless velar fricative	x	/xatama/ : ended
د	Voiced dento-alveolar stop	d	/dam/ : blood
ذ	Voiced interdental fricative	ð	/ðaalik/ : that
ر	Voiced alveo-palatal tril	r	/rabb/ : Lord
ز	Voiced alveolar fricative	z	/tanaazu3/ : conflict
س	Voiceless alveolar fricative	s	/muslim/ : Muslim
ش	Voiceless alveo-palatal fricative	š	/šahr/ : month
ص	Voiceless velarised alveolar fricative	S	/Saabir/ : patient person
ض	Voiced velarised dento-alveolar stop	Ḍ	/3irḌ/ : honor
ط	Voiceless velarised dento-alveolar stop	ṭ	/talab/ : request
ظ	Voiced velarised interdental fricative	Z	/ʔa3Zam/ : the greatest
ع	Voiced pharyngeal fricative	ʕ	/3aaš/ : lived
غ	Voiced uvular fricative	ɣ	/ʔasbaya/ : sent
ف	Voiceless labio-dental fricative	f	/wafaaʔ/ : faithfulness
ق	Voiceless uvular stop	q	/Sidq/ : honesty
ك	Voiceless velar stop	k	/kaðaalik/ : also
ل	Voiced alveolar lateral	l	/ʔawwal/ : first
م	Voiced bilabial nasal	m	/muntahaa/ : ending

ن	Voiced alveolar nasal	n	/naθara/ : spread
ه	Voiceless glottal fricative	h	/hiya/ : she
و	Voiced labiovelar glide:	w	/wa3ada/ : promise
ي	Voiced palatal glide	y	/yaktub/ : writes

Vowel endings and long vowels

Symbol	Description	Example	Meaning
e	Front short close vowel	/ xaaleq/	creator
a	Front short open vowel	/ baa ^a /	sold
u	Back short close vowel	/ muhaarib /	warrior
aa	Front long open vowel	/ ħaadd /	sharp
uu	Back long close vowel	/ turuud /	parcels

(Ahmad El-Sharif 2011, p. 12)

General Introduction

0.1 Introduction

In Moslem countries, believers go to the mosque every Friday to listen to the sermon which is delivered before the noon prayer by the Imam. Though sermons deal with different topics and issues, they seem to have a specific form and a specific purpose. This work aims to study a Friday sermon, using a pragmatic approach. The purpose is to identify the different syntactic moods of the sermon and the pragmatic functions they have in context.

0.2 Rationale of the Study

To the best of my knowledge, religious sermons, as delivered in Moroccan mosques, have never been subject to a systematic pragmatic investigation. This study hopes to fill this gap by attempting to identify the various pragmatic meanings conveyed through a sermon. Furthermore, this study would be of interest in that it aims to discover the syntactic moods with the pragmatic functions they have in a sermon.

0.3 Basic Assumptions

In this thesis, I will attempt to verify the following assumptions:

1. There is no one-to-one correspondence between the forms and functions of the Arabic sentences used in a sermon.
2. The various speech acts that are performed in a sermon fall under a single speech act, namely the act of sermonizing, which in turn falls under the category of directives.
3. If the locutionary and illocutionary acts are to be performed successfully in a sermon, the uptake needs to be secured on the part of both the Imam and the believers.
4. The participants in a Friday sermon observe the cooperative principle and its maxims.
5. There is one possible perlocutionary effect intended by the Imam while he might achieve many unintended perlocutionary effects.

0.4 Objectives

This study purports first to pinpoint the different moods used in a Friday sermon and the functions they are used for. It also aims to show that the directive category of illocutionary acts is the most used one in a Friday sermon. Furthermore, it argues that the participants observe the cooperative principle with its maxims. The study also argues that for the successful performance of illocutionary acts in a Friday sermon, the uptake needs to be secured by both the Imam and the audience. Finally, this study aims to list the possible perlocutionary effects intended by the Imam by delivering the sermon.

0.5 Research Questions

To achieve the objectives listed above, this study will attempt to answer the following questions:

- 1- What are the syntactic moods that are used in a Friday sermon, and what functions do they serve in the relevant context?
- 2- Is it the case that the speech acts performed in a Friday sermon fall under a single speech act, namely, sermonizing?
- 3- Is it possible to compute the number of illocutionary acts and of perlocutionary acts performed by the Imam in and by delivering a Friday sermon?
- 4- Is it possible to verify whether or not the Imam has achieved his goals (both illocutionary and perlocutionary), during and after the delivery of his sermon?
- 5- What evidence could there be to suggest that the Imam has succeeded in achieving the intended illocutionary goals and perlocutionary effects?
- 6- To what extent do the participants in a Friday sermon observe the cooperative principle and its maxims?
- 7- Is the notion of politeness (in all its manifestations) relevant to the Friday sermon context?

0.6 Methodology

In this piece of work, the data will be analyzed using two methods: quantitative and qualitative. The data will be quantified and results will be generalized. After the use of the quantitative method, the qualitative method comes into play in order to gain insight into the phenomenon that will be discussed in the research which is moods and functions in a Friday sermon. The data is collected from a videoed sermon which is chosen carefully so that it can be considered as a model of Friday sermons. This sermon will be translated from Classical Arabic into English to enable readers to understand the intended meaning. The data will be analyzed using speech act theory, the theory of implicature, and politeness theory.

In addition, a library research will be undertaken in order to support the research with scientific sources of information. Dependable electronic journals and websites will also be consulted.

0.7 Theoretical Framework

This study aims to investigate the various meanings of a Friday sermon in the Moroccan socio-cultural and socio-linguistic context. Accordingly, the approach to be adopted is pragmatic in character. Its basic philosophical background and theoretical assumptions are spelt out in speech act theory (Austin 1962 and Searle 1975), Grice's (1975) theory of implicature, and Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness.

0.8 Organization of the Work

The present study is composed of four chapters, in addition to a general introduction and a general conclusion. The first chapter will be devoted to a review of the literature related to the relevant theoretical framework, including speech act theory, theory of implicature and politeness theory. The second chapter will provide an account of the methodological steps

followed in the selection and analysis of the data of this study. The third chapter will be concerned with presenting the results of the study. Analysis of the results will be done with reference to the research questions. The fourth chapter will discuss the results in the light of the theoretical framework adopted. The general conclusion will summarize the entire work, list the main findings of the thesis and suggest relevant issues for further research.

Chapter One: Review of Literature

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I review the relevant literature that will be exploited in the analysis of the data. Some definitions of the term ‘pragmatics’ are given in order to have an idea about the theoretical framework within which the study will be conducted. The relevant literature includes three important pragmatic theories, namely speech-act theory, the theory of implicature, and politeness theory. Speech act theory is based on the idea that by saying something we are doing something (cf. Austin, 1975). The theory of implicature stresses the idea that there is some meaning which is intended by the speaker, but it is not expressed nor strictly implied by the utterance. Politeness theory states that politeness plays a major role in our interactions. This role is to minimize the negative effects of what we say and to maximize the positive effects. Finally, this chapter introduces Friday sermon with its meaning, terms of necessity, terms of correctness and its methodology.

1.2 Pragmatics: Definition and Scope

Pragmatics is defined by Morris as the study of “the relation of signs to interpreters” (Morris 1983 quoted in Levinson 1983, p 1). It is a branch of semiotics (“The scientific study of the properties of signalling systems, whether natural or artificial” (Crystal 2008, p. 431) that includes two more others, namely syntactics, the study of “the formal relation of signs to one another” (ibid), and semantics, the study of “the relation of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable” (ibid). It is difficult to draw the boundaries of the field of pragmatics as it interrelates with other fields such as semantics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics ... etc. Possibly, when we look at the different definitions, we may have some understanding of the term ‘pragmatics’. In his book “Pragmatics”, Levinson (1983) provides many definitions given by many linguists to the term ‘pragmatics’; I will provide the main ones which are relevant to this work.

- 1- ‘Pragmatics’ is “the study of language usage” (Levinson 1983, p 5). This definition has no clear implication.
- 2- ‘Pragmatics’ is “the study of those principles that will account for why a certain set of sentences are anomalous, or not possible utterances. That set might include:
 - ?? Come there please!
 - ?? Aristotle was Greek, but I don’t believe it.
 - ?? Fred’s children are hippies, and has no children.
 - ?? Fred’s children are hippies, and he has children.
 - ?? I order you not to obey this order.
 - ?? I hereby sing.
 - ?? As everyone knows, the earth please revolves around the sun”.(ibid, p 6-7).

There is no ordinary context in which we can use sentences such as the ones exist in the definition (2). This definition is not explicit since the set of pragmatic anomalies are presupposed, rather than explained.

- 3- 'Pragmatics' is "the study of language from a functional perspective, that is, it attempts to explain facets of linguistic structure by reference to non-linguistic pressures and causes" (ibid, p 7). According to Levinson (1983, p 7), this definition fails to distinguish between pragmatics and other disciplines interested in functional approaches such as psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics.
- 4- 'Pragmatics' "explicates the reasoning of speakers and hearers in working out the correlation in a context of a sentence token with a proposition. In this respect, a pragmatic theory is part of performance." (Katz 1977, p 19 as quoted in Levinson 1983, p 8). The problem of this definition as stated by Levinson (1983, p 8) is that it is impossible to draw a clear boundary between context-independent grammar (competence) and context-independent interpretation (performance).
- 5- 'Pragmatics' is "the study of those relations between language and context that are grammaticalized, or encoded in the structure of a language" (ibid, p 9). This definition restricts pragmatics to the study of certain aspects of linguistic structure, but it excludes the study of principles of language usage that are relevant to conversational implicatures.
- 6- 'Pragmatics' is "the study of deixis (at least in part), implicature, presupposition, speech acts and aspects of discourse structure" (ibid, p 24). The problem of this definition is that it does not help the laymen who are not familiar with these topics and it provides no criteria for the inclusion or exclusion for other topics that may come to our minds.

Based on these definitions, we can say that pragmatics studies the speaker's meaning, the contextual meaning, how more gets communicated than is said, the functions of utterances and the relation of language and context. We can say also that 'utterance' is the basic unit in pragmatics. Furthermore, the main topics studied in pragmatics are speech acts, reference, deixis, presupposition, implicature, politeness, meaning in context ... etc. Therefore, I adopt this definition (definition 6) of pragmatics in the present study.

1.3 Speech Act Theory

1.3.1 Austin's Work

1.3.1.1 Introduction

In his work "How to Do Things with Words?" Austin (1962) tries to construct a theory of linguistic communication. Austin's work is organized as follows: he attempts to draw a distinction between performative and constative utterances based on his view towards 'sentence'. After that, he deals with locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. At the end of his work, Austin aims to provide a rough classification of speech acts categories based on English verbs "using the test (with caution) of the first person singular present indicative active form" (Austin 1962, p 149).

1.3.1.2 The traditional view versus the Austinian view of 'sentence'

To expound his views, Austin starts by presenting the claim of philosophers towards the kinds of sentences exist in the language. Austin says that philosophers claim that there is only one kind of sentences which they define as a statement that can be used to describe a state of affairs, or state some fact that can be verified so we can say that it is "true" or "false", and any other sentence that cannot be described as true or false is nonsense. The scholars, as Austin (1962, p 1) claims, who pay attention to the wrong assumptions of philosophers that there is only one form of sentences which is the declarative one and which can be just true or false, are the New Grammarians who point out that there are also questions, exclamations, and sentences that express commands or wishes or concessions. However, Austin (1962, p 2) claims that not all statements ought to be verifiable. He calls those statements that are not verifiable 'pseudo-statement' such as interrogative sentences and directive sentences which cannot be assessed by the dimension of truth and falsity. For example:

(1) Come here!

We cannot say whether sentence (1) is true or false because this form of sentences can be neither true nor false.

Austin starts his arguments, which are considered to be the second objection against the philosophers' claim about 'statements' by asking whether some 'statements' really set to be 'statements'. To answer this question, he draws the attention that "many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts" (Austin 1962, P.2). For example 'ethical propositions which are meant to "evince emotions or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in special ways" (Ibid, p 2-3) rather than to describe a state of affairs or state a fact. Austin also notices that some perplexing words such as should in a sentence like 'you should take this pills' are not used aimlessly, but they serve to indicate –and not to report- the circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to which it is subject or how to be taken and so on and so forth. Following the idea of the existence of other types of sentences that cannot be assessed as true or false and are meaningful, Austin tries to make a distinction between two major types of utterances namely 'constatives' and 'performatives'.

Before dealing with 'constative' and 'performative' utterances, we need first to distinguish between a sentence and an utterance. Crystal (2008) defines sentence as "the largest structural unit in terms of which the Grammar of a language is organized" (Crystal 2008, p 432-433). Likewise, Lyons (1977) says that sentences have a particular grammatical structure (Lyons 1977, p 745). Concerning utterance Crystal (2008) defines it as "a stretch of speech about which no assumptions have been made in terms of linguistic theory" (Crystal 2008, p 505). While, Lyons (1977) claims that utterance has a particular illocutionary force. In short, Lyons (1977, p 745) says that statements, questions, and commands are types of utterances, while declarative, interrogative, and commands are types of sentences. Following the distinction between sentence and utterance, we need to make another distinction between 'literal meaning' and 'utterance meaning'. Searle claims that the common definition of the literal meaning of a sentence "can be construed as the meaning it has independently of any

context whatever” (Searle, p 207). However, he refuses this definition and he says that the literal meaning of a sentence “could be understood only against a set of background assumptions about the contexts in which the sentence could be appropriately uttered” (Ibid). Among the ones that adopt the common definition is Cruse (2006) who says that sentence meaning “is the meaning a sentence has by virtue of the words it contains and their grammatical arrangement, and which is not dependent on context” (Cruse 2006, p 164). Utterance meaning is defined by Cruse (2006) as “the meaning a sentence carries when it is used in a particular context, and taking into account any conversational implicature” (Ibid). In the present study, I will adopt the definitions given by Lyons to sentence and utterance and the definitions given by Cruse to Literal meaning and Utterance meaning.

1.3.1.3 Constatives and Performatives

Austin states that to issue a constative utterance (i.e to utter it with a historical reference) is to make a statement (Austin 1962, p 6). Therefore, constatives are the type of sentences which can be used to describe a state of affairs, or state some fact that can be verified so we can say that it is “true” or “false”. For example:

(2) the laptop is on the desk

Sentence (2) is a statement that states the fact that the laptop is on the desk. This statement is also a description of the state of the laptop being on the desk. We can certainly verify this statement, thus we can say that it is true if the laptop is really on the desk, and it is false if the laptop is not on the desk. By contrast, Austin claims that there are other sentences which are declarative in form but cannot be verified as true or false although they seem to be. If we assess them as true or false, we fall in what he calls the “descriptive fallacy”. Therefore, he names them “pseudo-statement”. And since it is hard to discriminate this type of sentences with those which can be true or false they are given the name of “masqueraders”. These “masqueraders” are characterized by the fact that they cannot be verified as true or false, but they have meaning and speakers use them meaningfully. “Masqueraders” are of two types: “ethical propositions” and “performatives”.

“Ethical propositions” cannot be true or false because they are "not intended to impart straightforward information" but instead are "intended, solely or partly, to evince emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in special ways" (Austin 1962, p 5). The intended meaning of this type of sentences are delivered by the use of words, the context, and the perplexing words (Austin 1962, p 3) which are not used haphazardly, but to play a role in those sentences. For example:

(3) You should come on time

Sentence (3) is an ethical proposition which contains the word “should” as to the way this sentence should be taken by the hearer. In this case, it should be taken as a piece of advice.

The second type of “masqueraders” (Austin uses this term in the sense that they masquerades the illocutionary force of the utterance) is what Austin calls “performatives”. These are utterances which can satisfy the following conditions:

A: They do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or ‘constate’ anything at all, are not ‘true or false’; and

B: the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying something.

(Austin 1962, p 5)

Let’s give some examples as provided by Austin to see how ‘performatives’ differ from ‘constatives’:

(4) *‘I do’ (SC. Take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)’ –as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.*

(5) *‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ –as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.*

(6) *‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’ –as occurring in a will.’*

(7) *‘I bet you six pence it will rain tomorrow.’*

(Austin 1962, p.5)

According to the traditional view, these sentences seem to be true or false. For example, sentence (6) seems to be true if the speaker gives and bequeaths his watch to his brother. Thus, the meaning of this sentence depends on its truth.

By contrast, Austin claims that these sentences are neither true nor false. He argues that to utter the sentence is not to describe the doing of something, it is to do it. Furthermore, none of these examples can be considered as true or false. When the speaker says ‘I do’ in example (4), he is not reporting on a marriage, he is indulging in it. In this case, we cannot say whether the marriage is ‘true’ or ‘false’, what we can say is whether it is ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’, ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’, depending on the circumstances, the people, and the context. If the circumstances, the people, and the context are appropriate, then the marriage is happy, otherwise it is unhappy. Thus, the saying of ‘I do’ becomes the doing of the action, which means the indulging in the marriage, if the circumstances, the people, and the context are appropriate. For this reason, Austin calls these types of sentences (or utterances) ‘performative sentences’ or ‘performative utterances’. That is to say, when we say something, we perform an action. Performative utterances are opposed to constative utterances, whose job is to state a fact or to describe a state of affairs, and which can be assessed as true or false. For example, a performative utterance can be utterance (8), and a constative utterance can be utterance (9).

(8) I order you to go.

(9) Snow is white.

1.3.1.4 Felicity conditions

For Austin, *performative utterances* are not describable as true or false, but as *happy* or *unhappy*. If they are performed successfully, as when the appropriate speaker who intends to make a promise when saying ‘I promise to....’ to the appropriate person in the appropriate context, the utterance is happy, otherwise, it is unhappy. Austin calls ‘the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion of such utterances, the doctrine of *Infelicities*’ (Austin 1962, p 14).

Austin states some conditions to be satisfied for an utterance to be considered as a ‘happy’ functioning of a performative.

(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B.2) completely

(Γ.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts and feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

(Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

(Austin 1962, p 15)

If any sentence of the performative type does not satisfy one or more of these conditions, then the action targeted (aimed at instead of performed) in the issuance of the performative will be in some way “infelicitous” or, as Austin would put it “unhappy”. The performatives can be infelicitous in different ways depending on which condition is violated.

Austin names the utterances that do not satisfy conditions A and B *Misfires* (the procedure which we aim to invoke is not permitted or is botched, which make our act to be void or without effect) because the formula is uttered incorrectly, or the participants are not in the position to do the act, for instance, the act of marrying would be void or without effect if it is performed by someone who is already married in Christian communities. Utterances that do not satisfy the conditions of Γ Austin calls *Abuses* (the act is professed or hollow).

There is also a distinction between A cases and B cases. A cases are called *misinvocations* because the procedure is not applied correctly, since there is no accepted conventional procedure; However, when there is a procedure but is not or cannot be applied

correctly, the A.2 cases are called *misapplications*. B cases, as opposed to A cases are called *misexecutions*. Class B.1 is that of *Flaws*, and Class B.2 is that of *Hitches*. The Γ cases which are called Abuses involve two types: $\Gamma.1$, called *Insincerities* and $\Gamma.2$, which have no name.

Austin examines these conditions. Concerning condition (A.1), he says that the most important words are 'exist' and 'accepted'. When we say that the procedure is not accepted, it is not accepted by persons other than speakers (at least if the speaker is speaking seriously). For example, a Christian husband says 'I divorce you' to his Christian wife in a Christian country. This act of divorcing is unhappy because only some other verbal or non-verbal procedures are admitted; otherwise the marriage is indissoluble. There are cases when the procedure may not even exist: 1- there are procedures which 'no longer exist', for example, the case of challenging. 2- There are cases of procedures which someone is initiating.

Concerning condition (A.2), this type of infelicity is called *Misapplications*. Here the procedure is alright but cannot be applied. For example, the act performed in saying 'I appoint you' is unhappy if you have already been appointed, someone else has been appointed, the person who has appointed you is not entitled to appoint you, or the appointed one is a horse. We need to distinguish between the 'inappropriate person' and the 'inappropriate circumstances'. The 'circumstances' can be extended to cover the nature of all persons participating. We also need to distinguish between cases where the inappropriateness of persons, objects, names...etc, is a matter of 'incapacity' (I baptize this infant 2704) and the cases where the object or 'performer' is the wrong kind or type (A clergy man baptizing the wrong baby with the right name).

The cases fall under condition (B.1) are called *misexcutions*. They are flaws that consist in the use of wrong formulas. Though the circumstances and persons are appropriate, the procedure is not gone through correctly. For example, the use of vague formulas, such as saying 'my house' when I have two houses.

The cases falling under condition (B.2) are called *hitches*. In these cases, we try to carry out the procedure but the act is abortive. For example, the attempt to make a bet by saying 'I bet six pence' is abortive unless the hearer says 'I take you on' or words to that effect.

Condition Γ includes what Austin calls *insincerities* where the performance of the act is not void, but unhappy. Austin considers 'feelings', 'thoughts', and 'intentions' as key words in this condition. Concerning 'feelings,' we may insincerely congratulate someone when we have no feeling of happiness towards the person's achievements. Circumstances are appropriate, but the act is insincere. Concerning 'Thoughts,' we can, for example, advise someone when we think that it is not the suitable advice. Thoughts must be distinguished. Do we really think it to be so? Or do we think insincerely that it is to be so? Thoughts, then, are misleading; for example, when I say that a person 'not guilty', I think that the deed was done by him or her, however, I may be mistaken in so thinking. Concerning 'intentions', we may promise someone while we do not intend to keep our promise. There might be awkwardness in the case of intention; for example, it is hard to determine the relation between 'I sell' and

completion of sale. The degree or mode of the infelicity is not determined if I do not do what I intend to do afterwards.

There are always overlaps between these cases. For example, when someone says ‘I congratulate you’, does he have the feeling or the thought that the congratulated person has done or deserves well? The result of infelicity is of different kinds when thoughts are incorrect. 1- I may give something which is not in fact mine, though I think it is mine. 2- I may give you an advice that it does not interest you, though I think it does. In this case, the act is neither void nor insincere. Austin calls it *bad advice*.

1.3.1.5 Entails, implies and presupposes

Consider the following examples:

- (10) He is eating
- (11) I regret

The truth of his being eating in the constative utterance in example (10) depends on his being eating. Whereas the happiness of the performative utterance in example (11) is what makes it the fact that I am regretting, and my success in regretting depends on the happiness of the performative utterance in example (11). Austin lists three ways in which a statement (“‘logical construction’ out of the makings of statements” (Austin 1962, p 1)) implies the truth of certain other statements.

1- **Entails**: for example,

- (12) All books are on the floor
- (13) Some books are on the floor
- (14) The computer is on the table
- (15) The computer is under the table \neq The computer is not under the table
- (16) The computer is on the table and the computer is under the table

Utterance (12) entails utterance (13). However, utterance (14) entails the contradictory of utterance (15), that’s why we cannot say utterance (16) because the first clause entails the contradictory of the second in (16). The truth of one proposition¹ is inconsistent with the truth of the other.

2- **Implies**: for example,

¹ Proposition is defined by Searle (1965) as the common content shared by utterances such as:

- a- Will John leave the room?
- b- John will leave the room.
- c- John, leave the room!
- d- Would that John left the room.
- e- If John will leave the room, I will leave also.

The speaker in these utterances expresses the utterances that John will leave the room.

(Searle 1965, p 256-257)

- (17) The computer is on the table
- (18) The computer is not on the table

Utterance (17) implies that I believe that '*the computer is on the table*'. However, it is not the case that my not believing in (17) implies (18). The insincerity of implication means that the statement is unhappy in that when I state something and I do not believe it to be so, any implication built on that is unhappy.

3-Presupposes: for example,

- (19) All children of Sue are genius
- (20) John's children are all bald

Utterance (19) presupposes that Sue has got some children. It is not true that Sue has got no children presupposes that Sue's children are not genius. We cannot say that a statement is devoid of reference, since reference is necessary for either truth or falsehood, for example, utterance (20) is made when John has no children. What we can say here is that the sentence is not meaningless, but the utterance is void.

1.3.1.6 How can we distinguish between performative utterances and constative utterances?

Austin provides some criteria for distinguishing performatives from constatives. The criteria he uses are the following:

- a- The adverb 'Hereby' test: If a sentence sounds fine with "hereby" inserted between the subject and the verb, it is being used performatively, for example:

- (21) Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be prosecuted.
- (22) I (*hereby) cry

Austin clearly states that "'Hereby' is a useful criterion for deciding if an utterance is performative" (Austin 1962, p 57). Hereby is inserted between the subject and the verb in example (21) to indicate that the utterance is the instrument effecting the act of warning, authorizing ...etc. However, if 'hereby' is not inserted, utterance (21) may be used as a description of what usually happens. This is why utterance (22) is incorrect, thus, it is constative and not performative.

- b- Mood and tense

- (23) Go!
- (24) I give you off-side.

Mood: Utterance (23) is used with the imperative mood which means 'I order you to go', hence the imperative mood which makes the sentence performative.

Tense: Utterance (24) is used with the simple present tense which is a device by which the sentence is signaled as performative. If the speaker says 'you were off-side', he is then describing a state, not performing an act.

c- Explicit performatives

(25) I order you to go.

Sentences that include performative verbs which are used performatively like utterance (25) are considered as explicit performative. Utterance (25) includes the performative verb *order* which is used performatively. However, performative verbs may be used with constative utterances, for example, 'he ordered me to go out'. In this case, the performative verbs are not used performatively.

d- The use of the first person singular present indicative active with performative verbs.

(26) I/We bet

(27) Out!

In utterance (26), the use of the first person singular/plural present indicative active '*I*' / '*we*' is what makes the utterance performative. If we replace '*I*' / '*we*' with the third singular person present indicative active '*he*' / '*she*', the utterance will be no more performative in that it will be just a description of the betting action. The utterance (27) is equivalent to 'I declare, pronounce, give, or call you out'.

However, as Austin states, this grammatical criterion is not exact because:

- a- It may be used to describe how I habitually behave, for example 'I bet him (every morning) six pence that it will rain.'
- b- It may be used in a way similar to 'historic' present, for example 'on page 10 I protest against the verdict.'
- c- Some verbs may be used in the first person singular present indicative in two ways, for example 'I call', as when I say 'I call inflation too much money chasing too few goods'. In this case, the context will help in the identification of meaning.
- d- We may not like to class some formulas as performatives, for example 'I state that' (to utter which is to state) as well as 'I bet that'
- e- We have cases of suiting the action to the word, for example 'I quote' followed by actually quoting.
- f- It is not always the case that we must have a performative verb for making something explicit, for example we insult by using other words than using the formula 'I insult you'
- g- We may have some loss when we put a performative into the normal form, for example 'I am sorry' is it the same as the explicit form 'I apologize'?

In short, Austin claims that performatives can be assessed as happy or unhappy, while constatives can be judged as true or false. He claims also that we can use the criteria of grammar or vocabulary or both. However, we cannot depend on these criteria all the time. The only way out is that we should see the use of the sentence on relevant context(s) of use.

1.3.1.7 Explicit versus implicit (primary) performatives

Austin opposes the criteria of the ‘explicit performative’ to ‘primary performative’. For example:

- (28) I shall be there
- (29) I promise that I shall be there

The utterance in (28) is a primary performative in that it does not contain a performative verb and if it contains the performative verb, it will result in the utterance (29), therefore, the speaker of an utterance like (28) does not make clear what act he or she is performing. Utterances in which the speaker makes explicit what act she or he is performing are called by Austin "explicit" performatives. The act is made clear when we use the explicit performed formula: I (hereby) V (where V is a performative verb used performatively, as in the following example “I (hereby) promise to lend you 1000 Dhs”). This means that the utterance (29) is explicit since it contains the performative verb ‘promise’ which is used in this utterance performatively. By contrast, implicit performatives are the performative utterances that do not include the performative formula and their illocutionary force is thus unclear. It must be worked out depending on the context of the utterance. If (28) is uttered, one might ask ‘is that a promise?’ The answer might be ‘Yes’, or ‘Yes, I promise it’, whereas the answer might have been only ‘no, but I intend to be.’

There are some roles that can be taken over by the ‘illocutionary indicating devices,’ as Searle (1975) calls them, when used in utterances:

- 1- Mood: The imperative mood can be used to achieve different functions such as command, permission, concession ...etc. For example, ‘go’ may be said in many contexts:
 - ‘go, do’ resembles the performative ‘I order you to go’
 - ‘go, I should’ resembles the performative ‘I advise you to go’
 - ‘go, if you like’ resembles the performative ‘I permit you to go’
 - Etc.
- 2- Tone of voice, cadence, emphasis. (these features are not productive in the written languages)
For example:
 - He’s going to get angry! (a warning)
 - He’s going to get angry? (a question)
 - He is going to get angry!? (a protest)

- 3- Adverbs and adverbial phrases: we can qualify the force of 'I shall' by adding probably, or certainty.
- 4- Connecting particles: we use the particle 'still' with the force of 'I insist that'.
- 5-Accompaniments of the utterance: The utterance may be accompanied by gestures (winks, or by ceremonial non-verbal actions)
- 6-The circumstances of the utterance: Circumstances help us understand the utterance. For example 'I shall die someday' when someone is ill.

To sum up, explicit performative utterance is the one in which the illocutionary force is pronounced explicitly. While implicit performative is the one in which the illocutionary force is not pronounced but implied and we elicit it depending on the context.

1.3.1.8 Constatives as illocutionary acts

Austin, in the eleventh lecture of his book "How to Do Things with Words?", tries to convince us that there are only performative utterances, and that constative utterances are just a type of performatives. He says that "statements are liable to every kind of infelicity to which performatives are liable" (Austin 1962, p. 135). Since statements are constatives and we can test them against the felicity conditions proposed by Austin in the second lecture of his book "How to Do Things with Words?"; thus, they are types of performatives. Consider the following examples:

- (30) It was snowing
- (31) I state that he did not do it
- (32) I argue that he did not do it
- (33) I suggest that he did not do it
- (34) I did not do it
- (35) I state that I did not do it

Austin (1962, p. 132) claims that whenever we say anything, we are performing both locutionary and illocutionary acts which are the two kinds of acts we use to distinguish between constatives and performatives. Thus, we need to reconsider the notions of constatives and performatives and to look for distinctions between 'saying' and 'doing' or locutionary and illocutionary acts. If we consider constative utterances, can we say that when we state something: a- we are doing something just as saying something and we are doing something distinct from saying something? And b- whenever we state anything, we are performing an illocutionary act as to warn or to pronounce? When we state, our statement can successfully meet all the criteria we had for distinguishing the illocutionary act. For example, in uttering (30), I am simply stating a fact. Stating here is but on a level with betting and warning. The utterance (31) is exactly on a level with the utterances (32), (33).....etc. We can also make explicit the primary or non-explicit form of utterance such as the utterance (34), and specify what we were doing in saying this, or specify the illocutionary force of the utterance, as our uttering (35). Using these arguments, Austin comes to the conclusion that there is no conflict

between: a- doing something by issuing an utterance, b- and assessing that utterance as true or false.

Following these arguments, statements are liable to every kind of infelicity to which performatives are liable to. For example,

- (36) The book is on the table
- (37) The president of France is bald

Uttering (36) implies that I believe that the book is on the table. So, the statement is liable to the insincerity form of infelicity. Thus, statements can fall under the two Γ kinds of infelicity conditions. Statements are also liable to felicity conditions A and B. For example, there might be no convention or accepted convention about the statement, also the circumstances may not be appropriate for its invocation by the speaker such as a putative statement which presupposes the existence of something which does not exist as in the statement (37). If this is so, the statement is not about anything, but it is void or null. Furthermore, you cannot now state how many people are in the next room, because if you do so, you are just guessing or conjecturing. This is just like when you cannot order someone because you are not in the appropriate position to do so. Statements are also liable to infelicities of type B, flaws and hitches. For example, when someone says something which he did not really mean, or says the wrong word such as in utterance (14), ‘the computer is on the table,’ when he means the television and not the computer. Austin is trying to convince us that ‘stating is only one among very numerous speech acts of illocutionary class’ (Austin 1962, p 146).

1.3.1.9 Securing the uptake

Austin (1962, p. 115) states that illocutionary acts cannot be performed unless the uptake is secured. This means that it is essential that the speaker must be sure that what he utters is heard and understood by the hearer. Austin says that “I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense” (Austin 1962, p 115). Securing the uptake is a necessary condition which is classified under the (B) condition in the felicity conditions.

When the uptake is not secured, we may achieve an opposite or unwanted result. For example, I was once in a café. I asked the waiter to give me coffee with milk. I told him to add a bit more coffee to get it harder; however, what he understood was to add some coffee to the milk and not adding some coffee to the coffee with milk to get it harder. So, instead of having a bit harder coffee I got lighter one. When stating, as all the illocutionary acts, it is essential to secure the uptake because when a speaker states (38), but the hearer has not heard him or he does not understand English so he has not understood him, the speaker in that case has not performed the act of stating successfully.

- (38) The sun rises in the east

The question now is who is responsible to secure the uptake? Austin believes that the speaker is the only responsible to secure the uptake as he states:

It is necessary that to have promised I must normally:

- a) *Have been heard by someone, perhaps the promise,*
- b) *Have been understood by him as promising.*

(Austin 1962, p 24)

It is thus the responsibility of the speaker to secure the uptake by speaking in a clear and heard voice, and by producing understandable utterances. Let's consider that the speaker is speaking clearly, using understandable utterances, however the hearer is deaf or crazy, are we talking here about securing the uptake or about something else? I think that we are not talking about securing the uptake but we are here concerned with the medium of delivering the message. If I speak to a deaf person, then I am using the wrong medium since he will not hear me. The medium that I should use then is gestures which fall under the non-verbal communication.

1.3.1.10 Locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts

By examining the difference between merely 'saying' and 'doing' something, Austin (1962) comes up with three different acts. These acts are locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts.

Austin (1962) argues that the performance of a locutionary act is the act of saying something in a full normal sense which includes the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain constructions, and the utterance of them with a certain meaning. So, he distinguishes between three parts of the utterance. 1- The phonetic act which is the utterance of certain noises. 2- The phatic act which is the utterance of certain vocables or words. 3- The rhetic act which is the performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference. It is the 'indirect speech'. For example, the utterance (39) reports a phatic act, whereas, the utterance (40) reports a rhetic act. The following are some points to be drawn from these distinctions:

- 1- When performing a phatic act, you must perform a phonetic act, not the opposite.
- 2- In the phonetic act, there are two things linked together: vocabulary and grammar.
- 3- The phonetic act can be mimicable and reproducible just like the phatic act. It may include intonation, winks, gestures, & c.).

(Austin 1962, p 95-96)

For example, in addition to the mimicking of the statement (41), it is also possible to mimic the more complex fact that he said it like (42).

- (39) He said "I shall be there"
- (40) He said we would be there
- (41) He has green eyes.
- (42) He has green eyes! (Shrugs).

In the imperative mood, instead of saying 'he said' we use 'he told to', 'he advised to', ..etc, or 'he said I was to', 'he said I should'.

Can a rhetic act performed without reference or name? It seems as if we cannot, however, there are confusing cases such as: what is the reference in 'all triangles have three sides?' Thus, we can perform a phatic act which is not rhetic act, and not the opposite, for example we may read a Chinese sentence without knowing the meaning of the words. All that is said is concerned with the locutionary act.

Austin states that "I explained the performance of an act in this new and second sense as the performance of an 'illocutionary' act, i.e. performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something; and I shall refer to the doctrine of the different types of function of language here in question as the doctrine of 'illocutionary forces'" (Austin 1962, p 99). Therefore, the illocutionary act is the function of the utterance. It is not what is literally meant by the utterance or what should be achieved when it is uttered.

The illocutionary act is different from the locutionary act in the sense that the illocutionary act, as Austin states, is a conventional act which necessarily involves the securing of uptake. Austin says that "the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake" (Austin 1962, p 116). When a speaker orders a hearer by uttering (23) 'Go!' or by uttering (25) 'I order you to go', the hearer should take it as an order and not as a promise, assuming that the uptake is secured. That is to say, the hearer has heard and understood what the speaker said. Searle (1968) contradicts this view by claiming that the description of a locutionary act as happily performed, it is at the same time a description of an illocutionary act. He argues then that "the description of the act as a happily performed locutionary act, since it involves the meaning of the sentence, is already a description of the illocutionary act, since a particular illocutionary act is determined by that meaning. They are one and the same act" (Searle 1968, p. 263). This is not a convincing argument since a speaker may just attempt to test the pronunciation of a certain sentence or to utter a sentence in a soliloquy. Thus, locutionary acts and illocutionary acts are different acts.

Concerning the perlocutionary act, it is introduced by Austin in this way:

Let us contrast both the locutionary and the illocutionary act with yet a third kind of act. There is yet a further sense (C) in which to perform a locutionary act, and therein an illocutionary act, may also be to perform an act of another kind. Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons. (Austin 1962, p. 101)

The consequential effects of our locutionary and illocutionary acts are what Austin calls "perlocutionary effects," or "perlocutionary acts." These effects may be upon feelings, thoughts, or actions of the hearer, of the speaker, or of other persons.

Austin differentiates between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts by using the two formulas “in” and “by”:

A- ‘In saying X I was doing Y’ or ‘I did Y’,

B- ‘By saying X I did Y’ or ‘I was doing Y’

(Austin 1962, p. 121)

By using ‘in’, we pick out verbs which are names for illocutionary acts, and by using ‘by’, we pick out verbs which are names for perlocutionary acts, for example:

1- In saying ‘I would shoot him’, I was threatening him.

2- By saying ‘I would shoot him’, I alarmed him.

We should pay attention that the use of the formula “in” is not restricted to illocutionary acts. a- It may apply with locutionary acts, for example, we may argue by saying that ‘saying’ is ambiguous, where ‘saying’ could be replaced by ‘speaking of’, or ‘using the expression’, or instead of ‘in saying X’ we could say ‘by the word X’, or ‘in using the word X’. In such cases we refer to the phatic and not the rhetic act. b- It will apply with acts which seem to fall outside our classification. A possible test would be to put the Y verb into non-continuous tense (present for example) instead of the continuous tense, or we change the ‘in’ into ‘by’ while keeping the continuous tense, then the Y verb is not the name for an illocution.

Austin (1962, p 130) lists two other tests to distinguish illocutionary acts from perlocutionary acts:

- 1- In the case of illocutionary verbs we often say ‘to say X was to do Y’. For example, ‘to hammer the nail was to drive it in’ is not possible to be said instead of ‘by hammering the nail he drove it in’.
- 2- Verbs classified as names of illocutionary acts seem to be close to explicit performative verbs. For example, we can say ‘I warn you that’ and ‘I order you to’ as explicit performatives; thus, warning and ordering are illocutionary acts. However, we can say ‘I warn you that’ but not ‘I convince you that’. Warning is an illocutionary act, while convincing is a perlocutionary act.

To conclude, there are three senses in which effects can come with illocutionary acts namely securing the uptake, taking effects, and inviting response. In addition, illocutionary acts are conventional acts, while perlocutionary acts are non-conventional acts. Acts of both kinds can be performed and called by the same name; they can also be brought non-verbally. For example, acts equivalent to the illocutionary act of warning or the perlocutionary act of convincing.

In general, we can differentiate locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts as follows: a locutionary act is the act of saying something; an illocutionary act is an act performed in saying something; a perlocutionary act is an act performed by saying something.

1.3.1.11 Illocutionary act and its missing part

There are two categories of illocutionary acts as claimed by Austin and Searle. The first category of illocutionary acts is the one in which illocutionary acts can be performed explicitly by using a performative verb to indicate clearly their illocutionary force such as ‘I hereby order you to go’. The second category is the one in which illocutionary acts cannot be performed explicitly such as ‘Go!’

Related to these categories of illocutionary acts, we sometimes ‘do’ some things with ‘saying’ some things which do not seem to fall exactly into any of these categories, or vaguely into more than one category. For example, ‘insinuating’ seems to involve some convention, as in the illocutionary act; but we cannot say ‘I insinuate...’, and it seems to be an effect rather than a mere act.

It seems that there are at least two categories of illocutionary acts beyond and over the categories defined by Austin and Searle. The easily describable category of illocutionary act is the one that consists of such acts as can be performed explicitly by using a performative verb to clearly and explicitly indicate their illocutionary force (I hereby promise to lend you the money you need).

*The second category would consist of such acts that cannot be performed explicitly by using the verb that describes them as a performative verb. The act of threatening is a case in point. For example, although the illocutionary act of threatening can be performed in various ways, it seems that this very act cannot be performed explicitly by using the verb ‘threaten’ as a performative verb, hence the unacceptability of an utterance like: * I (hereby) threaten you.*

However, it is possible to perform the illocutionary act of threatening by using other performative verbs such as “I hereby promise to send you to jail”. This utterance clearly does not have the illocutionary force of a promise (because it is not in the interest of the addressee to be sent to jail). The appropriate interpretation is that the speaker threatens to send the hearer to jail. The question is why is it that certain acts, like the act of threatening, cannot be performed explicitly or directly? The answer seems to be that threats tend to be, in general, veiled. Threats have to be made in a veiled manner because they will achieve their perlocutionary effects only if they are veiled.

The act of threatening is part of a more general phenomenon of indirect communication, identified as the phenomenon of hidden (canceled) goals (purposes). It is left to the hearer to work out the hidden meanings of such utterances by means of an inferential strategy.

(El Hakkouni 2013, seminar discussion)

In short, illocutionary acts can be of three categories: the illocutionary acts that can be performed explicitly using a performative verb that is used performatively; the illocutionary acts that can be performed implicitly; the illocutionary acts that cannot be performed unless they are veiled like the illocutionary act of threatening.

1.3.1.12 Austin's classification of illocutionary acts

To indulge in classification of speech acts, Austin states that what is needed is a classification of illocutionary forces of an utterance: "We said long ago that we needed a list of 'explicit performative verbs'; but in the light of the more general theory we now see that what we need is a list of illocutionary forces of an utterance" (Austin 1962, p. 148-149)

Using the simple test of the first person singular present indicative active, Austin attempts to make some classification which he claims that he is not satisfied with "I distinguish five more general classes: but I am far from equally happy about all of them" (Austin 1962, p. 150) : 1- *verdictives* 2- *exercitives* 3- *commissives* 4- *behabitives* 5- *expositives*.

- 1- ***Verdictives***: "They consist in delivering of finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact so far as these are distinguishable" (Austin, 1962, p. 152). They are characterized by the giving of a verdict, by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire. It may include an estimate, reckoning, or appraisal. It is essentially giving a finding as something –fact or value- Examples of verbs in this class are: acquit, hold, calculate, describe, rank, and characterize.
- 2- ***Exercitives***: "it is the giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course of action or advocacy of it. It is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgment that it is so" (Austin, 1962, p. 154). They are characterized by the exercising of powers, rights, or influence. Examples of verbs from this class are: order, command, direct, plead, beg, recommend, entreat, and advise.
- 3- ***Commissives***: "to commit the speaker to a certain course of action" (Ibid, p. 156). That is to say, they commit the speaker to doing something. Examples of verbs from this class are: promise, vow, pledge, contract, guarantee, embrace, and swear.
- 4- ***Behabitives***: "It includes the notion of reaction to other people's behavior and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent conduct" (Ibid, p. 159). This category then has to do with attitudes and social behaviours. Some examples of this class are: apologize, thank, deplore, commiserate, congratulate, felicitate, and welcome. Austin calls this class 'a shocker' because he is not satisfied with it.
- 5- ***Expositives***: "are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments and the clarifying of usages and references" (Ibid, p. 160). They make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation, how we are using words or, in general, are expository. Some examples of this class are: affirm, deny, emphasize, illustrate, and answer.

From the comparison Austin himself made between these categories, it is obvious that there is a sort of overlap between them. Austin states that:

- “the giving of a verdict or an estimate does, for example, commit us to certain future conduct” (Austin 1962, p. 153).
- “to blame is a verdictive, but in another sense it is to adopt an attitude towards a person and is thus a behabitive” (Ibid, p. 154).
- “When I say 'I interpret', 'I analyse', 'I describe', 'I characterize', this, in a way, is to give a verdict, but is essentially connected with verbal matters and clarifying our exposition” (Ibid, p. 154).
- “I award' and 'I absolve' are exercitives, which will be based on verdicts” (Ibid, p. 155).

These are examples of the overlap which exists between these categories and which enabled Searle to come up with another classification of speech act categories. This is what I am dealing with in the next section.

1.3.2 Searle’s Contribution to Speech Act Theory

1.3.2.1 Introduction

In his article ‘ATaxonomy of Illocutionary Acts’, Searle (1975a) examines the phenomenon of illocutionary acts in a way different from Austin’s. One of the most important things that Searle refuses is Austin’s classification of Illocutionary acts. Therefore, he aims to construct his taxonomy on a consistent principle. He starts by showing the different types of differences between different types of illocutionary acts, then he lists Austin’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts with its weaknesses, and finally he suggests an alternative systematic taxonomy of illocutionary acts.

1.3.2.2 The differences between illocutionary acts

Before setting any criterion to distinguish between any kind of illocutionary act from another, we need to know the differences between these acts first. For example, we need to know the differences between an order, a promise, a prediction, a statement ...etc. Searle states that the expression of ‘illocutionary force’ is misleading, in the sense that it suggests that “different illocutionary forces occupy different positions on a single continuum of force” (Searle 1979, p. 2); however, this is not the case, there are several distinct continua.

Searle defines illocutions as “parts of language as opposed to particular languages”, and illocutionary verbs as “always parts of a particular language” (Ibid, p. 2). Based on these definitions, Searle lists twelve significant dimensions of variation in which illocutionary acts differ one from the other:

1- Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act.

For example, the point or purpose of an order is an attempt to get the hearer to do something, the point or purpose of a description is a representation of how something is (i.e true or false, accurate or inaccurate), and the point or purpose of a promise is a commitment by the speaker to do something. The ‘point’ or ‘purpose’ does not imply

that every illocutionary act is associated by perlocutionary intent, simply because some illocutionary acts such as statements and promises by definition are not associated by perlocutionary intent. The illocutionary point is the purpose of a type of illocution. It is as Searle says “part of but not the same as illocutionary force” (Searle 1979. p 3). For example, the illocutionary point of orders is the same as that of requests: both are attempts to get the hearer to do something. But the illocutionary force is different.

2- *Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world.*

As part of their illocutionary point, some illocutions get the words (their propositional content) to match the world such as assertions. Some others get the world to match the words such as promises and requests. Direction of fit is always a consequence of illocutionary point. An example of world to word direction of fit is that when I promise to do something, I have to do more or less exactly that thing as I have said to do it. As for word to world direction of fit, when I describe something I just say how it looks like.

3- *Differences in expressed psychological states. (the psychological state is the sincerity condition of the act).*

When I assert that p, I am expressing the belief that p. For example, when a governor asserted that no more money would be available, he expressed his deep belief in that. When I promise something, I express my intention to do that thing. When I order someone, I express my desire that that one does what I have ordered him to do. It is always the case that the speaker expresses some attitudes, state, ...etc with a propositional content when he performs any illocutionary act with that propositional content. This is true even when the speaker is insincere. For example one cannot state that p but do not believe that p. This can only be expressed in the first person performative use as one can say, ‘he stated that p but didn’t really believe that p’.

4- *Differences in the force as strength with which the illocutionary point is presented.*

Both ordering and insisting have the same illocutionary point, but this illocutionary point is presented with different strength. For example, ‘I order you to go’ is stronger than ‘you have to go’ in getting someone to do the act of going.

5- *Differences in the status or position of the speaker and hearer as these bear on the illocutionary force of the utterance.*

If a teacher asks a student to close the door, it might be an order. If a student asks a teacher to close the door it is certainly not an order, it might be a request, a suggestion, or a proposal.

6- *Differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and the hearer.* (It is a type of preparatory condition)

When someone is boasting by saying ‘things were better because I was there’ is different when he expresses a repeated lament by saying ‘things were better because I wasn’t there, then!’

7- *Differences in the relations to the rest of the discourse.*

Some performative expressions such as ‘I conclude’ and ‘I deduce’ relate utterances to other utterances and to the surrounding discourse. For example, when I say ‘I conclude’ at the end of my speech, I announce that what I am going to say is a

summary, or a result of what I have been saying, or I inform people that I am about to finish.

8- *Differences in the propositional content that are determined by illocutionary force indicating device.*

A report can be about the past or the present, whereas a prediction must be about future. These differences correspond to differences in propositional content condition.

9- *Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be, but need not be performed as speech acts.*

One may make estimation by saying 'I estimate that'. But, one may estimate just by saying that 'the total cost is about 60000 dh'. Classify, conclude, diagnose are to be treated similarly.

10- *Differences between those acts that require linguistic institutions for their performances and those that do not.*

There are many illocutionary acts that need a special position by the speaker and the hearer within an institution in order for the act to be performed. For example, to declare war I need to be a minister of defense, a prime minister or a king. Austin sometimes speaks as if all the illocutionary acts like these, however they are not. In order to make a statement such as 'the snow is melting', or a promise such as 'I will come tomorrow', you need only to follow the rules of the language. No extra-linguistic institution is required.

11- *Differences between those acts where the corresponding illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where it does not.*

Not all verbs are performative verbs. Most illocutionary verbs have performative uses such as state, promise, declare ...etc. But one cannot perform acts of convincing, boasting, or threatening by saying 'I hereby convince you', 'I hereby boast', or 'I hereby threaten you'.

12- *Differences in the style of performance of the illocutionary act.*

Some illocutionary verbs serve to mark the style in which the illocutionary act is performed. For example, announcing and confiding involve the same illocutionary point or propositional content, but they differ only in the style of performing the illocutionary act.

1.3.2.3 The weaknesses of Austin's classification

After setting the differences between types of illocutionary acts, Searle (1979) lists Austin's taxonomy of illocutionary acts with its weaknesses. Searle says that Austin suggests this taxonomy tentatively. That is to say it can be a basis for discussion and not as a final result as he says "I am not putting this forward as in the very last definite" (Austin, 1962, p.151). Based on his discussion of this classification of Austin's illocutionary acts, Searle believes that it needs to be revised because it contains several weaknesses.

Austin suggests five categories of speech act namely verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives. As it has mentioned before these categories tend to overlap.

Searle's first notice about Austin's taxonomy is that it is a classification of English illocutionary verbs and not acts. Furthermore, Austin assumes that a classification of different verbs is by itself a classification of kinds of illocutionary acts. Thus, any two non-synonymous verbs must mark different illocutionary acts, however, this is not the case because some verbs, such as announce, mark the manner in which an illocutionary act performed. For example, one may announce orders, promises, or reports, but announcing has nothing to do with the three acts of ordering, promising, or reporting. This is because announcing is not the name of a type of illocutionary act, but of the way in which some illocutionary act is to be performed.

Searle lists the following criticisms against Austin's taxonomy of illocutionary acts:

- 1- ***Not all verbs listed are illocutionary verbs.*** For example, sympathize, regard as, meant to, intend, and shall. 'Intend' for example, is not performative. Saying 'I intend' is not intending. It does not report a speech act. The illocutionary act of intention is expressed by the verb phrase 'express intention'.
- 2- ***Austin does not construct his taxonomy on a consistent principle or set of principles.*** Expositives class is defined in terms of discourse analysis. Exercitives class is defined in terms of the exercise of authority. Behabitives seems to be defined in terms of what is good or bad for the speaker and hearer as well as expressions of attitudes. The only class which he uses the illocutionary point as its basis of definition is the class of commissives.
- 3- ***There is much overlapping from one category to another and a great deal of heterogeneity within some of the categories.*** Because of the unsystematic principle used in the classification of Austin, a large number of verbs blocked in the middle of two categories. For example, 'describe' finds itself in both verdictives and expositives.
- 4- ***There are different kinds of verbs with some of the categories.*** For example, 'dare', 'defy', and 'challenge', are listed in behabitives category alongside with 'thank', 'apologize' even they have to do with the hearer's subsequent actions. These verbs should be in the class which includes 'order' and 'command' on both syntactical and semantic basis.
- 5- ***Some verbs which are listed in the classes do not really satisfy the definitions given.*** For example, 'nominate', 'appoint', 'excommunicate' do not give decisions in favor of or against a course of action; instead, they are performances of these actions. For example, when I appoint you a minister, I do not advocate that you become a minister, I make you a minister.

1.3.2.4 Searle's alternative classification of illocutionary acts

Searle (1979) suggests an alternative to Austin's taxonomy. As a principle of construction, he takes illocutionary point, direction of fit and expressed sincerity conditions. Accordingly, he suggests the following classification supported by some syntactical aspects of the classification:

- 1- **Assertives**: “the point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something’s being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition” (Searle 1979, p. 12). Speech acts that belong to this category are assessable so we can say that they are true or false. The direction of fit is the words to the world, and the psychological state expressed is belief. ‘Belief’ and ‘commitment’ here are used as determinable and not determinates. For example, there is a difference between suggesting that p or putting it forward as a hypothesis that p on one hand and insisting that p or swearing that p on the other. Any performative verb that denotes illocutions which seem to be assessable in terms of true or false, regardless if it is a statement or not, falls into this class on the basis of the illocutionary point and the fact that they mark features of illocutionary force. Some examples are: boast, complain, deduce, illustrate, emphasize, deny, affirm, answer, conclude ...etc. This class includes most of Austin’s expositives.

The test that Searle suggests to know this class is whether we can literally characterize it as true or false.

Concerning the syntactical aspects of this class, Searle notes that the deep structure of this class is: *I verb (that) + S*. Examples of this deep structure are (43) and (44) below:

- (43) I state that it is raining
- (44) I predict he will come
- (45) I call him a liar
- (46) I diagnose his case as appendicitis
- (47) I describe John as fascist
- (48) * I call that he is a liar
- (49) He is a liar

Some verbs may pose some constraints on the lower node S. For example, ‘predict’ requires that an AUX in the lower S must be future or, at any rate, cannot be past. There are assertive verbs which do not have the same syntactic aspects of assertive such as diagnose, call, and describe, for example, the utterances in (45), (46) and (47). These examples have the general form: *I verb NPI + NPI be pred*. We cannot say, for example, the utterance in (48). Searle then asks the following question: do verbs like this need to be classified in a separate category (which is not assertive)? His answer is no because in assertive the question is not just what is the propositional content we are asserting, but what we say about the object(s) referred to in the propositional content. In addition to this, the actual sentences in which the describing, diagnosing, calling ...etc, done are seldom of the explicit performative type, but they are usually in the standard indicative forms which conform to the assertive class. For example, the utterance (49) is characteristically a statement. Following this, Searle comes to the conclusion that assertives class has typically two syntactical forms: illocutionary verbs which focus on propositional content and illocutionary verbs which focus on the object(s) referred to in the propositional content but both are semantically assertives.

- 2- **Directives**: “the illocutionary point of these consists in the fact that they are attempts (of varying degrees, and hence, more precisely, they are determinates of the determinable which includes attempting) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something” (Ibid, p. 13). The degrees of attempts vary in the sense that they may be very modest ‘attempts’ as when I invite you to do it or suggest that you do it, or they may be fierce ‘attempts’ as when I insist that you do it or I order you to do it. The direction of fit is world to words and the sincerity condition is want (or wish or desire). The propositional content is always that the hearer H does some future action A. Some examples of this class are: beg, ask, order, command, request, plead, pray, entreat, invite, permit, and advise. Searle thinks that dare, defy, and challenge, which are listed in behabitives class according to Austin, are included in this class. Most of Austin’s exercitives are also included in this class. Questions are a subclass of directives, since they are attempts by a speaker to get a hearer to answer. Concerning the syntactical aspects of this class, Searle notes that the deep structure of this class is: *I verb you + you fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv)*. For example:

- (50) I order you to leave
(51) I command you to stand at attention

The utterances (50) and (51) have the following deep structure: ‘I order you + you will leave’ and ‘I command you + you will stand at attention’. ‘Dare’, ‘defy’, and ‘challenge’ have the same deep structure, so they are among directives class. ‘Permit’ has the syntactic structure of directives class, even it is not strictly getting someone to do something, but it consists of removing restrictions on his doing it. It is, therefore, the illocutionary negation of a directive with a negative propositional content.

- 3- **Commissives**: “are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker (by varying degrees) to some future course of action” (Ibid, p. 14). The direction of fit is world to words and the sincerity condition is intention. The propositional content is always that the speaker does some future action. Examples are: promise, commit, plan, bet, undertake ...etc. The verbs such as ‘shall’, ‘intend’, ‘favor’ ...etc, which are listed by Austin as commissives do not belong to this class at all. This is because they are intentions and not commitments. Concerning the syntactical aspects of this class, Searle notes that the deep structure of this class is: *I verb (you) + I fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv)*. For example:

- (52) I promise to pay you the money
(53) I pledge allegiance to the flag
(54) I promise you to come
(55) I order you to come
(56) I promise that Henry will be here on Wednesday

The sentence in (52) has the deep structure ‘I promise you + I will pay you the money’. Not all commissives verbs have ‘you’ as an indirect object of the performative verb.

For example, the sentence (53) has the deep structure 'I pledge + I will be allegiant to the flag' and not the deep structure 'I pledge to you flag + I will be allegiant'.

The only difference between directives and commissives concerning deep structure is that, for example in sentences such as (54) and (55) which have respectively the deep structures 'I promise you + I will come' and 'I order you + you will come', is that the former sentence has *I* as the subject of come while the latter has *you* as the subject of come. For directive verbs as 'order' and 'command' as well as the imperative mood require 'you' as the deep structure subject of the lower node S. However, it is not argued enough that commissives require 'I' as the deep structure subject on their lower node. Searle says that we must interpret sentences as (56) as meaning 'I promise that I will see to it that Henry will be here next Wednesday'.

- 4- **Expressives**: "the illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content" (Ibid, p. 15). Examples of verbs belong to this class are: thank, congratulate, apologize, condole, deplore, and welcome. There is no direction of fit in this class because the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed. For example, when I apologize on having broken your glass, it is not my purpose either to claim that your glass was broken or to get it broken. This fact is expressed in the syntactical aspect (at least in English) of this class by the fact that the deep structure of this class will not take that clause but require a gerundive nominalization transformation (or some other nominals). For example, it is ungrammatical to say (57); instead, we should say (58). The deep structure of this class is: *I verb you + I/you VP gerundive nom.* Not all permissible nominalization transformations are gerundive. For example, we can say the sentence in (59).

- (57) I apologize that I broke your glass
- (58) I apologize for breaking your glass
- (59) I apologize for my bad behavior

The propositional content ascribes some property (not necessarily an action) to either the speaker or the hearer. I can congratulate you not only on your winning the race, but also on your good looks. The property expressed must be related to the speaker or the hearer.

- 5- **Declarations**: "in this class, the state of affairs represented in the proposition expressed is realized or brought into existence by the illocutionary force indicating device, cases where one brings a state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist, cases where, so to speak 'saying makes it so' (Ibid, p. 16). For example, 'I resign', 'I name' ...etc. A defining characteristic of this class is that successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world. If I successfully appointing you a chairman, then you are a chairman. In this class, the propositional content is the same as the illocutionary force. The illocutionary force indicating device serves to indicate the direction of fit between the propositional content and reality,

among other things. This class calls for extra-linguistic institutions for the performance of its acts. There are only two cases in which these extra-linguistic institutions are not required: 1- Supernatural declarations as when God says 'let there be a light', and 2- the declarations that concern the language itself, as when someone says 'I define, abbreviate, name, call or dub.' The direction of fit is both words to world and world to words and there is no sincerity condition. Some members of the class of declarations overlap with members of the class as assertive. This is because we need an authority to decide as to what the facts are after the fact-finding procedure has been gone through. This leads Searle to think of a 'sixth' class which he names '**Assertives declaration**'. He defines it as "the cases where some institutions require assertive claims to be issued with the force of declarations in order that the argument over the truth of the claim can come to an end somewhere and the next institutional steps which wait on the setting of the factual issue can proceed" (Ibid, p. 19), for example the prisoner is released or sent to jail. This class unlike declarations shares with assertives a sincerity condition. For example, the judge can logically speaking lie, but the man who declares war cannot lie in the performance of his illocutionary act.

- (60) I find you guilty
- (61) I declare war
- (62) You are fired

Concerning the syntactical aspects of declarations class, Searle notes that there are three types of deep structure in this class: 1- *I verb NPI + NPI be pred.* For example, the deep structure of (60) is 'I find you + you be guilty as charge'. 2- *I declare + S.* For example, the deep structure of (61) is 'I (hereby) declare + a state of war exist'. It is assumed by Searle that the second type is the purest form of declarations since "the speaker in authority brings about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content by saying in effect, I declare the state of affairs to exist" (Ibid, p. 26). 3- *I verb (NP).* Searle declares that this type is misleading because it has the same semantic structure as type 2. For example, if the sentence (62) is uttered as performance of the act of firing someone and not as a report, it has the following deep structure: I declare + your job is terminated. To get out from this ambiguity, Searle assumes that some verbs encapsulate in their performance both the declarative force and the propositional content.

Searle notes that, many of illocutionary verbs are not markers of illocutionary points but of some other features of the illocutionary act. For example, (63) and (64) are directives, while (65) and (66) are assertives.

- (63) I insist that we go to the movies.
- (64) I suggest that we go to the movies.
- (65) I insist that the answer is found on p. 16.
- (66) I suggest that the answer is found on p. 16.

Thus, are 'insist' and 'suggest' different illocutionary acts from assertives and directives? Or, are they both assertives and directives? Searle answers both questions with no. Both 'insist', and 'suggest' perform the same illocutionary point but mark the degree of intensity with which the illocutionary point is presented.

Concerning the classification of the illocutionary verbs, Searle suggest the following:

- a- ***Some verbs do not mark illocutionary point at all but some other feature.*** Some examples are: 'insist', 'suggest', 'announce', 'confide', 'reply', 'answer', 'interject', 'remark', 'ejaculate', and 'interpose'.
- b- ***Many verbs mark illocutionary point plus some other feature.*** For example, 'boast', 'lament', 'criticize', 'accuse', and 'warn'. All of these verbs add the feature of goodness or badness to their primary illocutionary point.
- c- ***Some few verbs mark more than one illocutionary point.*** For example, 'protest' involves both an expression of disapproval and a petition of change.
- d- ***Some few verbs can take more than one illocutionary point.*** For example, both 'warn' and 'advise' take either the directive syntax or the assertive syntax. Thus, (67) and (69) are directives, while (68) and (70) are assertive.

- (67) I warn you to stay away from my wife!
- (68) I warn you that the bull is about to charge.
- (69) I advise you to leave.
- (70) Passengers are hereby advised that the train will be late.

Finally, Searle claims that there are limited uses of language as opposed to what others have claimed as Wittgenstein. The only problem is that there is an enormous unclarity about what constitutes the criteria for delimiting one language game or use of language from another. For example, if we adopt, as Searle does, illocutionary point as the basic notion of classification, we find that there is a limited number of basic things we do with language.

Overall, it seems that Searle has built his classification on constructed principles namely illocutionary point, direction of fit and expressed sincerity conditions. By contrast, Austin tends to classify English illocutionary verbs and not acts; hence, there is no consistent principle or set of principles on which he constructs his taxonomy. Therefore, Searle's classification is favoured over Austin's classification; consequently I will adopt it as the only valid classification.

1.3.3 What is a speech act?

1.3.3.1 Introduction

When a speaker produces a meaningful utterance, he actually performs a speech act that is constituted of many acts. As we have mentioned earlier, these acts can be just one of the following acts: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Searle (1965, p. 254) states, in this sense, that any meaningful utterance occupies a space in the speech situation. It is produced by some physical movement by the speech organs from the part of the speaker who aims by this production to make the hearer feel boring, irritating, or being informed. In

addition, this utterance can be without sense if there is no reference to somebody, something or some idea. Searle assumes that “the illocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication” (Searle 1965, p. 254), thus it is the most important one which needs to be exhaustively studied. Likewise, Austin believes that the illocutionary act is very important in the study of speech acts. It seems, from Searle and Austin’s claims, that the illocutionary act is the core of any speech act.

1.3.3.2 The importance of the study of speech acts and arguments of their existence.

It is clear that no human being can indulge in a linguistic communication without performing speech acts because there is no linguistic communication out of speech acts. Speech acts are the pillars of any linguistic communication. Indeed, as Searle claims, “any instance of linguistic communication which is considered as a message is produced with certain intentions” (Searle 1965, p. 255). If it is considered so, it is then a speech act. Additionally, the construction of linguistic communication involves the construction of their production as speech acts.

Searle asserts that “to perform illocutionary acts is to engage in a rule-governed form of behavior” (ibid). This suggests that to perform a speech act is to engage in a systematic form of behaviour. This behavior is then governed by rules just like games.

1.3.3.3 Speech acts as constitutive rules

Some philosophers believe that it is enough to know the rules and the use of a word to know the meaning. Some others do not bother themselves to look for any rules, so they claim that there are no semantical rules of the expressions at all. Searle says that the latter philosophers refuse the existence of such rules to get rid of the burden of looking at them. Searle takes the side of the former philosophers. He even moves a step towards finding those rules. Therefore, according to him, there are two types of rules: regulative rules and constitutive rules.

Searle (1969) argues that there is a distinction between two types of rules.

“Some rules regulate antecedently existing forms of behaviour. For example, the rules of polite table behaviour regulate eating, but eating exists independently of these rules. Some rules, on the other hand, do not merely regulate an antecedently existing activity called playing chess; they, as it were, create the possibility of or define that activity. The activity of playing chess is constituted by action in accordance with these rules. The institutions of marriage, money, and promising are like the institutions of baseball and chess in that they are systems of such constitutive rules or conventions” (Searle 1969, p. 131).

Regulative rules, then, are the already existing rules that regulate some forms of behavior such as the rules of etiquette which regulate the relationships among people. The rules in this case are pre-existed and they are independent from the activity. These rules take

the form of imperatives such as sentence (71) as might happen in a Muslim family when they are eating if a member of the family eats with his left hand. They take the form ‘Do X’ or ‘if Y do X’. In the other hand, constitutive rules create and define new forms of behavior. The activity in this case is dependent on these rules which are part of the activity. Therefore, as Searle mentions the activity “has no existence apart from these rules” (Searle 1965, p. 255). The rules used in chess are an example of this type of rules. The forms these rules take is the indicative such as sentence (72), and imperative such as sentence (73) as might happen in football. They are tautological in that they take the form of ‘X counts as Y’, and they also have the form of the regulative rules ‘Do X’ or ‘If Y do X’, therefore, constitutive rules can be both constitutive and regulative.

- (71) Eat with your right hand!
- (72) A football player is out when he got a red car
- (73) Don’t touch the ball with your hand

By providing the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, Searle aims to argue that the rules (Searle names them conditions in that a condition may constitute a set of rules) govern speech acts are the constitutive rules. Let’s consider the example given by Searle which is giving an order. Among the conditions governing giving orders are the preparatory conditions. These conditions, in the case of orders, include that the speaker should be in a position of authority over the hearer. This is the same as in chess which is governed too by constitutive rules, among the conditions governing chess are the preparatory conditions which include, in the case of chess, that a player can move the knight, for example, only if it is his turn. Later on, in this section, I will provide the possible conditions that govern a speech act namely the act of sermonizing by Imam in a Friday sermon.

1.3.3.4 Propositions

Propositions are essential to be understood so as not to be confused with speech acts. Different illocutionary acts may have a shared proposition, for example (74) is a question, (75) is an assertion about the future prediction, (76) is a request or an order (it depends on intonation, (77) is an expression of wish, and (78) is a hypothetical expression of intention.

- (74) Will John leave the room?
- (75) John will leave the room.
- (76) John, leave the room!
- (77) Would that John left the room.
- (78) If John will leave the room, I will leave also.

(Searle 1956, p. 256)

These speech acts share the same proposition, that is, the same content. The proposition expressed is that *John will leave the room*. This can be proved by using sentences as ‘*the speaker asked whether John will leave the room*’, ‘*the speaker asserted that John leave the room*’, ‘*the speaker ordered John to leave the room*’, ‘*the speaker wished John had left the room*’, and finally ‘*the speaker intended to leave the room if John would have left the room*’.

Searle states that there is a difference between an illocutionary act and a proposition, for example, the proposition that '*John leaves the room*' is expressed in all sentences, while illocutionary act 'expression of wish' is expressed only in sentence (77). Moreover, not all illocutionary acts have proposition, for example an utterance of 'Ouch!' does not. Finally, a proposition is not an act at all; it is only a part of performing certain illocutionary acts.

From a semantical point of view, Searle (1965, p. 257) declares that a sentence has two parts which are not necessarily separated. The first one is the proposition-indicating element and the second one is the function-indicating device. The function-indicating device shows the illocutionary force the utterance is to have, and this could be shown in English, for example, by word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and the set of perormative verbs. In addition to these indicators, the context plays an important role in defining the illocutionary force. A speaker may indicate the illocutionary force simply by using the performative verb performatively such as the utterance (55) 'I order you to come,' or he may depend on the context to indicate it using the inferential strategies suggested by Grice (1968). Concerning the proposition-indicating elements, they can be expressed using prediction and reference.

1.3.3.5 Meaning

The question raised is what does it mean that a speech act has a meaning? Searle states that "speech acts are characteristically performed in the utterance of sounds or the making of marks" (Searle 1965, p. 257). This suggests that sounds and marks have meaning when they are made in the performance of a speech act, and that the use of those sounds and marks are used by the speaker to mean something. Grice (1957) tries to answer the question by asserting that "A meant something by x" is (roughly) equivalent to 'A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention'" (Grice 1957, p. 385). Grice, then, made a close relationship between meaning and intention. Therefore, using language to communicate things equals getting the hearer to know the intention of the speaker to communicate just those things. However, Searle argues that "meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also a matter of convention" (Searle 1965, p. 259). Therefore, he states that "in the performance of an illocutionary act the speaker intends to produce a certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect, and furthermore, if he is using words literally, he intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the expressions he utters associate the expressions with the production of that effect" (Ibid, p. 259). Thus, in addition to the necessity of intention to get the meaning of an illocutionary act on the part of the hearer, there is also a necessity of convention. However, the hearer will not recognize the intention of the speaker if they do not share the same code of communication, and also if they do not share the way the code used and in what situation.

1.3.3.6 How to Sermonize

Before dealing with the act of sermonizing, we need first to provide a lexical meaning of some important items namely a sermon, to sermonize, to preach, and to deliver. According

to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (OALD) (1995, p. 1073), a 'sermon' is "a talk on a moral or religious subject, usually given by a priest during a religious service." The same source cites another sense of the word 'sermon', when the word is used informally to express disapproval on the part of S1 regarding S2's speech/talk: when used, the noun 'sermon' denotes "a long talk about moral matters or about somebody's faults, etc." It seems that it is this sense of 'sermon' which is conveyed through the use of the verb to 'sermonize', which also involves the sense of 'disapproval', meaning that the verb has negative connotations. Thus, for the OALD, to 'sermonize' means "to give moral advice, especially when it is boring or not wanted" (OALD 1995, p. 1073). The sense in which the term to 'sermonize' is used in this research paper is constructed on the basis of two terms – 'to preach' and 'to deliver' – using the meanings given to them by OALD (1995). According to OALD (1995, p. 906), to 'preach' to somebody about/against/on something is "to make a religious speech, especially in church; to give a sermon" (in the sense given to the term 'sermon' by OALD). To 'preach' also means "to make a religion or belief known by talking about it publicly." Another definition given by the same dictionary to the term to 'preach' is "to try to persuade people to accept, follow or support a belief, a method, etc." Another term which has approximately the same meaning as the term to 'preach' is the term to 'deliver' which has the sense "to give a lecture, a speech or any other formal spoken statement" (OALD 1995, p. 308). In this thesis, I will adopt the following definition to the verb 'to sermonize' based on the definitions given to the verb 'to preach' and to the verb 'to deliver': to 'sermonize' is to make a religious speech known, especially in a church or a mosque aiming to make people to do something, to accept, support or follow a belief, a method, etc.

Following Searle's example of the act of promising used to show the way rules govern speech acts, let us try to see how the act of sermonizing is performed using the rules governing the performance of speech acts. So, what are the necessary conditions under which one can be said to have successfully performed the act of sermonizing? Let us assume the existence of grammatically well-formed sentences. Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H, then, in the utterance of T, S sincerely (and non-defectively) sermonizes that P to get the H to do what the speaker actually says if and only if:

- 1- Normal input and output conditions obtain.

This means that in the case of sermonizing, the Imam and his audience know how to speak the language; both are conscious of what they are doing; the speaker is not acting under duress or threats; they have no impediments to communicate; they are in the mosque at noon. Both of them are abluted, Muslims...etc.

- 2- S expresses that P in the utterance of T.
- 3- In expressing that P, S predicates a future act A of H.

2 and 3 are propositional conditions.

- 4- The Imam must be the one qualified to deliver the sermon.

This means that he should be literate, have a certain level of education, and know some verses in Quran ... etc.

- 5- Both the speaker and the hearer are in the mosque.

- 6- The speaker assumes that the hearer wants him to perform the act, and the hearer actually wants him to perform it.
- 7- It is obvious to both the speaker and the hearer that the hearer and the speaker will perform the action.
4, 5, 6, and 7 are the preparatory conditions of sermonizing.
- 8- The hearer wants the speaker to deliver the sermon.
This condition is the sincerity condition.
- 9- The utterance of sermonizing is an attempt by speaker to get the hearer convinced and do the things he has been asked by the speaker.
This condition is the essential condition.
- 10- The speaker intends that the utterance U will produce in H a belief that conditions 8 and 9 obtain by means of the recognition of the intention to produce that belief, and he intends this recognition to be achieved by means of the recognition of the sentence T as one conventionally used to produce such beliefs.

To conclude, speech acts in general are governed by constitutive rules. These rules are hard to define because speech acts depend on many elements. The most important element that is used to define speech acts is the context, which is not stable and can change any time.

1.3.4 Indirect Speech Acts

1.3.4.1 Introduction

It seems that Searle (1975) discussed the notion of ‘indirect speech act’ on the basis of Austin’s distinction between ‘explicit performatives’ and ‘implicit performatives’. Austin (1962) claims that utterances in which the speaker makes explicit what act he or she is performing are called ‘explicit performatives’. It is explicit in the sense that it can be used with the explicit performative formula *I (hereby) V (where V is a performative verb used performatively, as in this example: I hereby promise to lend you 1000 dhs)*. While, ‘implicit performatives’ are the performative utterances that do not include the performative formula, and their illocutionary force is thus unclear and it must be worked out depending on the context of the utterance.

Searle (1957) claims that “the simplest cases of meaning are those in which the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly and literally what he says” (Searle 1975, p. 265). In these cases the speaker aims to get the hearer to recognize his intention to produce a certain illocutionary effect in him on the basis of the hearer’s knowledge of the rules that govern the utterance of the sentence. However, not all sentences belong to the simplest cases of meaning in which the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly and literally what he says. A large part of sentences belong to the cases in which the speaker does not mean exactly and literally what he says, but the speaker’s utterance meaning and the sentence meaning come apart in various ways. Examples of these cases are metaphor, irony, and insinuations... etc. In some cases of this type, the speaker means exactly and literally what he says, and means something more, for example, uttering (79) by way of requesting the hearer to go. In this case, the utterance is a statement, but it is also a request made by way of making a statement. “In such cases a sentence that contains the illocutionary force indicators for one kind of illocutionary

act can be uttered to perform, in addition, another type of illocutionary act” (Searle 1975, p. 265).

(79) I want you to go

(80) Can you clean the board?

There are also cases in which the speaker utters a sentence by which he means not only what he says, but he means another illocution with a different propositional content, for example, utterance (80) is not meant only as a question, but it is primarily meant as a request to clean the board. Therefore, we should distinguish between the first class of cases in which the utterance has one illocutionary force which is expressed literally and explicitly in the utterance, and the second class of cases in which the utterance has two illocutionary forces. The first class is called the direct speech acts (it has already been discussed in the previous section), and the second class is called the indirect speech acts and it is the concern of this section.

1.3.4.2 What is an Indirect Speech Act?

According to Searle (1975) “cases in which one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another” are called indirect speech acts (Searle 1975, p. 266). Similarly, Clark states that “indirect speech acts have both a literal meaning and an indirect meaning” (Clark 1979, p. 199). Thus, in the case of indirect speech act, an illocutionary act is performed using the literal meaning, and another illocutionary act is performed indirectly depending on the illocutionary act that is performed using the literal meaning. The question now is how is it possible for the speaker to say something and mean it, and also mean something else? And how is it possible for the hearer to infer the indirect meaning in addition to the literal meaning?

Searle claims that, firstly, meaning contains in part in the intention to produce understanding in the hearer, and secondly it seems that some indirect acts are conventionally used, for example we usually make requests by a utterance like (80). Concerning these cases, Searle (1969: Chapter 3), suggests that “the fact that the sentences in question concern conditions of the felicitous performance of the speech acts are used to perform indirectly – preparatory conditions, propositional content conditions, and sincerity conditions- and their use to perform indirect speech acts consists in indicating the satisfaction of an essential condition by means of asserting or questioning one of the other conditions”. We can understand from this that the essential condition is the one concerned with the indirect speech act and that the other conditions are ways of questioning the essential condition. In general, Searle (1975) says that indirect speech acts works as follows: “in indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relaying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer” (Searle 1975, p. 266). Therefore, the indirect speech act includes, as Searle suggests, a theory of speech acts, principles of cooperative conversation, mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer, and finally the ability of the hearer to make inference.

1.3.4.3 Searle's Steps to derive the primary illocution from the literal illocution

Searle explains the systematic way by which a speaker and a hearer derive the meaning of an indirect speech act in terms of steps. Let us see these steps.

- (81) Friend X: Can you lend me your bike?
- (82) Friend Y: It's broken.

The utterance of (81) contains a request in the form of a question. The literal meaning of this utterance (81) is whether you are able to lend me your bike. However, by questioning the ability of the hearer to do something is conventionally used in the performance of indirect speech acts as Searle (1975, p. 268) claims. The utterance (81) is, thus, used to make a request based on convention. The utterance (82) is a rejection of the request, not in virtue of its meaning but in virtue of something else which helps us to infer the primary illocutionary force. In virtue of its meaning, it is merely a statement about Y. In this case, normally statements of this form do not constitute rejection of proposals. Thus, how can X infer that the utterance is a rejection of the request? And how is it for Y to mean or intend the utterance (82) as a rejection of the proposal?

The primary illocutionary act performed in Y's utterance is the refusal of the request made by X, and that Y does that by way of making a statement which is '*the bike is broken*'. Furthermore, he performs a secondary illocutionary act by way of uttering a sentence whose literal meaning constitutes a performance of that illocutionary act. In short, the secondary illocutionary act is literal, while the primary illocutionary act is non-literal. Searle suggests the following steps to derive the primary illocution from the literal illocution:

Step 1: I have made a request to Y and in response he has made a statement to the effect that his bike is broken. (facts about the conversation)

Step 2: I assume that Y is cooperating in the conversation and that therefore his remark is intended to be relevant. (Principles of conversational cooperation)

Step 3: A relevant response must be one of acceptance, rejection, further discussion, etc. (theory of speech acts)

Step 4: But his literal utterance was not one of these, and so was not a relevant response (inference from step 1 and 3)

Step 5: Therefore, he probably means more than he says. Assuming that his remark is relevant, his primary illocutionary point must differ from his literal one. (Inference from step 2 and 4)

Step 6: I know that I cannot use a broken bike because it will not take me to the place I want to go to. (Factual background information)

Step 7: Therefore, the bike will not be used. (Inference from 6)

Step 8: A preparatory condition on the acceptance of request, or any directive, is the ability to perform the act predicated in the propositional content condition. (Theory of speech acts)

Step 9: Therefore, I know that he has said something that has the consequence that he probably cannot consistently accept the request. (Inference from step 1, 2, and 8)

Step 10: Therefore, his primary illocutionary point is probably to reject the request. (Inference from steps 5 and 9)

The conclusion from these steps is probabilistic. It should be because the reply does not necessarily constitute a rejection of the request. In addition, the inferential strategy should establish that the primary illocutionary force departs from the literal, and what it is.

Searle claims that the area of directives is the most fruitful to study in the field of indirect speech acts because it is awkward to issue flat imperatives (e.g *go out!*) or explicit performatives (e.g *I order you to go*) due to the politeness principle. Searle states that “In directives, politeness is the chief motivation for indirectness” (Searle 1975, p. 268).

1.3.4.3.1 An explanation in terms of the theory of speech acts

The theory of speech acts provides an explanation of how sentences which have one illocutionary force as part of their meaning can be used to perform an act with a different illocutionary force. In this theory, as Searle states, “each type of illocutionary act has a set of conditions that are necessary for the successful and felicitous performance of the act” (Searle 1957, p. 271). These conditions are the propositional conditions, the preparatory conditions, the essential conditions and the sincerity conditions. Let’s see an example of how indirect speech acts are explained in terms of the theory of speech acts:

(83) X: Would you clean the board?

(84) Y: I’m tired.

Step 1: Y has asked me a question as to whether I want to clean the board (fact about the conversation)

Step 2: I assume that he is cooperating in the conversation and that therefore his utterance has some aim or point (principles of conversational cooperation).

Step 3: The conversational setting is not such as to indicate a theoretical interest or wish to clean the board (factual background information).

Step 4: Furthermore, he probably already knows that the answer to the question is yes (factual background information). (This step facilitates the move to step 5, but is not essential)

Step 5: Therefore, his utterance is probably not just a question. It probably has some ulterior illocutionary point (inference from steps 1, 2, 3, and 4).

Step 6: A preparatory condition for the directive illocutionary in this utterance is the ability of H to perform the act predicated in the propositional content condition (theory of speech acts).

Step 7: Therefore, X has asked me a question the affirmative answer to which would entail that the preparatory condition for requesting me to clean the board is satisfied (inference from step 1 and 6).

Step 8: We are now in the class, and the board is full of writing and the teacher wants to write other sentences to which there is no space in the board, and the teacher normally asks students to clean the board, etc (background information).

Step 9: He has therefore alluded to the satisfaction of a preparatory condition for a request whose obedience conditions, it is quite likely he wants me to bring about (inference from steps 7 and 8).

Step 10: Therefore, in the absence of any other plausible illocutionary point, he is probably requesting me to clean the board (inference from steps 5 and 9).

To summarize, Searle (1975, p. 273) claims that there are two things that are crucial in explaining the indirect speech acts. The first thing is that we need a strategy for recognizing the existence of a primary illocutionary point beyond the secondary illocutionary point contained in the literal meaning of the sentence. To recognize this we have to depend on the principles of conversation operating on the information of the hearer and the speaker. The second thing is that we need a device to find out what the primary illocutionary point is. This can be derived using the theory of speech act together with background information. In the coming section, we will see how Clark explains the way indirect speech acts work.

1.3.4.4 Clark's view of indirect speech acts (1979)

Clark (1979, p. 199) says that "indirect speech acts can be intended to be taken seriously (along with the indirect meaning) or merely pro-forma". That is to say, in the first case, the speaker intends both the literal meaning and the indirect meaning of the sentence, for example as Clark illustrates, in uttering (85) in the right circumstances, I may mean both 'I assert to you that we will miss the train' and 'I ask you to hurry up'. In the second case, the speaker intends only the indirect meaning since the literal meaning of the sentence has no role but to be only used as a tool to convey the indirect meaning. In this case, the sentence is conventionally used to convey the indirect meaning, for example, the sentence (86) means literally whether you have the ability to shut the door; however, it is not what is intended by the speaker. What is intended by the speaker in this sentence (86) is a request to the hearer to shut the door. The hearer systematically shuts the door or he refuses to do so. But in any case, he will not provide a response to whether he can or cannot shut the door. Clark (1979, p. 199) claims that there are six sources used by the hearer to judge whether the literal meaning was intended seriously or pro-forma, in addition, if there was intended to be any indirect meaning. In the following lines, I will present the six properties of indirect speech acts as suggested by Clark.

(85) We will miss the train

(86) Can you shut the door, please?

1.3.4.4.1 The properties of indirect speech acts

As Clark (1979) claims, there are six properties of indirect speech acts:

1- Multiplicity of meanings

In direct speech acts there is only one meaning, or illocutionary force intended, for example, the sentence (87) means 'I assert you that it is cloudy'. However, indirect speech acts, as Searle (1975) claims, have more than one meaning or illocutionary force. For example, in uttering (85) in the right circumstances, I mean both 'I assert to you that we will miss the train' and 'I ask you to hurry up' (The first meaning is henceforth M1 and the second meaning is henceforth M2). Clark (1979) claims that "M1 and M2 are not meanings of the sentence 'we will miss the train'. Rather, they are the two parts of what I mean in uttering the sentence in this occasion" (Clark 1979, p. 200). M1 and M2 are the speaker's meanings in Grice and Schiffrin's terminology.

(87) It's cloudy

2- Logical property of meanings

Meanings in indirect speech acts are not conveyed in parallel. M1 is "logically prior" to M2 or M2 is "logically contingent" on M1. M1 and M2 constitute a chain of meaning in which M1 is the initial meaning and M2 is the final meaning. For example, in uttering (88), the speaker requests the hearer to bring him or pass him some sugar by virtue of his assertion to him that tea needs some sugar. What we have said about the logical priority of M1 to M2 does not mean that M1 is temporally prior to M2 in any psychological state. It is possible to have more than two meanings in a chain and even more than one chain. There are chains which are long, for example, by uttering, as Clark illustrates, (89), S can use his literal question, M1, to assert that H has forgotten to clean his room, M2; he can use M2 to convey another assertion, M3, that he wants H to clean his room now; and he can use M1, to request H to clean his room now, M4.

(88) Tea needs some sugar

(89) Haven't you forgotten to clean your room?

3- Rationality

The logical meanings of an indirect speech act have a rational basis. Both the speaker and the hearer share mutual background facts. Furthermore, the speaker observes principles of cooperative conversation (utterance must be relevant). He must adhere to certain conventions about the use of sentences in performing direct speech acts. For example, for a speaker S to utter (88) and he intends both M1 and M2, he must assume that a hearer H shares a mutual background facts. They may share, for example, that they are at breakfast, that he has just tasted tea, that there is some sugar near him, and other such facts. He must also consider the principles of cooperative conversation (his utterance must be relevant). Finally, he should abide by the conventional use of sentences in performing direct speech acts.

4- Conventionality

There are conventions about which sentences can be used for indirect speech acts, for example ‘Can you...?’, ‘Would you...?’ are two forms among others which are used to make requests. These forms are idiomatic. This type of convention is called convention of forms. There is a possibility of inserting the word please at some points in the highly idiomatic indirect request, but only some or no point in the less idiomatic ones. The other type of convention is called convention of means. This type determines a semantic device by which indirect speech act can be performed. For example, it is a matter of convention in English that I can indirectly request a hearer to do a particular act by questioning his ability to do the act. In short, Searle (1975, p. 274) identifies a conversational maxim that says: speak idiomatically unless there is some special reason not to.

5- Politeness

The chief motivation, as Searle (1975, p. 268) declares, for using indirect forms is politeness. This is done through giving options to the hearer so as not to threaten his face by using a direct speech act, for example, it is more polite to use the form in (90) than to use the form in (91). In the first form, the speaker gives the hearer an option to provide various responses in favour for either acceptance or refusal such as ‘Sorry, I can’t’, ‘I don’t have that much right now’, ‘Ok, here you are’...etc. While in the second form, there is no choice given to the hearer and it seems that speaker is enforcing the hearer to lend him that amount of money by using that direct form.

(90) Can you lend me \$ 100?

(91) Lend me \$ 100.

6- Purposefulness

Speech acts have certain purposes. They are intended to achieve certain goals such as to get the addressee to do something (as with requests). To achieve these purposes, Grice (1957, 1968) and Schiffer (1972), list this procedure of the way the speaker produces effects on the hearer:

- a- The speaker has goals he wants to achieve.
- b- He formulates plans for achieving these goals.
- c- He selects his speech acts as parts of these plans.
- d- The listener is intended to infer these speech acts in part by recognizing these goals, these plans, and the roles the speech acts play within plans.

1.4 Grice’s Theory of Implicature (1975)

1.4.1 Introduction

There has been a debate between two groups about the existence of divergences between the logical meaning and the natural meaning. The first group- the formalists- claims that “the formal devices possess a decisive advantage over their natural counterparts” (Grice

1975, p. 305). These formal devices can be used to construct a system of general formulas which are acceptable if the devices have the meaning that has assigned to them. However, the meaning which corresponds to devices used in the natural languages, and which they do not share with the corresponding formal devices, is considered an imperfection of natural languages. This is because they cannot be precisely or clearly defined; therefore, the “statement involving them cannot, in some circumstances, be assigned a definite truth value” (Ibid, p. 306). Thus, this indefiniteness is objectionable and opens the door to metaphysics. Accordingly, the expressions used in natural speech are unacceptable and unintelligible. The informalists, on the other hand, refuse these ideas and claim that the use of inference in science is not the only metric for assessing natural language constructions, and that while formal languages are suitable for science, natural language inferences functions perfectly well for some non-scientific uses. Grice takes a neutral position between these two groups. He states “I have, moreover, no intention of entering the fray on behalf of either contestants” (Ibid, p. 306). He claims that “the common assumption of the contestants that divergences do in fact exist is (broadly speaking) a common mistake, and that the mistake arises from inadequate attention to the nature and importance of the conditions governing conversation” (ibid). He, thus, challenges the assumption in the debate that there actually exist divergences between formal languages and natural languages. Grice, therefore, attempts to investigate the possibility of developing a formal account of some natural language inferences that are not treated by classical logic.

1.4.2 What is ‘Implicature’?

The most important thing in implicature is to identify the intended meaning of the speaker. Grice (1975, p. 307) claims that to perceive what the speaker has said we should identify: a) the identity of the speaker; b) the time of the utterance; and c) the meaning on the particular occasion of utterance. To explain the phenomenon of implicature Grice provides the following example:

(92) *Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on his job, and B replies, oh quite well, I think, he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet” (Grice 1975, p. 306).*

In this example (92), as Grice illustrates, A might question what B meant, what he was proposing, what he was about to let him know by saying that C had not yet been to prison. The answer is possibly that C is easily tempted by the opportunity of having money in his occupation, that his colleagues are treacherous, etc. It might be that A does not need to ask B any questions about his answer since it is clear from the context. It is also clear that what B says differs from what he implies.

There are two types of implicatures: a) Conventional implicatures are those which have a stable association of meaning with particular linguistic expressions. This conventional meaning determines what is implicated; in addition, it helps to determine what is said. For example in sentence (93), provided by (Cruse 2006, p. 87), the element of surprise is associated with *yet*, the speaker does not actually say he or she is surprised.

(93) Haven't you finished yet?

B) Conversational implicatures are non-conventional and they must be inferred using the contextual information. An example is the implied negative in B's reply in (94):

(94) A: Can I see James?

B: He is in the greengrocer's. Would you come back later on?

Grice (1975, p. 307) claims that conversational implicatures are connected with the following features of discourse:

- 1- Conversational implicatures do not consist of a set of disconnected remarks. If they do so, they would not be rational.
- 2- Conversational implicatures have a common purpose, or set of purposes which participants recognize, or they have at least a mutually accepted direction.
- 3- These purposes, set of purposes, or directions are either fixed at the beginning or evolved in the course of conversation.
- 4- At each stage, the appropriateness of moves is limited by the purpose or direction.

1.4.3 The Cooperative Principle

Grice defines the cooperative principle as follows: "Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage in which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice 1975, p. 307). Under this principle, we can generate the following maxims with their sub-maxims:

- 1- **Quantity:** relates to the quantity of information to be provided
 - a- Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)
 - b- Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

An example of this maxim as provided by Grice (1975, p. 309) is that "if you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required. If, for example, at a particular stage I need four screws, I expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six." If you provide more or less information than is required, I may think that you are not doing that aimlessly, but to evoke some particular point. These side issues which are raised because of over or less informativeness is what leads Grice (Ibid, p. 308) to claim that this maxim is disputable. However, these side effects are secured by the maxim of relevance.

- 2- **Quality:** 'Try to make your contribution one that is true.'
 - a- Do not say what you believe to be false.
 - b- Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

To explain this maxim, Grice (1975, p. 309) provides the following example: "I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious. If I need sugar as an ingredient in

the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt; is I need a spon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”

- 3- **Relation:** ‘Be relevant’: Make your conversational contribution one that is relevant to the purpose and direction of the conversation.

To explain this maxim Grice (1975, p. 309) provides the following example: “If I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good book, or an oven cloth.”

- 4- **Manner:** “Be perspicuous”: this maxim is related to how something is said in conversation.
- a- Avoid obscurity of expression
 - b- Avoid ambiguity
 - c- Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
 - d- Be orderly

This maxim can be illustrated using the example in (95):

- (95) A: What did John do when he heard that his father’s car has arrived?
B: He jumped and ran to the car.

B’s answer does not seem to violate the manner maxim or any other maxim. If B’s answer is the following ‘*He run to the car and jumped*’, one finds it bewildering because the maxim of manner is violated. It is violated since the answer is not in order.

Grice (1975, p. 309) says that Cooperative transactions have distinctive features:

- 1- The participants have some common immediate aim. In a talk exchange, everyone should identify himself with the transitory conversational interests of others.
- 2- The contributions of the participants should be dovetailed, mutually dependent.
- 3- There is a sort of understanding that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate.

Participants in the talk exchange obey a rational principle which is the cooperative principle. This claim is supported by two arguments. The first one is that when participants engage in a conversation, they seem to make a contract. However, this contract cannot cover some cases such as quarreling and letter writing. The second one is that participants in conversation have goals, thus, they have a reason to follow the CP which facilitates reaching those goals (Grice 1975, p. 309).

1.4.4 The Connection between the CP, Maxims, and Conversational Implication

Grice (1975, p. 310) claims that “a participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim in various ways.” The ways in which a participant may fail to fulfill a maxim are of four types:

- 1- **Violate:** “He may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim” (Grice 1975, p. 310). As an example to explain how a participant may violate a maxim, Grice provides the following example:

(96) **A:** *I am out of petrol.*
 B: *There is a garage round the corner.*

B would be infringing the maxim ‘Be relevant’ unless he thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and has petrol to sell; so he implicates that the garage is, or at least may be open, etc.

(Ibid, p. 311)

- 2- **Opt out:** A participant may opt out of obeying the CP and the maxims all together by explicitly refusing to follow the cooperative principle, for example *I cannot say more, my lips are sealed.* (Ibid, p. 310)
- 3- **Clash:** A participant may be unable to fulfill a maxim without violating another (Ibid). For example:

(97) **A:** *Where does C live?*
 B: *Somewhere in the south of France.*

There is no reason to suppose that B is opting out; his answer is, as he well knows, less informative than is required to meet A’s needs. This infringement of the first maxim of Quantity can be explained only by the supposition that B is aware that to be more informative would be to say something that infringe the second maxim of quality. ‘Don’t say what you lack adequate evidenc for’, so B implicates that he does not know in which town C lives.

(Ibid, p. 311)

- 4- **Flout:** Grice (1975, p. 310) says that a participant “may flout a maxim; that is, he may balatantly fail to fulfill it. For example, one might flout the maxim of quality –avoid falsehood- as in the example (98) in which B implicates that *Madrid is not in Portugal* by means of providing false information.

(98) **A:** *Madrid is in Portugal. Isn’t it?*

B: *Uh huh, and Casablanca is in Libya.*

The flouting of maxims seems to be deliberate and apparent, on the part of the speaker, in order to persuade the listener to infer the hidden meaning behind the utterance. This situation “gives rise to a conversational implicature and when a conversational implicature is generated in this way, I shall say that the maxim is being exploited” (Grice 1975, p. 310). The violation of maxims is meant to convey some hidden meaning which is not the literal meaning of the utterance.

In general, a speaker is conversationally implicates P if and only if S implicates P when:

- 1- **Cooperation**: the speaker is presumed to be observing the Cooperative Principle.
- 2- **Determinacy**: the supposition that S believes that P is required to make his utterance consistent with the Cooperative Principle.
- 3- **Mutual knowledge**: the speaker believes (or thinks), and expects the hearer to think that the speaker thinks that the hearer is able to work out that the supposition mentioned in (2) is true and required.

1.4.5 How to Work out Conversational Implicatures?

The CIs can be grasped intuitively, even that, they must be worked out. For the hearer to work out the CI, he/she will generally rely on the following:

- a- The conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that maybe involved.
- b- The CP and its maxims.
- c- The context, linguistic or otherwise of utterance.
- d- Other items of background knowledge.
- e- The fact or supposed fact that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case.

Grice (1975) says that the general pattern to work out CI is that the speaker “has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP; he could not be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q” (Grice 1975, p. 310).

1.4.6 Conclusion

To conclude, conversational implicature must possess certain features. To begin with, the presence of CI necessitates that the CP is observed. Secondly, it is characterized by non-detachability, that is to say, as Grice (1975, p. 315) states “it will not be possible to find another way of saying the same thing.” Thirdly, “conversational implicature are not part of the meaning of the expressions to the employment of which they attach” (Ibid). Fourthly, the implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by putting it that way. Finally, if the list of specific explanations is open, the implicature will have just the kind of indeterminacy that many actual implicatures do in fact seem to possess.

1.5 Politeness Theory

1.5.1 Introduction

Both Searle (1975) and Grice (1975) mention that ‘politeness’ is an important element that play a crucial role in linguistic interactions. Searle (1975, p. 268) claims that “politeness is the chief motivation for indirectness.” Grice (1975) says that in addition to the four maxims

–quantity, quality, relation and manner, there are other maxims “such as ‘Be polite’, that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchange, and these may also generate nonconventional implicatures” (Grice 1975, p. 308). Therefore, ‘politeness’ is the main reason behind indirectness in linguistic interactions, and it generates, among other maxims, conversational implicatures. It seems that Brown and Levinson (henceforth B&L) got inspired by what Searle and Grice have said about politeness and they constructed a theory. This theory is called ‘politeness theory’.

B&L’s theory of linguistic politeness has had a privilege in pragmatics for many years. It consists of two main parts: 1- a theory about the nature of politeness and how it functions in interaction, and 2- a list of politeness strategies based on examples from three languages, namely English, Tzeltal and Tamil. The main premise in this theory as formed by Cutrone (2011) “is that politeness in any culture can be explained in terms of a limited number of universal phenomena, namely the construct of face and certain variables –i.e, differences in power (P), social distance (D) and the relative imposition of particular acts (R) (Cutrone 2011, p. 51). In this section, I will deal with the following: politeness, positive and negative face, face threatening acts (henceforth FTAs), politeness strategies, and finally choice of strategies.

1.5.2 Politeness and Face

Politeness is defined by Mills (2003) as “the expression of the speaker’s intention to mitigate face threats carried by certain face threatening acts toward another” (Mills 2003, p. 6). More specifically, Cruse (2006) defines it as “a matter of minimizing the negative effects of what one says on the feelings of others and maximizing the positive effects (known as negative face and positive face)” (Cruse 2006, p. 131). Therefore, politeness is an attempt by agents to save their face and to save each other’s face in interaction. The way they manage to do that is what coming next.

1.5.3 Positive Face versus Negative Face

Face is defined by B & L as “the public self image that every member wants to claim for himself” (B&L 1987, p. 66). Similarly, Goffman defines it as “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact...an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes” (Goffman 1955/1967 mentioned in Watts 2003: 124). It is characterized by the fact that it is owned by all competent adult members of society. It consists of two aspects as B&L claim. The first aspect is negative face and it is defined as “the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction –i.e to freedom of action and freedom from imposition” (B&L 1987, p. 66). B&L also define it as “the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his actions be unimpeded by others” (Ibid, p 67). The second aspect is positive face, and it is defined as “the positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the desire that this self image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants” (Ibid, p. 66). B&L also define it as “the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others” (Ibid, p. 67). What can be understood from these definitions is that negative face is the liberty to act that anyone, who is considered a competent adult member of society, has. It is the right of freedom of thought and actions that every human being has. While, positive face

is the self-esteem that every human being has. It is the need to be valued, respected and appreciated in social group. In short, any social interaction cannot succeed in the absence of these two aspects (positive and negative face); therefore, when agents are interacting, they need to maintain each other's face via cooperation.

1.5.4 Face Threatening Acts (FTAs)

Positive face and negative face exist across-culturally. There are acts that threaten positive face and acts that threaten negative face. These acts inherently damage the face of the addressee or the speaker by acting in opposition to the wants and desires of the other. These acts occur in social interaction which intrinsically threaten the face of the speaker (S) or the hearer (R), such as when makes an order, gives advice, apologies ...etc. Most of these acts are verbal or use the characteristics of speech such as prosody using intonation, stress ... etc. Some of these acts can also be in non-verbal forms of communication such as kinesics. It is impossible to find an utterance without a threatening act associated with it. By contrast, it is possible to find a single utterance that is associated with multiple face threatening acts.

B&L (1987, p. 81) claim that the assessment of the seriousness of an FTA involves the following factors in many and perhaps all cultures:

- 1- The 'social distance' (D) of S and H (a symmetric relation).
- 2- The 'relative power' (P) of S and H (an asymmetric relation).
- 3- The absolute ranking (R) of impositions in the particular culture.

The weightiness of an FTA is calculated thus:

$$W_x = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + R_x$$

Where:

- x is the face threatening act,
- W_x measures the weightiness of the FTA_x ,
- $D(S,H)$ measures the social distance between S and H,
- $P(H,S)$ measures the power that H has over S, and
- R_x measures the degree to which the FTA_x is rated an imposition in the culture.

Accordingly, strategies used by speakers and hearers to save face are chosen according to the gravity of the FTA.

As B&L (1987, p. 85) state, P, D, and R are not the only relevant factors used by actors to assess the danger of FTAs, but there are other factors that have principled effect on such assessment such as status, authority, occupation, ethnicity, identity, friendship, situational factors ... etc. These factors are subsumed under these three main factors, namely P, D and R.

1.5.4.1 Negative Face Threatening Acts

According to B&L (1987, p. 134), negative face is threatened when an interactant does not avoid or intend to avoid obstructing his/her interlocutor's freedom of action. This can hurt either the speaker or the hearer in a way that one of the interactants will submit his/her will to

the other. Consequently, we say that a negative face is threatened when freedom of choice and action are impeded. Negative face is threatened in various ways:

a- Damage to the hearer's negative face

FTAs that can cause damage to the hearer's negative face are of at least three types:

- 1- Acts which put pressure on H to do or not to do an act. For example, orders, requests, suggestions, advice, reminders, threats, warnings, or dares.
- 2- Acts that predicate the speaker to do positive acts toward H, and in so doing put some pressure on H to accept or reject them and possibly to incur indebtedness. For example, offers and promises.
- 3- Acts that express S's desire toward H or H's goods, giving H reason to think that he may have to take action to protect the object of S's desire, or give it to S. For example, compliments, envy, admiration, expressions of strong (negative) emotion towards H (e.g. hatred, anger, lust).

b- Damage to the speaker's negative face

- 1- Acts that exhibit the submission of the speaker to the power of the hearer. For example, expressing thanks, accepting a thank you or apology, excuse, or acceptance of offers.

1.5.4.2 Positive Face Threatening Acts

There are acts that threaten the positive face want by indicating that the speaker does not care about the addressee's feelings, wants ... etc. The speaker in some respect does not want H's want, therefore, positive face is threatened. Positive face threatening acts can hurt both the hearer's face and the speaker's face:

a- Damage to the hearer's positive face

FTAs that are threatening to H are:

- 1- Acts that show that S has negative evaluation of the hearer's desire face or part of his/her positive face. For example, expressions of disapproval, criticism, disagreement, contradictions or challenges. The speaker damages the hearer's positive face in two ways. The first way is to indicate directly or indirectly that he does not like some aspects of the hearer's desires, personal attributes, or possessions. The second way is to imply that the hearer is unreasonable, wrong, or misguided as a way of expressing disapproval.
- 2- Acts that show that S does not care about (or indifferent to) H's positive face. For example, expressions of violent emotions, mention of taboo topics ... etc.
- 3- Acts that threaten both negative and positive face. For example, complaints, interruption, threats, requests for personal information.

b- Damage to the speaker's positive face

FTAs that are threatening to S include:

- 1- Acts that offend S's positive face. For example, expressing thanks, acceptance of H's thanks or H's apology, excuses.
- 2- Acts that directly damage S's positive face. For example, apologies, acceptance of compliment.

- 3- Acts that show that the speaker is in some sense wrong, and unable to control himself. For example, confessions, inability to control one's physical and emotional self, self humiliations.

1.5.5 Politeness Strategies

In any interaction, participants will avoid FTAs, or will use strategies to minimize the threat. The role of these strategies is to mould messages in a way that enable the speaker to save the hearer's face when FTA cannot be avoided or not desired. B&L argue that the speaker "will take into consideration the relative weightings of (at least) three wants: (a) the want to communicate the content of FTAX, (b) the want to be efficient or urgent, and (c) the want to maintain H's face to any degree. Unless (b) is greater than (c), S will want to minimize the threat of his FTA" (B&L 1987, p. 73). Accordingly, they outline five main types of politeness strategies: bald-on-record, negative politeness, positive politeness, off-record, and don't do the FTA.

1.5.5.1 Bald-on-Record Strategies

B&L (1987, p. 100) claim that "the prime reason for bald-on-record usage may be stated simply: in general, whenever S wants to do the FTA with maximum efficiency more than he wants to satisfy H's face; even to any degree, he will choose the bald-on-record strategy". Bald-on-record strategies, then, are not used as an attempt to minimize the FTA that threatens the hearer's face. And since this type of strategies cause embarrassment to the hearer, they are often used with people with whom the speaker has a close relationship such as friends or family. There are many situations in which the speaker might use the bald-on-record strategies:

- 1- Cases where maximum efficiency is very important. This is known to both S and H. That is why no face redress is necessary. In these cases, there is no attempt to minimize threat.

a- Cases of great urgency or desperation. For example:

(99) Help! (Compare the non-urgent 'Please help me, if you would be so kind')

b- Cases where S speaks as if maximum efficiency is very important. For example:

(100) Listen, I have got an idea.

c- Cases of channel noise, or difficulties in communication is the reason to speak with maximum efficiency. For example, when S is calling across a distance:

(101) Come home right now!

d- Cases where the focus of interaction is task-oriented. For example:

(102) Give me the nails.

- e- Cases where S's want to satisfy H's face is small, either because S is powerful and does not fear retaliation or non-cooperation from H, or because S wants to be rude, or Does not care about maintaining face. For example:

(103) Next time, you must add some sugar to tea.

(104) Get angry

- f- Doing the FTA is in the interest of the hearer. For example:

(105) Careful! He's a dangerous man (Warning H against someone who could threaten him)

- 2- Cases in which the threat is minimized implicitly. There are three areas where one would expect this:

- a- Welcomings (or post-greetings). For example:

(106) Come in.

- b- Farwells. For example:

(107) Ban. (Farwell in Tzeltal)

(Go)

- c- Offers. For example:

(108) Eat!

- d- Some other cases seem to be addressed to H's reluctance to transgress on S's positive face. For example:

(109) Don't worry about me.

1.5.5.2 Positive Politeness Strategies

Using positive strategies, S saves the face of H by wanting H's wants (Ibid, p. 75). These strategies are used to make the hearer feels good about himself, his interests or possessions. They are mostly used in situations where participants know each other well. Positive strategies are of three types:

- 1- Claim common grounds

S claims common ground with H by indicating the sharing of the same goals and values.

- a- Notice, attend to H's interests, wants, needs, and goods. For example:

(110) You must be hungry. It's a long time since breakfast. How about some lunch?

b- Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with it). For example:

(111) What a fantastic garden you have!

c- Intensify interest to H

(112) I come down the stairs, and what do you think I see? A huge mess all over the place, the phone's off, the hook and clothes are scattered all over....

d- Use in group identity markers. For example:

(113) Come here, mate.

e- Seek agreement using safe topics or repetition. For example:

(114) A: John went to London this weekend!

B: To London!

f- Joke

(115) Ok if I tackle those cookies now?

- 2- Convey that S and H are cooperators
- a- Offer or promise

(116) If you wash the dishes, I'll vacuum the floor.

b- Be optimistic

(117) I've come to borrow a cup of flour.

- 3- Fulfill H's want for some X
- a- Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)

1.5.5.3 Negative Politeness strategies

Negative politeness strategies are used to save the hearer's negative face and to avoid imposition on the hearer. They redress actions addressed to the addressee's negative face. By using negative politeness strategies, the speaker attempts to maintain the hearer's want to have his freedom of action unhindered and his attention unimpeded (Ibid, p. 134). There are five types of negative politeness strategies:

- 1- Be indirect
- a- Be conventionally indirect. For example

(118) Can you pass the salt?

2- Don't presume/assume

a- Questions, hedges. For example:

(119) I suppose that Harry is coming

(120) Won't you open the door?

3- Don't coerce H

a- Be pessimistic. For example:

(121) You couldn't possibly pass the salt. Could you?

b- Minimize the imposition. For example:

(122) It's not too much out of your way, just a couple of blocks.

c- Give difference. For example:

(123) We look forward very much to dining (instead of eating) with you

4- Communicate S's want to not impinge on H

a- Apologize. For example:

(124) I'm sorry.

b- Impersonalize S and H. For example:

(125) It is so. (instead of saying 'I tell you that it is so')

c- State the FTA as a general rule. For example:

(126) Passengers will please refrain from flushing toilets on the train. (Instead of saying 'You will please refrain from flushing toilets on the train')

d- Nominalize. For example:

(127) Your good performance on the examination impressed us favourably. (Instead of saying 'You performed well on the examination and we were favourably impressed')

5- Redress other wants to H's

a- Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H. For example:

(128) I could easily do it for you.

1.5.5.4 Off-Record Strategies

Off-record strategies are also called indirect strategies. This is because it is not possible to associate only one clear communicative intention to an act which is off record (Ibid, p. 216). Using off record strategies, “the speaker leaves himself an ‘out’ by providing himself with a number of defensible interpretations” (Ibid). In this way, the speaker avoids the responsibility for doing an FTA. When the speaker uses an off-record strategy, the hearer must make some inference to recover what was in fact intended. There are many types of off-record strategies including:

1- Invite conversational implicatures

The speaker gives hints and hopes that the hearer will grasp them and interpret the intended meaning. To do this, the speaker violates, in some way, the Gricean maxims of efficient communication. For example, the speaker may say (129) to implicate a request that H opens the window:

(129) Mmm, it’s pretty stuffy in here.

Many strategies can fall under this type:

a- Give hints (violation of the relevance maxim). For example:

(130) It’s cold in here. (c.i shut the window)

b- Give association clues (violation of relevance maxim). For example:

(131) Oh God, I’ve got a headache. (may be used to ask the hearer to give him a pill, if S and H mutually know that H has a pill)

c- Presuppose. For example:

(132) I washed the car again today. (he presupposes that he has done it before and therefore may implicate a criticism)

d- Understate (violation of quantity maxim). For example:

(133) She’s some kind of idiot. (c.i she’s an idiot)

2- Be vague or ambiguous (violation of manner maxim)

a- Be ambiguous

(134) John’s a pretty sharp cookie. (could be either a compliment or an insult. It depends on the connotation of the word sharp)

b- Be vague

(135) Perhaps someone did something naughty. (may be used as a criticism)

1.5.5.5 Don't do the FTA strategy

Using this strategy, the speaker simply avoids offending H at all with an FTA.

1.5.6 Choice of Strategies

Using Grice's (1975, p. 309) claim that all participants in a conversation are rational and their main interest is to convey their messages efficiently, B&L say that rational actors will use the same politeness strategy given the same circumstances to try to mitigate face (B&L, p. 76). FTAs can threaten both the speaker's face and the hearer's face, thus the speaker will always try to use certain strategies to minimize the threat. In his doing so, he weights the following:

- 1- The want to communicate the content of the FTA in question
- 2- The want to be efficient or urgent
- 3- The want to maintain H's face to any degree

In any conversation, where participants obey the cooperative principle, if 3 is greater than 2, S will choose a suitable strategy to minimize the FTA. When the speaker thinks that he will lose his face and offend the hearer, he may choose the strategy of don't do the FTA or he may use high number of strategies to redress his FTA to be accepted by the hearer.

The choice of strategies depends on the circumstances; therefore, the speaker may choose bald-on-record strategies when he does not want to redress his action or he thinks that redressing his action will maximize the FTA, thus he is, in no way, minimizing the FTA. If he chooses to use positive politeness strategies, he then tries to satisfy H's desires. If he chooses to use negative politeness strategies, he then aims to let H's desires unimpeded. Finally, using off-record strategies by the speaker means that he wants to avoid the responsibility of using the FTA.

1.5.7 Benefits of Politeness strategies

When the speaker chooses a strategy, he then thinks of the benefits that he might gain by using those strategies. Therefore, using bald-on-record strategies, the speaker can get credit for honesty or avoids danger of being misunderstood. When he uses positive politeness strategies, he might think of minimizing threatening aspect of the FTA, avoiding criticism, lessening the potential for FTA debt. When he uses negative politeness strategies, he might think of avoiding future debt or keeping social distance. When he uses off-record strategies, he might think of getting credit for being tactful and non-coercive, avoiding responsibility for the possible FTA interpretations. Finally, when using don't do the FTA strategy, he might think of avoiding offending H at all or he does not have any thing to say. In short, there are many other benefits that can be gained by deciding to use one of these strategies and this depend on the context, the circumstances and the social factors P, D, and R.

1.5.8 Conclusion

B&L (1987) argue that each member of a society is rational and has face. In communication, and when a speaker decides to make an action which possibly causes the hearer (or the speaker) to lose face, the speaker will tend to use a politeness strategy to minimize the threat of that act. According to B&L (1987), there are five types of strategies that are used by the speaker to mitigate a FTA, namely bald-on-record, positive politeness, negative politeness, off-record, and don't do a FTA. When the risk of the FTA is high, the speaker tends to use a high number of strategies. Before choosing a strategy, the speaker computes the gravity of the FTA on the basis of three factors: the social distance between the speaker and the hearer, the power that the hearer has over the speaker, and the ranking of impositions in the particular culture. After the evaluation of the face threatening act in relation to these factors, the speaker then decides the level of politeness. These strategies and the way speaker deal with them are universal as B&L claim.

1.6 Religious Discourse

1.6.1 What is Discourse?

Discourse is defined by Crystal as “a set of utterances which constitute any recognizable speech event, e.g. a conversation, a joke, a sermon, an interview’ (Crystal 2008, p. 148). Fairclough defines discourse as a sort of “social practice” (Fairclough 1992, p. 28). Fairclough focuses on the idea that the analysis of discourse should focus on the ways social and political dimensions are reproduced by texts and speeches because discourse is “shaped by relations of power, and invested with ideologies” (Fairclough 1992, p. 8).

In this sense, religious discourse is a social practice that “reproduces a set of ethical principles and laws which aim to resist social and (ethical) inequality, oppression (power abuse), or ungrounded supremacy (domination) (El-Sharif 2011, p. 43).

Discourse analysis “shows how a given discourse is constructed on the basis of accumulated beliefs and ideologies of the discourse maker and his/her society” (Ibid). Therefore, the work of a discourse analyst is to break discourse into its component to uncover its hidden messages. There are many dimensions on which discourse should be analysed. These dimensions include sounds (intonation, etc), gestures, syntax, the lexicon, style, rhetoric, meanings, speech acts, ... etc (van Dijk 1998, p. 191).

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an approach developed to analyse discourse in a critical way. The aim of this approach is to “distinguish the role of language in structuring power relations within society and to reveal how these differences are reflected in conversation and discourse” (El-Sharif 2011, p. 44). Therefore, discourse analysis should deal with form and meaning in order to “deconstruct beliefs and ideologies from the text or “denaturalize” them in a way that involves showing how social structures determine properties of discourse, and how discourse in turn determines social structures” (Fairclough 1995, p. 27).

In general, CDA deals with the manifestation of power, domination and ideology in discourse. It also deals with the content of the text and its structures to reveal the ideology that is hidden in a certain discourse. Finally, it can uncover the underlying ideological arguments and beliefs with reference to religious discourse and show how they are related to the different social orders in a given society (El-Sharif 2011, p. 45).

On the basis of what have been said, we can consider religious discourse as a social practice. What coming next, is about the functions of religious discourse.

1.6.2 Functions of religious discourse

There is a distinction between “religious language” and “non-religious language” in the sense that religious language refers to the written and spoken language typically used by religious believers and their religious experiences. Religious language is used to include any claims or statements made about god(s) (El-Sharif 2011, p. 46). Religious language might include texts such as the ones taken from the Holly Quran or the Bible.

El-Sharif (2011, pp. 46-47) claims that religious language has many purposes. It stirs emotional feelings while performing prayers. In addition, it has ideological implications. According to Binkly and Hick (El-Sharif 2011, p. 47 as quoted from Binkly and Hick 1962, pp. 19-21), there are at least seven kinds of language usage for religious language. First, religious language involves an “empirical usage” in which empirical statements are made about important events such as the way God made his revelation to his prophets. Second, religious language involves “tautological usage” in which redundant repetition of a particular meaning become prominent in the religious discourse. Third, religious language involves “emotive usage” in which religious language aims to raise feelings of reverence among followers for their religion and its dignity and religious practices. The fourth usage is that religious language is used to perform rituals. Fifth, religious language involves a “prescriptive usage” in that it provides a directive function which is to perform certain kinds of behavior. Sixth, religious language can serve a “mythical usage” in that myths are employed in religion as a pre-scientific account of certain mysterious facts such as the creation of the universe. Finally, religious language involves “paradoxical usage” where in many religious texts, there exist contradictions and inconsistencies. It is the religious language that gives relevant interpretation and elucidation of the hypothetical incongruities.

The listener for Friday sermons finds that –for most part- they conform to the above mentiend usages. For example, the Imam may quote the Prophet Muhammad’s Sayings in which he talks about factual and historical events. Friday sermons also involve tautological usage in which redundant repititions of a particular meaning are expressed, such as referring to Muslims as brothers or as servants of God. Friday sermons also involve emotive usage which is realized in the use of commands and those sayings which involve supplication to God. Furthermore, Friday sermons involve prescribed actions such as laws and policies. Concerning mythical usage, El-Sharif (2011, p. 48) claims that “a Muslim my reluctantly accept the association between the concept “myth” (?ustura) and Islamic religious discourse because “myth” usually refers to “untrue” folkloric stories about ancient people and their deities.”

Friday sermons have another usage which is not among those usages. They have an “explanatory usage” of other religious discourse such as the Quranic discourse and the Prophetic discourse. However, Friday sermons cannot be recited while performing prayers or any ritual in Islam.

Most researchers who have dealt with the religious language have studied the topic from two sides namely meaning and form. The present study aims to deal with the pragmatic side which has not been dealt with at least to my knowledge.

1.7 Friday Sermon

1.7.1 Introduction

Friday sermon is an important event for Muslims. It is delivered every Friday before the noon prayer. Adult Muslims who do not have any excuse and are able to go to the mosque are obliged to practice this cult. Friday sermon is an essential means to teach Muslims the religious concepts and principles. It is also a means to guide and remind them of the way to behave. Therefore, it is a tool that can be used to prepare good Muslims if the Imam is knowledgeable and know what to do; otherwise, it becomes a destruction tool if the Imam does not know the Islamic religion well and if he does not know the skill and the art of sermonizing.

1.7.2 Definition of a Friday sermon

Al-arabi Al-qarawi defines Friday sermon as “two Rak'ah done in a loud voice on Friday at noon after two sermons” (Al-arabi Al-qarawi 2005, p. 150). Tamir (2004) adopts the definition of Malik which is “all the sermons are the sermons delivered by the Imam for Ascites, in the two Aids (Aid Al- Adha and Aid Al- Fitr), in the day of Arafat, and on Friday. He (the Imam) sits between the two sermons” (Tamir 2004, p. 204). A Friday sermon, then, is composed of two sermons that are separated by a sit of the Imam for a while and after the second sermon the Imam and the audience pray two Rak'ah. In addition, every adult Muslim is obliged to go to the Friday sermon. Friday sermon has certain conditions that specify who is obliged to practice it and when can it be called as a correct sermon.

1.7.3 Terms of necessity

Any Friday sermon has certain conditions which specify who is obliged to practice it. These conditions are:

- 1- Male: Males are obliged to go to the Friday sermon, but females are not.
- 2- Freedom: Slaves are not obliged to go to the Friday sermon.
- 3- There should be no excuse: that is patients or old people who cannot go are not obliged to do so.
- 4- Residency in the place where the sermon is delivered or on the places which are not far by more than three miles. And it is obliged on the passenger who decides to stay more than four days in the place where the sermon is delivered.

1.7.4 Terms of correctness

For any Friday sermon to be correct, it has to satisfy the following conditions:

- 1- The intention to stay forever in the place where the sermon is delivered.
- 2- The presence of at least twelve men plus the Imam. These twelve people have to be from the place where the sermon is delivered and they have to be present from the beginning of the sermon till the end.
- 3- The Imam: the sermon is not correct if there is no Imam.
- 4- Two sermons which delivered by the Imam who must be standing up. They must be delivered using a loud voice with the Arabic language even to those Muslims who do not speak Arabic.
- 5- The mosque: the Friday sermon is not correct if it is delivered at home for example.

1.7.5 Friday Sermon Standards

In the preparation of a sermon, the Imam should pay attention to the methodology if he wants to achieve the aims he targets. The Imam should take into consideration three Standards: objective Standards, methodology Standards, and skill Standards.

Concerning the objective Standards, the Muslims today live in an interactive world where they influence others and get influenced by others using technology. In addition, Muslims consume more than produce. Therefore, the Imam “is called for working on -what is called by Fuqaha’- the necessary things in religion which focus on morals and good deeds. These things should be at the heart of the sermon” (The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs 2007, p. 131).

Concerning the methodology Standards, the Imam should use a discourse that has positive influence on the audience. Therefore, he should use sentences that attract them to him and to the things he says. By this way, he can has effects on them and can change them. If he uses threatening sentences, he should accompany them by granulation sentences so as to let hope for the audience. In addition, the Imam has to avoid personal or political conflicts in the sermon because this my let people to lose trust in him, consequently, the sermon will have no effect on them. He should avoid giving opinions about new things in the life of people since there are people who are specialized in doing that. Furthermore, the Imam should take into consideration the educational level of the audience and their different specialties. This is because if he deals with issues that are out of his specialty, he may let people laugh at him and he may lose their trust. Therefore, he should not indulge in issues he does not know well, as God says in Qur’an “And follow not (O man i.e., say not, or do not or witness not) that of which you have no knowledge. Verily! The hearing, and the sight, and the heart, of each of those one will be questioned (by Allah)” (Sûrah Al-Isrâ’ verse. 36). Finally, the Imam must purify his intention, thus what he does must be in the sake of God.

Concerning the skill Standards, the Imam should be skillful in the preparation and presentation of the sermon in order to attract people to what he says. Among the important things that he should take into consideration when he is preparing and when he is delivering the sermon are:

- Briefness and conciseness
- The unity of the topic
- To be skillful when presenting
- To wear best clothes

To summarize, if the Imam pays attention to these things, he will be successful in delivering the sermon and get more close to the audience. Consequently, he will achieve the targets of the sermon which focus on changing the life of the people to the best.

1.8 Conclusion

I have introduced, in this chapter, the relevant literature that will be used in the analysis of the data. This work is done within the field of pragmatics which I have shown that it is difficult to define as it interrelates with other fields. In the present study I adopt the definition that pragmatics studies the speaker's meaning, the contextual meaning, how more gets communicated than is said, the functions of utterances and the relation of language and context. The main theories adopted in this work include speech act theory, implicature theory and politeness theory. Speech act theory stresses the idea that we perform actions via our utterances. Implicature theory stresses the idea that many times we communicate more than we say. Politeness theory stresses the idea that politeness is used in our interactions to minimize the threat of acts and maximize the positive effects of those acts. Religious discourse is considered a social practice that needs analysis. Finally, I introduced Friday sermon as it is the subject of my pragmatic investigation. It is the speech that is delivered by the Imam before the noon prayer. This speech is divided to two parts which are separated by the sitting of the Imam for a while. The next chapter will focus on the methodology being adopted in dealing with the data.

Chapter two: Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the research design and methodology. It includes a review of the research approaches and design appropriateness, in addition to a discussion of all that concerns the methodological considerations that were taken into account while conducting the present study. A restatement of the research objectives, research hypotheses and research questions are presented first. Then, this chapter introduces the reasons behind the selection of the Friday sermon under study. In addition, a description and a historical review of the approaches and research instruments adopted are presented. Moreover, the situational variables, subjects, procedure and data analysis are discussed. The chapter is enclosed with a summary of the chapter.

2.2 Research objectives

This study aims to pin down the different moods used in a Friday sermon and the functions they are used for. It also aims to argue that the directive category of illocutionary acts is the most used one in a Friday sermon. In addition, it shows that, the participants observe the cooperative principle with its maxims. This investigation is equally concerned with arguing that the uptake needs to be secured by both the Imam and the audience for the successful performance of illocutionary acts in a Friday sermon. Moreover, this study attempts to list the possible perlocutionary effects intended by the Imam by delivering the sermon. Finally, another concern of this study is to argue that the notion of politeness (in all its manifestations) is relevant to the Friday sermon context.

2.3 Research hypotheses

There are five hypotheses verified in this piece of work. They all fall in the field of pragmatics. The first hypothesis proposes that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the forms and functions used in a sermon. The second one proposes that the act of sermonizing is the illocutionary act performed by a sermon if we consider a sermon as a single speech act. The third one assumes that the uptake needs to be secured on the act of both the Imam and the audience in order to have successful locutionary and illocutionary acts. The fourth hypothesis is that participants in a Friday sermon observe the cooperative principle and its maxims. The last one proposes that the notion of politeness (in all its manifestations) is relevant to the Friday sermon context.

2.4 Research questions

To reach the objectives of this study, I will try to answer the following questions:

- 8- What are the syntactic moods that are used in a Friday sermon, and what functions do they serve in the relevant context?
- 9- Is it the case that the speech acts performed in a Friday sermon fall under a single speech act, namely, sermonizing?
- 10- Is it possible to compute the number of illocutionary acts and of perlocutionary acts performed by the Imam in and by delivering a Friday sermon?

- 11- Is it possible to verify whether or not the Imam has achieved his goals (both illocutionary and perlocutionary), during and after the delivery of his sermon?
- 12- What evidence could there be to suggest that the Imam has succeeded in delivering the intended illocutionary goals and perlocutionary effects?
- 13- To what extent do the participants in a Friday sermon observe the cooperative principle and its maxims?
- 14- Is the notion of politeness (in all its manifestations) relevant to the Friday sermon context?

2.5 Reasons for the option of the sermon under study

Since Friday sermons are common sources of preaching characterized by special use of language, I considered relevant to the study this specific genre to investigate how language is used and manipulated. After the selection of the area of study, the challenge was to find the typical sermon to be the data of the study.

After the listening of many Friday sermons in YouTube, I came across the sermon that I considered the typical one to be the data of this study. All of these sermons share some common points such as style, lexicon, and the layout. They differ only in some parts such as length, the type of language used (some Friday sermons are delivered using both classical Arabic and Moroccan Arabic), and the way the Imam delivers the sermon. There are many reasons for the adoption of this Friday sermon to be the basis for my data.

First of all, This Friday sermon was given by a well-known Imam in Morocco whose name is Omar Al Kazabri (I will introduce him later in this chapter). He is the Imam of the most famous mosque in Morocco: Hassan II mosque. Second, this mosque is under the supervision of the Ministry of Awkaf and Islamic Affairs; therefore, the Imam must have taken the directions of the Ministry into consideration when he was writing the sermon. Third, this sermon was delivered in a famous mosque which is attended by many people especially the ones belong to the middle and high class in Casablanca, Morocco. Forth, the sermon was given using Classical Arabic only. Fifth, the topic of the sermon appears to be about love of life as the main reason that leads to the separation between Muslims (as presented in the website of the Imam: <http://www.kazabri.com>). However, from a deep reading of the sermon and the time given at, it is clear that the sermon is not about love of life as the first reason behind the separation of Muslims as main issue, but about an implicit main issue which is the Arab spring; thus the sermon was given to calm the audience so as not to revolt against the current regime. Finally, the time when this Friday sermon was delivered was on the fourth of February 2011. At this time, there were revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, so there was a worry that these revolutions would spread to all the other Arab countries. These are the reasons that led me to stick to this Friday sermon as a source of my data.

2.6 Research approaches

The correct choice of the research approaches is the most crucial and vital element to successful conduct of a research. In order to investigate the different moods and functions in a Friday sermon, both a qualitative and quantitative research methods were used. Ryman (1988)

contends that the combination of qualitative and quantitative data increases the validity of the findings of any research.

2.6.1 Quantitative approach

Since this research is based on some statistics, the quantitative method is needed as a method of research. Quantitative method “involves the generation of data in quantitative form which can be subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis in a formal and rigid fashion” (Kothari 2004, p. 5), and it “uses procedures that gather data in numerical forms” (Richard and Schmidt 2002, p. 436). Quantitative method is based on systematic empirical investigation of quantitative properties where mathematical model and process measurement are central elements. It provides fundamental connection between empirical observation and mathematical expression of quantitative relationships. In general, quantitative method is used to verify whether the hypotheses are true or false. Examples of tools used in this approach are:

- Surveys
- Questionnaires
- Performance tests
- Clinical tests
- Observational checklists
- Archival research

There are many advantages to using quantitative approach. It is easy to administer and can deal with large sample and large number of questions. It is also easy to summarize. Furthermore, it is widely accepted as a form of evidence regarding program effectiveness. There are also disadvantages when using this approach. The tools used in this approach may be difficult for some participants such as questionnaires and surveys. These tools may not provide the information needed for interpretations of data findings. Finally, large amount of data may require sophisticated analysis approaches. (http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~pbd/pdfs/Evaluation_Methods.pdf)

2.6.2 Qualitative approach

In addition to the quantitative method, a qualitative method is also used. This is because this research is not based only on empirical investigation, but also on subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviours. Qualitative method “is concerned with subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviours. Research in such a situation is a function of researcher’s insight and impressions. Such an approach to research generates results either in non-quantitative forms or in the forms which are not subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis” (Kothari 2004, p. 5). This method is used in “any research that uses procedures that make use of non-numerical data, such as interviews, case studies, or participant observation” (Richard and Schmidt 2002, p. 435). Examples of qualitative data collection methods include:

- Individual interviews
- Participant or free observation

- Filed notes
- Focus groups
- Open-ended questions on a survey or questionnaire
- Logs, journals, diaries and/or essays
- Stories/ Case studies
- Document reviews

Like quantitative approach, qualitative approach also has advantages and disadvantages. Concerning advantages, qualitative approach can deal with attitudes, behaviors and opinions. It can clarify quantitative data and put it into context. Concerning disadvantages, using tools of qualitative approach is time consuming. This approach is subjective; therefore, it may yield less reliable results. It may yield smaller sample sizes. The data gathered using the tools of this approach are difficult to summarize and compare systematically. (http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~pbd/pdfs/Evaluation_Methods.pdf)

2.7 Research instruments

Among the fundamental concerns in carrying out research into the production of a language is the means by which data is gathered, and the means by which this data is subsequently analyzed. There are many elements that interfere in the design and implementation of a research tool which is meant to gather data. In this research, I did not need any tool to gather data. What I needed is a pen, a paper and a good ear to listen carefully to jot down the sermon. Since I can write and speak Classical Arabic fluently, I did not have any problem in writing it. The problem was created when I wanted to translate the sermon into English.

2.7.1 Translation

Newmark (1988) defines translation as “rendering the meaning of a text into another language in the way that the author intended the text” (Newmark 198, p. 5). Munday (2008) says that translation “refers to the general subject field, the product (the text that has been translated) or the process (the act of producing the translation, otherwise known as translating). The process of translation between two different written languages involves the translation or changing an original written text (the source text or ST) in the original verbal language (the source language or SL) into a written text (the target text or TT) in a different verbal language (the target language or TL) (Munday 2008, p. 4). Paul (2009) says that “A translation should have the same virtues as the original” (Paul 2009, p 1).

It is clear from these definitions that the ultimate goal behind translation is to change an original text in the original language into another text in a different language. The meaning of the new text should be almost the same as the meaning of the original text. To what extent is this possible? Newmark (1988) claims that “a satisfactory translation is always possible, but a good translator is never satisfied with it” (Newmark 198, p.6). Therefore, the translation cannot reproduce, or be, the original. There are two types of translation: “Translation in which more emphasis is given to overall meaning than exact wording is known as free translation. A translation that approximates to a word-for-word representation of the original is known as a

literal translation” (Richard and Schmidt 2002, p. 563). The translation of the Friday sermon, I am working on in this study, is translated based on free translation where the emphasis is more on overall meaning than exact wording. This is clear when we compare between the original text and the translation. Consider an example for a translated passage:

معاشر الصالحين، إن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم حين أرسله ربه هاديا يهدي إلى سواء الصراط، كان من أول ما بثه في أصحابه ومتبعيه روح الأخوة، روح الصدق، روح الوفاء، وكل هذه الصفات والمبادئ هي أسس الأخوة، وهي عمدها التي لا تقوم بدونها، ولما أحس صلى الله عليه وسلم بدينه وأجله وقرب رحيله إلى ربه، كان كذلك من أعظم ما ختم به دعوته المجيدة، الدعوة إلى الأخوة، فقد وقف (ص) في حشود المسلمين في صعيد عرفات وهو يوصيهم وينثر فيهم تلك الدرر وتلك الجواهر والنفائس من الكلم والوصايا

O the righteous! Indeed, when the Messenger of Allah (Peace and blessing be upon him) was sent by God as a guide to the straight way, the first thing he spread among his companions and followers was the spirit of brotherhood, sincerity and faithfulness. All these features and principles constitute the foundations of brotherhood. They are its pillars without which it cannot exist. When he (Peace and blessing be upon him) felt that he would die and leave life soon, among the greatest things that he ended his mission with was his call for brotherhood. He (Peace and blessing be upon him) stood in front of the crowd of Muslims on the Mount of Arafat and issued invaluable recommendations and pieces of advice.

It is clear from this passage, that the translator uses free translation method. He targeted the meaning in the translation rather than word-by-word translation.

Translating a very simple text is not like translating a complex one. The first one includes very short sentences that their understanding depends on the literal meaning, while the second one includes complex sentences that contain metaphors, similes, illusions ... etc.

The type of text I wanted to translate is religious. It includes complex sentences. These sentences include a lot of pragmatic devices such as metaphors, similes, rhetorical questions... etc. Therefore, I needed a specialized dictionary which contains specific religious terms and good understanding of the Arabic text itself. There was no problem in understanding the text, but there was a problem finding a specialized dictionary. Thus, I depended on a bilingual dictionary called “Al-Mawrid”. When I finished, I gave the original text and the translation to a specialized translator who revised it². I asked him to revise the text in a way that I can break it down into utterances. This is because utterance is the unit of analysis when conducting a pragmatic research.

² Ahmed Aloui was graduated from the University of Wales (United Kingdom). He is a translator certified by United Nations (Roster). He is also certified by the Ministry of Justice in Morocco. He is a University professor of Translation in Hassan II University, Casablanca, Morocco.

2.7.1.1 Translator

Longman Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics defines translator as:

In general, someone who translates written language from one language (SOURCE LANGUAGE) into another (the TARGETED LANGUAGE). An accredited translator (or certified translator) is someone who has received accreditation (or certification) from a professional organization such as the Institute of Translation and Interpreting (ITI) or the American Translators Association (ATA), issued on the basis of training, experience, and examinations.

(Richard and Schmidt 2002, p. 563, 564)

According to this definition, the translator has specific characteristics. He should be certified by a professional organization. This means that he masters both the language by which the original text is written and the language to which the text is translated. Based on this, I had to look for a professional translator. With the help of my supervisor, I would be able to find a professional one who is accredited and has a long experience in the field.

After the revision of the sermon by a professional translator, I could guarantee that I would depend on a reliable data.

2.7.2 Excel

“Microsoft Excel is an example of a program called a “spreadsheet.” Spreadsheets are used to organize real world data, such as a check register or a rolodex. Data can be numerical or alphanumeric (involving letters or numbers). The key benefit to using a spreadsheet program is that you can make changes easily, including correcting spelling or values, adding, deleting, formatting, and relocating data” (www.co.orange.nc.us/library/.../Microsoft_Excel.pdf)

This program is used for organizing numerical data. It is also used to have a clear idea about a certain phenomenon just by a quick look to the tables or graphs that the program provides. I used this program in order to have graphs representation of the data; therefore, it is easy for the reader to see and understand the presented phenomenon. This program is used to present the number of utterances associated to each mood. In addition, it is used to present the number of functions associated to each category based on Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts.

Using Excel program, I have changed the following tables into graphs. These tables show the number of utterances for each mood, the number of functions for each mood, the number of explicit and implicit performatives and the number of illocutionary acts for each category.

Table.1: The number of utterances for each mood

Moods	Utterances
Indicative	373
Imperative	54
Interrogative	22
Subjunctive	6

Table.1 shows the number of utterances for each mood. It is clear in the table that the indicative mood is the dominant one in the sermon by 373 utterances. The second more used mood is the imperative mood by 54 utterances. The third more used mood is the interrogative by 22 utterances. The less used mood is the subjunctive mood by 6 utterances.

Table.2: The number of functions for each mood

Moods	Functions
Indicative	21
Imperative	3
Interrogative	4
Subjunctive	3

Table.2 presents the number of functions associated to each mood. 30 Functions counted in the sermon. The indicative mood is associated with the majority of functions by 21 functions. The imperative mood is associated with 3 functions. The interrogative mood is associated with 4 functions. Finally, the subjunctive mood is associated with 3 functions.

Table.3: The number of explicit and implicit performatives

Explicit performatives	Implicit performatives
6	459

Table.3 presents the number of explicit and implicit performatives in the sermon. Mostly, all the utterances are implicit performatives by more than 459 implicit performatives. The explicit performatives are only 6 in the sermon.

Table.4: The number of illocutionary acts for each category

Categories	Illocutionary acts	
	Literal meaning	Utterance meaning
Assertives	334	177
Directives	119	197

Commissives	6	5
Expressives	4	82
Declaratives	2	2

Table.4 shows the number of illocutionary acts associated to each category at two levels, namely the sentence meaning and the utterance meaning. At the level of sentence meaning, there are five categories manifested in the sermon: assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarative. The assertive category is associated with 334 illocutionary acts. The directive category is associated with 119 illocutionary acts. The commissive category is associated with 6 illocutionary acts. The expressive category is associated with 4 illocutionary acts. Finally, the declarative category is associated with 2 illocutionary acts. At the level of utterance meaning, there are five categories manifested in the sermon: assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarative. The assertive category is associated with 177 illocutionary acts. The directive category is associated with 197 illocutionary acts. The commissive category is associated with 5 illocutionary acts. The expressive category is associated with 82 illocutionary acts. Finally, the declarative category is associated with 2 illocutionary acts.

Concerning the cooperative principle, I have given examples to show that the participants in the Friday sermon observe it. Likewise, to prove that the notion of politeness is relevant to the sermon, I have given examples in the analysis chapter (chapter 3).

2.8 The situational variables

The contextual variables that were controlled in this study fall in two categories: context external factors and context internal factor. The former include the dimensions of time, place and participants. Whereas internal factors are features inherently linked to the utterances such as the mood of the utterance, the illocutionary act performed by the utterance, the category of the illocutionary act, whether the speaker observes the CP and whether the notion of politeness is relevant in the sermon.

In this regard, time, place and participants have certain effects on the speaker when he produces the utterances. Concerning the external variables, their uses show their pragmatic utility. Therefore, if we consider that the Imam uses the directive category more than the others, it shows the nature of the sermon as a tool used by the Islam religion to guide the believers.

2.8.1 The external variables

The external variables involve time, place and participants. In this section, I describe time and place. As for participants, I describe them under the section of subjects (2.9)

2.8.1.1 Time

The choice of the theme of the sermon by the Imam is not done haphazardly, but it is done on the basis of time dimension. The sermon is given on the fourth of February 2011. This date comes after the beginning of the Arab spring which was begun on 18th December 2010 in Tunisia where a young man called Elbouzizi burned himself to death in protest at his treatment by police. In this day, a revolution started in Tunisia which ended by the escape of the president Benali to Saudi Arabia. Later on, and exactly on the 25th of January, another revolution started in Egypt and lead to the resign of the president Hosni Mubarak. All the regimes in the Arab world were afraid from the spreading of revolution to their countries. Among those regimes was the Moroccan one. The Moroccan regime started to calm the people in the country using various tools especially media and mosques. This sermon comes in this context. It was given to calm people and to implicitly criminalize the people who would think to revolt against the regime. Therefore, the type of sentences and the type of categories reflect the theme and the way the Imam wants to affect the audience.

2.8.1.2 Place

The sermon is given in the most famous mosque in Morocco: Hassan II mosque. This mosque is among the three biggest mosques in the world. It is under the supervision of the Ministry of Awkaf and Religious Affairs. Most of the people who go there are from the middle and high class. These elements have a great impact on the type of theme and the style of language chosen to deliver the sermon. On this basis, the Imam chooses to address the audience using Classical Arabic which is understood by only educated people in Morocco. Therefore, the notion of place directly affects the language used by the Imam when delivering a sermon.

2.8.2 Internal variables

2.8.2.1 Moods in the sermon

Mood is defined by Richard and Schmidt (2002) as “a set of contrasts which are often shown by the form of the verb and which express the speaker’s or writers attitude to what is said or written” (Richard and Schmidt 2002, p. 340). There are four types of mood in English namely, the indicative mood, the interrogative mood, the imperative mood and the subjunctive mood. Three of these moods are used in the sermon: the indicative, the interrogative and the imperative. These moods reflect the type of text delivered. The text is religious; therefore it has a guidance function. We should expect that most of the sentences are in the imperative mood to be in compatibility with the function of the sermon. However, as we have seen in the first chapter that we speak more indirectly than we do directly. Thus, even if we use, for example, the indicative mood we may intend to get the hearer to do something instead of just informing him by something.

2.8.2.2 Illocutionary acts performed in the sermon

It has been explained in the first chapter that each illocutionary act has an illocutionary point (Searle 1975). Therefore, we expect the verbs that have the illocutionary point of getting

the hearer to do something to be the majority in the sermon. However, the majority of illocutionary verbs used in the sermon are assertives: the point of this type of sentences is to commit the speaker to something's being the case, or to the truth of the expressed proposition. The majority of illocutionary verbs are assertives when it comes to the literal meaning of the utterance, but when it comes to the utterance meaning, and as has been proven, the majority of illocutionary verbs in the sermon has the illocutionary point of getting the hearer to do something.

2.8.2.3 Categories of illocutionary acts performed in the sermon

According to Searle (1975), speech acts are categorized to five categories: assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarative. As the sermon has the function of guidance, we expect the directive category to be the dominant one. On the basis of the utterance meaning, it is the dominant one by 170 illocutionary verbs out of 211 illocutionary verbs exist in the sermon. But, if we look at the literal meaning of sentences, we find that the dominant category is the assertive by 143 illocutionary verbs. This proves that the primary act of a sentence is the one based on the utterance meaning.

2.8.2.4 Observance of the CP during the sermon

Grice (1975) claims that, in any rational conversation, participants observe the cooperative principle. Therefore, the Imam must respect the cooperative principle in the sermon since he is delivering a rational speech. In the analysis of the sermon, we notice that there are many violations to the cooperative principle. However, these violations are not done aimlessly, but they are done to imply some meaning. The limitations exist against saying utterances directly are many. The most famous one is the notion of politeness. The speaker uses politeness strategies in order to minimize the threat of the face threatening acts. In short, the Imam and the audience observe the CP in the sermon. Any violations are done to raise conversational implicatures. Thus, the use of utterances is affected by the CP.

2.8.2.5 Politeness

Politeness is an internal factor that affects the uses of utterances. Instead of using direct speech act, speakers in interactions prefer to use indirect speech acts. This indirect use of speech acts is motivated by the notion of politeness. Politeness pushes speakers to change the utterances using many strategies. Speakers may add words to the utterance such as hedges, delete certain words, use certain expression or add more expressions to an utterance. All this is done by speakers for the simple reason: being polite.

2.9 Subjects

In order to answer the research questions, it is necessary to know the participants in the interaction. There are two subjects addressed in this work: The Imam and believers. The Imam is the only speaker in the sermon, while believers are listeners and supposed to do what the Imam says. Let's define each participant in the interaction:

2.9.1 The Imam

The Imam, who delivered this sermon, is well-known in Morocco since he is the Imam of the most famous mosque in Morocco. Here is his biography according to his website: <http://www.kazabri.com>

Omar Al Kazabri was born in 1974 in Marrakech in Morocco. He was taught Qur'an by his father Ahmed Al Kazabri. He learnt Qur'an by heart when he was eleven years old. When he got his baccalaureate, he travelled to Mecca to study in the Islamic Institute. He became the Imam of the University Mosque in Jeddah. During his stay in Saudi Arabia, he was taught Qur'an by great teachers. After that, he went back to Morocco and became the Imam of Arrayyan Mosque in Casablanca. Then, he went to Cairo in Egypt to pursue his studies about Qur'an. Actually, he is the Imam of Hassan the second mosque in Casablanca.

It seems from this biography that the Imam is well-educated because he took science of Qur'an from its sources. Therefore, what he says in the sermon is well studied and meant to have certain effects on the audience.

2.9.2 The audience

If we look at the place where Hassan II mosque is located, we may guess the type of people who attend the Friday sermon there. Hassan II is built partially on land and partially over the ocean. It is located at Boulevard Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah in Casablanca. This Boulevard is inhabited by people who belong to the high class in Morocco. So, these people and people who have a means of transport are the only people can attend the Friday sermon in this mosque. It is well-known in Morocco that people who belong to the low class cannot afford to buy a car. This means that, the people who live in Boulevard Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah and the people who own a car are the most ones that can possibly attend the Friday sermon in this mosque. This does not mean that people who belong to the low class do not attend, but if they do, they would not be the majority in the mosque. According to these pieces of information, we can say that the majority of people who attend the Friday sermon in Hassan II mosque are educated. Educated means can write, read and understand Standard Arabic. The problem created is that the sermon under study was delivered by Classical Arabic; therefore not all who were present in the mosque would understand the sermon. This is because the uptake is not secured. The Imam, in the delivery of this sermon, did nothing to make all who were present understand the sermon.

2.10 Data classification procedure

After the choice of the discipline in which to conduct the research, I agreed with my supervisor about the topic. The challenge, then, was to find the suitable sermon to work on. I had listened to many sermons on YouTube before I came across the sermon under study. I listened to the sermon carefully and I wrote it. The sermon was in Classical Arabic. I had to read and understand it well. After that, I translated it into English. Translation took me one whole week because I am not a professional translator. I gave the translation to a professional translator who revised it. After that, I broke the sermon down into utterances (on the basis of

the definition of the “jumla”³ (sentence) in classical Arabic). I studied these utterances at two levels, namely literal meaning and utterance meaning. The objective behind studying each utterance alone at two levels is to know the function it has at those two levels. I categorized them according to Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts. The results were presented in graphs using Excel program. After that, I analyzed the results in the light of the theories presented in the first chapter to verify the hypotheses made in the study. In the following, I present the sermon in the Arabic version and in the English version.

2.11 The Arabic version of the sermon

الخطبة الأولى

باسمه الأسمى. المختص بالملك الأعز الأسمى. الذي ليس دونه منتهى ولا وراءه مرمى. الظاهر لا تخيلا ووهما. الباطن تقديسا لا عدما. وسع كل شيء رحمة وعلما. وأسبغ على أوليائه نعماء عما. وبعث فيهم رسولا من انفسهم انفسهم عربا وعجما. وأزكاهم محتدا و منمى. وأشدهم بهم رافة ورحما. حاشاه ربه عيبا و وهما. وزكاه روحا وجسما. و آتاه حكمة وحكما. فأمن به وصدق من جعل الله له في مغنم السعادة قسما. وكذب به وصدف عنه من كتب الله عليه الشقاء حتما. ومن كان في هذه اعمى فهو في الآخرة اعمى. صلى الله عليه صلاة تنموا و تنمى، وعلى اله وصحبه وسلم تسليما. معاشر الصالحين، ان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم حين ارسله ربه هاديا يهدي الى سواء الصراط، كان من اول ما بثه في اصحابه ومتبعيه روح الأخوة، روح الصدق، روح الوفاء، وكل هذه الصفات و المبادئ هي اسس الأخوة، وهي عمدها التي لا تقوم بدونها. ولما أحس صلى الله عليه وسلم بدنو أجله وقرب رحيله إلى ربه، كان كذلك من أعظم ما ختم به دعوته المجيدة، الدعوة إلى الأخوة. فقد وقف (ص) في حشود المسلمين في صعيد عرفات وهو يوصيهم وينثر فيهم تلك الدرر وتلك الجواهر و النفائس من الكلم و الوصايا. وكان من جملة ما نثره فيهم من درر قوله (ص): **" ان دماكم و أموالكم و أعراضكم عليكم حرام كحرمة يومكم هذا في شهركم هذا "**. وكان من جملة وصاياه: **" وكونوا عباد الله إخوانا "**. عاش (ص) وهو يؤسس للأخوة ويدعو إليها. يجسدها بالحال و بالمقال. ويربي عليها الأصحاب و يذكرهم بأي الكتاب: **" إنما المؤمنون إخوة "**. وحذر من ضدها، وهو الاختلاف و التنازع. ودل على المآلات: مآلات الخلاف و الاختلاف. دل على ذلك من خلال وحي ربه: **" ولا تنازعوا فتفشلوا وتذهب ريحكم واصبروا إن الله مع الصابرين "**. ولتحصين هذه الأخوة دل على ما يفسد هذه الأخوة من تسرب الأهواء واحتلال الدنيا دواخل القلب و التعلق بالمنصب. لأنه (ص) يعلم أن حب الدنيا إذا تسرب الى القلب أفسده وأحاله إلى مجرد عضلة آلية لا علاقة لها بوجودان ولا بذكر ولا بفكر. لينتقل صاحبها من مقام البشرية إلى حضيض البهيمية **" ولقد ذرأنا لجهنم كثيرا من الجن والإنس لهم قلوب لا يفقهون بها ولهم أعين لا يبصرون بها ولهم آذان لا يسمعون بها أولئك كالأنعام بل هم أضل "**. شبههم بداية بالأنعام التي لا تفهم ولا تدرك. ثم نزل بهم عن مستوى الأنعام في قوله **" بل هم أضل "** لأنهم أوتوا ملكات الإدراك فعطلوها وأبو إلا الإلتحاق بعالم البهيمية، لا عشقا ولكن استعباد ورقا. رقا وعبودية للدنيا التي هي في حقيقتها لعب ولهو كما وصفها القرآن. ومعلوم أن اللعب واللهو لا يستهوي إلا الأطفال. بين (ص) حقيقة هذه الدنيا الفانية بآيات ربه المنزلة عليه **" إنما الحياة الدنيا لعب ولهو وزينة وتفاخر بينكم وتكاثر في الأموال و الأولاد كمثل غيث أعجب الكفار نباته ثم يهيج فتراه مصفرا ثم يكون حطاما "**، **" يأيها الذين آمنوا إذا قيل لكم انفروا في سبيل الله اثاقلتم إلى الأرض أرضيتم بالحياة الدنيا من الآخرة فما**

³ “Al-jumla” (the sentence) is defined by Al-Lubdi (1985, pp. 52-53) as the crux of “Al-kalaam” (Speech) that is sent or the speech that is not sent. As claimed by Al-Lubdi, linguists differ according to the definition of “Al-jumla” (the sentence) in that it is a synonym to “Al-kalaam” (speech) or not. Al-Zamakhshari defines “Al-jumla” (the sentence) as “Al-kalam” (speech). It is any speech that is meaningful. However, Ibn Hicham contradicts this and claims that “Al-jumla” (the sentence) is more general than “Al-kalam” (speech) in that one condition of speech is that it must be meaningful. And “Al-kalam” (speech) cannot be called “Jumla” (sentence) unless it has a verb and a subject or a subject and a predicate. Ibn Hicham says that “Al-jumla” (the sentence) may not be complete in meaning and it needs some other things to be complete. (Al-Lubdi 1985, pp. 52-53)

متاع الحياة الدنيا في الآخرة إلا قليل". "من كان يريد الحياة الدنيا وزينتها نوف إليهم أعمالهم فيها وهم فيها لا يبخسون أولئك الذين ليس لهم في الآخرة إلا النار" "من كان يريد حرث الدنيا نزل له في حرثه من كان يريد حرث الدنيا نوته منها وماله في الآخرة من نصيب". عاش (ص) مجليا لهذه الحقائق بحاله ومقاله. عاش زاهدا راضيا. تمر الشهور ولا يوقد في بيته نار، وإنما أكله التمر والماء. ينام على الحصير حتى يؤثر في جنبه. يرقع الثوب ويحلب الشاة ويحزم بطنه من الجوع. ولو أراد الذهب والفضة لأخذها وأدركها. ولكنه صاحب رسالة وقائد أمة وصانع تاريخ. وهذا شأن العظماء. فكيف لأعظمهم. هذا شأن الكمل فكيف بأكملهم. العظماء لا يتصارعون على الفتات. العظماء لا يذبحون ولا يقتلون. العظماء لا يتقاتلون من أجل الحطام. العظماء لا يخربون ولا يعتدون. لأنهم يعلمون أنهم راحلون من الدنيا، ولأنهم يعلمون أنها لا قيمة لها في اعتبار الله. لو كانت الدنيا تساوي عند الله جناح بعوضة ما سقى منها كافرا شربة ماء. العظماء اقوياء والقوة ضد الوهن، والوهن منشأه وأصله حب الدنيا. قال (ص) "يوشك أن تتداعى عليكم الأمم كما تتداعى الأكلة إلى قصعتها قالوا أومن قلة نحن يومئذ يا رسول الله قال لا بل أنتم يومئذ كثير ولكنكم غثاء كغثاء السيل ولينزعن الله من قلبكم المهابة منكم وليقذفن في قلوبكم الوهن قالوا وما الوهن يا رسول الله قال حب الدنيا وكراهية الموت (حب الدنيا وكراهية الموت)". اجتمع في الحديث متضادان حب وكره. حب للدنيا وكره للخروج منها بسبب الموت. حب للبقاء وكره للفناء. حب للخيال وكره للحق. فأى عقل هذا الذي يتعلق بالفناء ويكره الحقيقة وهي الزوال والرحيل إلى الله. ومن ثم فإن كل متعلق بالدنيا راغب فيها هو ناقص العقل ان لم يكن فاقده. لأنه يتعلق بالأحلام ويكره اليقظة. وكما تقول الحكمة "أول وسيلة لتحقيق أحلامك هو أن تستيقظ من النوم". ولكن كل محب للدنيا لا يريد الاستيقاظ من النوم لمواجهة الحقيقة المرعبة له. فيفضل الأحلام والأوهام على الحقائق. ولذلكم وقطعا للطريق، طريق الإنغماس في أحلام الدنيا الفانية. يذكرنا (ص) بقوله "أكثرنا من ذكر هادم اللذات الموت". انظروا إلى هذا التعبير العظيم هادم اللذات. فكما أن الاستيقاظ من النوم هو هادم للأحلام فكذلك الموت هادم للذات. فالدنيا حلم، والموت يقظة. ويؤيد هذا المعنى ما جاء في قوله (ص) "الناس نيام فإذا ماتوا انتبهوا" "واعبد ربك حتى يأتيك اليقين". واليقين هو تمام اليقظة وكمال الإنتباه. ولذلكم يقول سبحانه وتعالى في بيان افضلية الآخرة "والآخرة خير وأبقى"، في إشارة إلى أن خيريتها في بقاءها ودوامها ولإنعدام هادم اللذات فيها وهو الموت. لا موت في الآخرة ولا فناء فيها. ومن ثم استحققت الأفضلية والخيرية. أما الزائل فإن أصحاب العقول لا يتقاتلون من أجله. الزائل لا قيمة له في قواميس العظماء. الزائل لا وجود له في قواميس القادة. العظماء لا يسرقون، لا يتعاملون بالربا، لا يظلمون، لا يقتلون، لا يخونون، ولا يكذبون، لأنهم يعلمون أنهم راحلون، ومحاسبون، ومسائلون. هم لقاء ربهم رقاهم، ونقاهم، وحلاهم. فلا تمتد أعينهم أسفل، لأن قلوبهم تعلقت بالأعلى. وليس معنى هذا أن لا يكون لهم مشاركة في الدنيا، في تجاراتها وأعمالها وإعمارها أبدا. ولكنهم يجعلون مسافة فاصلة بين الدنيا وبين قلوبهم. فلا تدخل قلوبهم ولا تستقر فيه. لأنهم يعملون أن تمكن الدنيا من قلوبهم هو سبب هلاكهم وبوارهم. شأنهم مع الدنيا كشأن السفينة مع الماء. يمشون فوقها يجعلونها وسيلة ولا يدخلونها إلى قلوبهم لأنهم يدركون أن غرقهم في تسرب الدنيا إلى قلوبهم كما أن غرق السفينة في دخول الماء إلى قلبها. إذا معاشر الأحياء أسس (ص) دعوته على الأخوة وختمها بالدعوة إلى الأخوة. وحذر من الدنيا باعتبارها قاطعة لحبل هذه الأخوة إذا استقرت في القلوب. وبين موقفه منها بالحال والمقال. يقول (ص) و هو سيد القادة و إمام العظماء "مالي وللدنيا إنما أنا والدنيا كراكب استظل تحت شجرة ثم تركها وراح". فإذا ما أخضعنا مسألة الدنيا إلى العقل أدركنا أنها لا تستحق أن تعبد ولا تستحق أن تؤسس عليها العلاقات ولا أن تبني عليها المودات. لأنها زائلة متغيرة فانية. وإذا ما أخضعناها إلى مسألة النقل وجدنا قوله تعالى "وما الحياة الدنيا إلا متاع". فالدنيا عقلا ونقلا لا تستحق أن يقاتل من أجلها بين العقول. جعلني الله وإياكم ممن ذكر فنفعتهم الذكرى. وأخلص الله عمله سرا وجهرا. آمين، آمين، والحمد لله رب العالمين.

الخطبة الثانية

الحمد لله الذي أنار العوالم جلاله وأحاط بكل شيء كماله. لا إله إلا هو يبدئ ويعيد ذو العرش المجيد فعال لما يريد. القائل في محكم الكتاب "إن بطش ربك لشديد". والصلاة والسلام على أشرف البرية وسيد البشرية سيدنا محمد (ص) الذي حذر من الدنيا الدنية صلى الله عليه صلاة أبدية سرمدية وعلى أتباعه إلى يوم الدين. معاشر الصالحين. إن رسول الله (ص) بين بحاله ومقاله حقيقة الدنيا. زهد فيها وزهد. وعلى هذا المعنى أسس جيلا فريدا من عظماء الدنيا. جيلا هو أعظم جيل عرفته

الدنيا إيماناً وزهداً وعطاءً. جيلاً تعلموا أن إمامهم أن الدنيا عرض زائل وأن الآخرة وعد صادق. جيل تربوا في أحضان الأمان ونشؤوا على المبادئ العالية. لم تستهزم الدنيا بقصورها وزهدها ومناصبها. فدانت لهم البلاد وأحبهم العباد. وسادوا فجادوا. وأعطوا فزادوا. يسأل الصديق رضي الله عنه حينما جاء بماله كله لله ورسوله. يسأل ماذا تركت لأهلك؟ فيقول تركت لهم الله ورسوله. فتأتي التزكية من رب البرية "وسيجنبها الأتقى الذي يؤتي ماله يتزكى وما لأحد عنده من نعمة تجزى إلا ابتغاء وجه ربه الأعلى ولسوف يرضى". يقف الفاروق عمر وقد احتاج عسلاً يتداوى به. وهو يومها أمير المؤمنين. فيخطب في الناس ويطلب منهم أن يسمحوا له أن يأخذ العسل من بيت مال المسلمين. والحبي عثمان يجود بالمال ويجهز جيش العسرة في عقد المشتري فيه هو الله. فتأتيه البشارة الهنية من سيد البشرية "ما ضر عثمان ما فعل بعد اليوم". وهذا الإمام علي. الصهر الولي. يصفه أحد الأصحاب قائلاً "ولقد رأيته يوماً واقفاً في محاربة يبكي بكاء الحزين. ماسكاً بلحيته وهو يقول "يا دنيا غري غيري أما أنا فقد طلقناك ثلاثاً". طلقها ولم يتزوجها يوماً ولم تكن عنده معبودة معشوقة. ساروا على ذلك. وعاشوا على ذلك. وجاء الجيل الذي بعدهم من جيل التابعين. وعلى نفس الخط ساروا. فكان الحسن البصري وسفيان الثوري والربيع بن خثيم والفضيل ومالك جيل فريد عظيم. وغيرهم كثير من أفاضل الدنيا الذين بصموا على صفحة التاريخ. وأول ما بصموا عليه زهدهم في هذه الدنيا. وعدم افتتانهم واقتنائهم من أجلها. ثم بدأت المبادئ تنهوى. وبدأت الدنيا تنسرب إلى قلوب الأجيال جيلاً بعد جيل. وعندما دخل حب الدنيا إلى القلوب. بدأت مظاهر التراجع والانحطاط جيلاً بعد جيل. وبدأ تسلط أعداء الأمة على الأمة. والتاريخ خير شاهد. والواقع اليوم خير شاهد. التتار والصليبيون وغيرهم. وبدأت الهجمات عبر الهجوم المباشر أو عبر تمكين المنافقين. وبدأت الشقاق والخلافات جيلاً بعد جيل. حتى وصلت إلى الأمة اليوم. ليرى العاقل كيف حولت الدنيا بعض المسلمين إلى ذناب. وأكثرهم إلى قطعان. فعم القتل وانتشرت الفتن. وضاعت خيرات المسلمين ليتسلمها أعدائهم. وبها يفرقون بين المسلمين. ويقسمونهم إلى شيع وأحزاب متصارعة متطاحنة. يقع بعضها في بعض. ويسلب بعضها خيرات بعض. وإيقاع الفرقة بين الناس هو مظهر من مظاهر الاستعلاء. هو مظهر من مظاهر الفرعونية. قال الله عن إمام من أئمة الاستعلاء والبغي "إن فرعون على فالأرض وجعل أهلها شيعاً يستضعف طائفة منهم. يذبح أبنائهم ويستحيي نساءهم إنه كان من المفسدين". تمكنت الدنيا من القلوب فصارت الأمة في المرتبة الدنيا. و الدنيا لغة ضد العليا. ودخول الدنيا إلى القلب واستقرارها فيه يجعل صاحب هذا القلب يلصق بالتراب، ويعبد الجسد، وينسى الروح. إن المؤمن الصادق الذي يتأمل في حال أمة رسول الله (ص) اليوم، يصاب بالحيرة ويعتريه الذهول. فهذه الوحشية التي نرى في عالم اليوم لا يمكن أبداً أن تكون في قواميس من ينتسبون إلى أمة الإسلام. هل الدنيا بهذا المحل الأسنى حتى تفعل في القلوب هذه الأفعال؟ هل حب البقاء بهذا المحل الأسنى حتى يفعل في الواقع مثل هذه الأفعال؟ إنها تساؤلات تتبع من قلوب تتعصر ألماً وحزناً على واقع الأمة المرير الحزين الاليم رغم بوادر الإشراق. رغم بوادر الإشراف. تساؤلات متداخلة وكلها تنصب في سؤال واحد محوري: ماذا يحدث لأمة سيدنا رسول الله (ص)؟ ماذا يحدث لأمة إمامها هو سيدنا رسول الله؟ ماذا يحدث لأمة قال الله فيها "كنتم خير أمة أخرجت للناس تامرون بالمعروف وتنهون عن المنكر وتؤمنون بالله"؟ من الذي يحاول قطع خيط الوصل بين الأمة وبين أصولها حتى صارت على هذه الصورة المحزنة من الصراعات، ومن القتل ومن الترويع؟ والسبب حب الدنيا. والسبب عبادة الذات والتسلط على الرقاب. حتى صارت بهذه الصورة من التزييف والفوضى العامة، حتى على مستوى الوجدان "كنتم خير أمة أخرجت للناس تامرون بالمعروف وتنهون عن المنكر". هل هذه الخبرية المشار إليها في هذه الآية تتناسب مع واقع أمة الإسلام اليوم؟ هذه الصورة التي تعطيها أمتنا للعالم اليوم، هل هي صورة حقيقة الأمة التي أسسها رسول الله (ص) على الأخوة وعلى المودة وعلى التألف وعلى الاجتماع؟ يقول ربنا "يا أيها الذين آمنوا لا تخونوا الله والرسول وتخونوا أماناتكم (وتخونوا أماناتكم) وأنتم تعلمون". إن نبذ العهد والميثاق الذي دعا إليه رسول الله هو خيانة لرسول الله. التعلق بالدنيا، والتمسك بحطامها، والإقتتال من أجلها، سورة من سور الغي. قال الله "فلخلف من بعدهم خلف أضاعوا الصلاة واتبعوا الشهوات فسوف يلقون غياً". إن المتعلق بالدنيا والتمسك بها والمسعور من أجلها يصل إلى درجة أن يصبح له عقل لا يفهم وقلب لا يرحم. وتلك بلاهة الحس وموت الضمير. تعطيل أدوات الفهم لإحقاق بركب البهيمية. والسبب حب الدنيا. إن كل مسلم راشد محب لرسول الله (ص)، متمسك بهديه، يجب عليه أن يعيد النظر في نفسه، وفي تعاطيه مع الدين، وفي تعامله مع الدنيا. إذا كانت الدنيا لا تدوم ولا تبقى، وإذا كانت الموت ينتظر كل حي، وإذا كان دخول القبر ينتظر كل واحد، فلماذا نفقتل على الدنيا ونعكف عليها؟ لماذا ننهب المروءات؟ لماذا نتمسك بالظلم؟ لماذا نخلى عن المبادئ؟ إن الفتنة والظلم والقهر والاعتداء والعناد والفوضى والمكر والخداع، والربى والرشوة، كل ذلك مظاهر لا تليق بهذه الأمة. كلها مظاهر تتنافى مع مبادئ هذه الأمة التي أسسها رسول الله (ص) بوحى من ربه على الأخوة والتضامن والبناء. إن كل فرد ينتمي إلى هذه الأمة عليه أن يراجع نفسه. و من كل المواقع عليه أن يتوب إلى الله وخصوصاً من مظالم العباد، لأن الهلاك والدمار واليوار يدخل من

لا تظلمن إذا ما كانت مقتدرا فالظلم ترجع عقباه إلى الندم
تنام عينك والمظلوم منتبه يدعو عليك وعين الله لم تنم

2.12 The English version of the sermon

In the Name of Allah who is alone in possessing His most splendid Name, and is the Owner of unconquerable might. Praise be to Allah who is Unique having the highest Names, the Owner of tremendous might, having neither beginning nor end. He is apparent, not by imagination or guesswork. He is the hidden out of purity, not out of nonexistence who has encompassed everything in His Mercy and Knowledge Allah has sent an abundance of His Favor to those whom He guides (friends) and He sent to them a Messenger of pure descent from the best among Arabs and non-Arabs and who is the finest both in lineage and upbringing. His intelligence and patience were greater than any of the creation of Allah, and his knowledge and understanding were indeed of the highest standing. His conviction was the strongest likewise his determination, as for his compassion and mercy it was the greatest of all humans. Allah purified him in both spirit and body and protected him from all imperfections and blemishes, and bestowed him with wisdom and judgment. Through him, Allah opened eyes that were blind, hearts that were covered and ears that were deaf, and He caused people to believe in Him. Those whom Allah had decreed happiness honored and helped him, as for

those to whom Allah had written wretchedness they rejected and turned away from him. Allah says, "But he who is blind in this life shall be blind in the Everlasting Life and will be further astray from the Path." May Allah praise His Messenger with praising that increase continuously and may He grant peace upon his family and Companions.

O the righteous! Indeed, when the Messenger of Allah (Peace and blessing be upon him) was sent by God as a guide to the straight way, the first thing he spread among his companions and followers was the spirit of brotherhood, sincerity and faithfulness. All these features and principles constitute the foundations of brotherhood. They are its pillars without which it cannot exist. When he (Peace and blessing be upon him) felt that he would die and leave life soon, among the greatest things that he ended his mission with was his call for brotherhood. He (Peace and blessing be upon him) stood in front of the crowd of Muslims in the Mount of Arafat and made invaluable recommendations and pieces of advice. A precious recommendation was "Indeed, your blood, property and honor are forbidden to be violated; they are as sacred as this day, in this month" (Riyad As-Saalihiin 2009, p. 49). Another recommendation he made was "Be brothers, O servants of Allah". In his life, he (Peace and blessing be upon him) laid the foundations of brotherhood and promoted it. He called for it, translating his words into deeds. He taught its principles to his companions, and used to remind them through the verses of the Holy Book (Quran) "The believers are brothers indeed" (Sûrah Al-Hujurât, verse 10). He admonished the opposite values, namely disagreement and conflict. He proved the outcomes of the difference and the disagreement via his God's revelation "And do not dispute (with one another) lest you lose courage and your strength departs, and be patient. Surely, Allah is with the patient)" (Sûrah Al-Anfâl, verse 46). In order to strengthen this brotherhood, he indicated the things that corrupt it: the creeping of desires and life to the inner of heart, and the attachment to high positions. This is because he (Peace and blessing be upon him) knew that if love of life creeps into the heart, it spoils it and turns it to a mere mechanical muscle which has no relation with emotion, with Allah remembrance, or with thoughts. Therefore, the carrier of such heart shifts from the rank of sublime humanity to the bottom of animalistic realm "And surely, We have created many of the jinn and mankind for hell. They have hearts wherewith they understand not, and they have eyes wherewith they see not, and they have ears wherewith they hear not (the truth). They are like cattle, nay even more astray" (Sûrah Al-A'râf, verse 179). At the beginning, he (God) likened them (unbelievers) to animals which do not understand or comprehend. Then, he moved them down below the animalistic level in his saying "nay even more astray" (Sûrah Al-A'râf, verse 179), because they had been granted the faculties of perception but they deactivated them, and they insisted on behaving like animals. This is not because they love that, but because they are enslaved. They are slaves of life which is just a game as described by the Holy Quran. It is well-known that games seduce children only. The Prophet (Peace and blessing be upon him) showed the truth of this ephemeral life by verses revealed to him by Allah "the life of this world is only play and amusement, pomp and mutual boasting among you, and rivalry in respect of wealth and children. (It is) as the likeness of vegetation after rain, thereof the growth is pleasing to the tiller" (Sûrah Al-Hadîd, verse 20), "O you who believe! What is the matter with you, that when you are asked to march forth in the Cause of Allah (i.e Jihâd) you cling heavily to the earth? Are you pleased with the life of this world rather than the

Hereafter? But little is the enjoyment of the life of this world as compared to the Hereafter” (Sûrah At-Taubah, verse 38), “Whoever desires the life of the world and its glitter, to them we shall pay in full (the wages of) their deeds therein (15) They are those for whom there is nothing Hereafter but fire...” (Sûrah Hûd, verse 15,16), “Whosoever desires (by his deeds) the reward of the Hereafter, We give him increase in his reward, and whosoever desires the reward of this world (by his deeds) we give him thereof (what is decreed for him) and he has no portion in the Hereafter” (Sûrah Ash-Shûra, verse 20). He (Peace and blessing be upon him) lived to reveal this truth through deeds and words. He had led an ascetic life and he was satisfied with. Months would go by without lighting fire in his house (i.e. no cooking). His food was nothing but dates and water. He would sleep on straw mat, which would leave traces on his body side. He would patch up his garments, milk ewe, and tie up his belly because of hunger. If he had wished to get gold and silver, he would have obtained them, but he was a Messenger, a Leader and a history Maker. It is the case of the great figures, let alone the greatest among them? It is the case of the perfect, let alone the most perfect among them? The great do not fight about crumbs. Great figures do not murder or kill each other. The great do not fight over trifles. The great do not commit vandalism or aggression. This is because they know they are leaving the present life, which is worthless in the view of Allah. If, in the view of Allah, it equaled the wing of a mosquito, he would not allow a disbeliever to have access to its drinking water. The great are strong. Strength is against weakness. Weakness is instigated by the love of the present life. The Prophet (Peace and blessing be upon him) said “The people will soon summon one another to attack you as people when eating invite others to share their dish. Someone asked: Will that be because of our small numbers at that time? He replied: No, you will be numerous at that time: but you will be scum and rubbish like that carried down by a torrent, and Allah will take fear of you from the breasts of your enemy and last enervation into your hearts. Someone asked: What is wahan (enervation), Messenger of Allah (PBBH)? He replied: Love of this life and dislike of death”. Two opposites are stated in this Hadith: love and hate. Loving life and hating leaving it due to death. Loving continuity and hating evanescence. Loving imagination and hating truth. So, is it reasonable for the mind to love evanescence and hate the truth which is the return to God. Therefore, anyone who loves and clings to the present life has a deficient mind, if he has any at all. This is because he loves dreams and hates reality. There is a wise saying which reminds us that “The first way to make your dreams come true is to wake up”. But, anyone who loves the present life does not want to wake up to face the horrible truth. Thus, he prefers dreams and imagination more than the truth. For this reason, and in order to prevent people from dreaming about the vanishing life, he (Peace and blessing be upon him) reminds us by his saying: “Constantly remember the destroyer of pleasures (meaning death)”. Look at this meaningful expression “the destroyer of desires”. Awakening is the destroyer of dreams in the same sense as death is the destroyer of desires. Therefore, the present life is a dream, while death is awakening. This meaning is supported by his (Peace and blessing be upon him) saying and God’s saying “People are sleeping <right now>, when they die, they will pay attention”, “And worship your Lord until there comes unto you the certainty (i.e death)” (Sûrah Al- Hijr, verse 99). Death is ultimate awakening and perfect awareness. God Almighty says about the priority of the Hereafter “the Hereafter is better and more lasting” (Sûrah Al-A’lâ, verse 17), to indicate that its priority comes from its continuity and eternity, and comes also from the absence of death (the

destroyer of desires). There is no death or evanescence in the Hereafter. This is why it deserves its priority and supremacy. Therefore, smart people do not fight over what is ephemeral, as it is worthless in their eyes. The great do not concern themselves with ephemeral matters. The great do not steal, do not deal with each other using usury, do not oppress, do not kill, do not betray, and do not lie. This is because they know they are leaving this life, and they will be accountable. Their interest to meet their God promotes, purifies and raises them high. They do not look down because their hearts are attached to sublime matters. This does not mean that they will not participate in mundane matters such as business, work and construction of the present life. Rather, they keep a distance between present life and their hearts so as not to settle therein. This is because they know that if secular matters gain ground in their hearts, they will be doomed to destruction. Their relationship with life is just like the relationship of the ship with water. They live in it and use it as a means, but they do not let it in their hearts, because they know that if they do, they will be destroyed just like the ship when it is filled with water.

Thus, dear believers, the Prophet (Peace and blessing be upon him) established his mission on brotherhood and ended it by calling for brotherhood. He warned against the present life because it breaks brotherhood ties. He pointed this out by his deeds and words. He (Peace and blessing be upon him), the foremost leader and a great figure, said “**I do not care about the present life. I am only a traveler who sat in the shadow of a tree for a while and then left it**”. Therefore, it stands to reason that the present life is not worth worshipping, and it does not deserve to be taken as a basis to establish our relationships, or to be the foundation of mutual love. This because it is ephemeral, variable and transient. And if we refer to the word of God, the Almighty says: “**The life of this world is only the enjoyment of deception (a deceiving thing)**” (Sûrah Âl-‘Imrân, verse 185). Thus, using both reason and the word of God, life does not deserve to be fought about between wise people.

May Allah help us benefit from the word of Allah, and be sincere in our overt and covert acts. Amen, Amen, and praise be to Allah, the Lord of the entire universe (mankind, jinn and all that exist).

Second sermon

Praise be to Allah whose light enlightens the world and whose perfection covers everything. Allah! Lâ ilâha illa huwa (none has the right to be worshipped but he. He begins (punishment) and repeats (punishment in the Hereafter) (or originates the creation of everything, and then repeats it on the Day of Resurrection), Owner of the Glorious Throne, (He is the) Doer of whatsoever He intends (or wills). He who said in his Holy Book “**Verily, the seizure (punishment) of your Lord is severe and painful**” (Sûrah Al-Burûj, verse 12). Salutations and blessings be upon the most noble and the Master of all mankind Muhammad (Peace and blessing be upon him) who warned against the villainous present life. May Allah bless him and his followers forever.

Dear righteous!

The Messenger of Allah (Peace and blessing be upon him) showed, through his deeds and words, the truth of the present life. He gave it up and relinquished its pleasures. On this basis, he established a unique generation of great figures in this life, the best generation this life has ever witnessed. They were the most faithful, the most ascetic, and the most generous. It was a generation that learnt from their Imam (Master) that the present life is ephemeral and that the Hereafter is the true promise. It is a generation that grew up in the realm of belief and was taught exalted principles. They were not seduced by the palaces, gold or positions of this life. That is why the Islamic Community accepted them as leaders and people loved them. Thus, they were adequate governors and generous donors.

When the Upright Companion (Abû Bakr Assidîq) (May Allah be pleased with him) brought all his money to donate it for the sake of God and the Prophet, he was asked ‘what did you leave for your family?’ He said ‘I left God and his Prophet for them’. This deed was corroborated by the following verses: “**And Al-Muttaqûn (the pious) will be far removed from it (Hell) He who spends his wealth for increase in self-purification And who has (in mind) no favour from anyone to be paid back (When he enters Paradise) Except to seek the Countenance of his Lord, the most High**” (Sûrah Al-Lail, verses 17- 21). Omar, who distinguishes truth from falsehood, needed some honey for medical use, and he requested people to let him have some from the Muslims’ Treasury, although he was the Commander of the faithful. Othman, the pious, gave money and equipped the army of Al-ûsra in a contract between him and God. Then the good news came from the Master of all mankind, who said “**Nothing can harm Othman after this day**”. Ali, the Imam, and the Prophet’s son-in-law, was described by one of the Prophet’s Companions: “One day, he was standing in his niche crying like a sad person, holding his beard and saying ‘O present life! seduce another one not me. I have divorced you three times’”. He divorced it before he even married it. He had never loved it at all. This generation chose this way, and lived this way. The second generation of companions chose the same way. Some of the leaders of this generation were Al-Hassan Al-Basri, Sufian Atawri, A-rrabi’ Bnu Khutaym and Malik. There were many like them who served as great figures in history. Their most outstanding achievement was their disinterest in life. They were not seduced by it or fight over it.

Just after that time, principles started to disintegrate, and the present life started creeping into the hearts of generation after regeneration. When the love of life gained ground in hearts, the deterioration and decay started taking its toll on generation after generation. And the enemies of the Islamic Community started to dominate the Muslim nation. This is proved by history and the facts on the ground. Tatars, Crusaders, among others, started to attack directly or indirectly via enabling the disbelievers to dominate Muslims. Disagreements and disputes started to arise one generation after the other till they have inflicted the Islamic Community today. The wise observer can see how life changed some people to wolves and many others to herds of cattle. Thus, killing and strife spread, and Muslims’ resources have been spoiled and exploited by their enemies. Such resources are being used to separate Muslims into parties and sects who engage in fighting, oppressing and stealing the resources of each other. Separating people is an aspect of hegemony which is among the characteristics of the Pharaohs. God says about one of the outstanding figures of hegemony and oppression

“Verily, Fir’aun (Pharaoh) exalted himself in the land and made its people sects, weakening (oppressing) a group (i.e children of Israel) among them: killing their sons, and letting their females live. Verily, he was of the Mufsidûn (i.e those who commit great sins and crimes, oppressors, tyrants)” (Sûrah Al-Qasas, verse 4). Life gripped people’s hearts; hence, the Islamic Community fell to the bottom. Literally, Arabic “dunya” (life- the lowest) is the opposite of “the highest”. When life creeps into the heart and gains ground therein, it makes the bearer of such heart a mundane person, worshiping the body and neglecting the soul. The true believer, who considers the situation of the Prophet’s nation (Peace and blessing be upon him) today will get surprised and astonished. The barbarism that the world witnesses today cannot be associated to those who belong to the Islamic Community. Is life so important that it takes its toll on hearts in such a way? Is the love of staying alive in this world so powerful that it leads to such deeds on the ground? These are bitter questions emanating from sad hearts due to the deteriorating situation of the Muslim nation, despite some silver linings. These are overlapping questions which all fall under one central question: what is happening to the nation of our Master Muhammad (Peace and blessing be upon him)? What is happening to a nation whose Leader is Muhammad (Peace and blessing be upon him)? What is happening to a nation whom God says about it “You [true believers in Islamic Monotheism, and real followers of Prophet Muhammad (Peace and blessing be upon him) and his Sunnah] are the best of people ever raised up for mankind; you enjoin Al-Ma’rûf (i.e Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam has ordained) and forbid Al-Munkar (Polytheism, disbelief and all that Islam has forbidden). And you believe in Allah” (Sûrah Al-‘Imrân, verse 110)? Who is trying to break the bonds linking the Islamic nation to its origin so that it has reached this situation characterized by fights, killing and terror? The reason is the love of the present life, self-worshipping and hegemony; so much so that the Islamic Community now shows this fake, chaotic image even at the level of conscience “You [true believers in Islamic Monotheism, and real followers of Prophet Muhammad (Peace and blessing be upon him) and his Sunnah] are the best of people ever raised up for mankind; you enjoin Al-Ma’rûf (i.e Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam has ordained) and forbid Al-Munkar (Polytheism, disbelief and all that Islam has forbidden)” (Sûrah Al-‘Imrân, verse 110). Is the supremacy indicated in this verse corresponds to the reality of the Muslim nation today? Does the image which our nation shows to the world constitute the real picture of the nation that our Prophet (Peace and blessing be upon him) established on brotherhood, love, unity and harmony? Our God says “O you who believe! Betray not Allah and His Messenger, nor betray knowingly your Amânât (things entrusted to you, and all the duties which Allah has ordained for you” (Sûrah Al-Anfâl, verse 27). Breaking the covenant and pact which the Prophet called for is considered a betrayal to him. Being fond of life and its vanities and fighting for secular matters are signs of sin. God says “Then, there has succeeded them a posterity who have given up As-slât (the prayers) [i.e made their Salât (prayers) to be lost, either by not offering them or by not offering them perfectly or by not offering them in their proper fixed times] and have followed lusts: so they will be thrown in Hell” (Sûrah Maryam, verse 59). Those who love life and fiercely cling to it would reach a point in which their mind gets unperceptive and their hearts merciless, which leads to senselessness and death of conscience. Deactivating the tools of understanding moves you down to the animalistic level. And the reason is the love of life. Any wise Muslim, who loves the Messenger of Allah (Peace and blessing be upon him)

and respects his guidance, should reconsider his conduct and the way he is dealing with religion, as well as the way he is treating life. If life does not last forever, and if everyone is mortal, why do we fight over it and stick to it? Why do we admonish honorable values? Why do we stick to injustice? Why do we abandon principles? Strife, oppression, persecution, aggression, stubbornness, chaos, deception, betrayal, usury and corruption are aspects not in tune with this nation (Islamic Community). All these aspects are at odds with the principles of brotherhood, solidarity and constructiveness, on which the Messenger of Allah (Peace and blessing be upon him) established the nation, with inspiration from his God.

Every member who belongs to this nation (Islamic Community) should review his behavior. And from all sides, he should turn to God in repentance especially from oppression which he might have perpetrated against people, because destruction and ruin are caused by oppression and infringement upon the rights of people. Anyone who has oppressed his brother should give him his right back immediately and before the Day of Judgment “**You will have no refuge on that Day, nor there will be for you any denying (of your crimes as they are all recorded in the Book of your deeds)**” (Sûrah Ash-Shûra, verse 47). This is because aggression leads to regret, as the poetic verses below indicate:

Do not oppress if you are powerful

Because oppression leads to regret

You sleep, while the oppressed person does not

He invokes God against you and God never sleeps.

Every Muslim who took by force and exhorated his brother's right, or he harmed him in his honor, should give him his right back. He (Peace and blessing be upon him) said “**Allah decrees the (Hell) Fire and debars Jannah for the one who usurps the rights of a believer by taking a false oath.**” One man asked: “O Messenger of Allah! Even if it should be for an insignificant thing?” He said, “Even if it be a stick of the Arak tree (i.e., the tree from which **Miswak sticks are taken**)”. Every true Muslim should pray and beseech God in these times of strife that the nation faces, for Allah to spare Muslims this ordeal, spread peace among them, be merciful to his powerless servants, takes revenge on their oppressor, and restrains evil, oppressive, stubborn, and corrupted people.

O Allah, we seek Your favor to raise our status. Help us operate under your obedience and lead us to the good deeds. May Allah mend our intentions. May Allah mend our intentions. May Allah mend our intentions. O Lord! Make our souls fearful of you, purify our soul, since none can purify it better and you are its Master. O Lord! We ask you to grant us victory in the judgment Day; secure us a place among martyrs and happy people. We ask you to grant us victory over the enemies. We ask you for blessings never ceasing and the coolness of our eyes (i.e. pleasure) that never ends. We ask for a life of coolness after death. We ask You for the delight of gazing upon Your Face and the joy of meeting You without any harm and misleading trials befalling us. O Lord of Majesty and Bounty! Anyone who wants to harm, oppress or cheat this nation, take revenge on him. O Lord! Be merciful by your powerless

servants everywhere. O Lord! Be merciful by your powerless servants everywhere. O Lord! Be merciful to your powerless servants everywhere. O Lord! Remove the oppression against the nation of the Messenger of Allah. O Lord! Remove the oppression against the nation of the Messenger of Allah. O Lord! Remove the oppression against the nation of the Messenger of Allah. O Lord! Remove despotism against the nation of the Messenger of Allah. O Lord! Remove despotism against the nation of the Messenger of Allah. O Lord! Remove despotism against the nation of the Messenger of Allah. O Lord of Majesty and Bounty! Take revenge on anyone who intends to kill, oppress or subdue this nation of the Messenger of Allah. O Lord of Majesty and Bounty! Anyone one who wants to kill, oppress or subdue this nation of the Messenger of Allah, show us in them the wonders of Your Might. You are the Ever living, the One Who sustains and protects all that exists, none has the right to be worshipped but you. O Lord! help Islam and Muslims. O Lord! help Islam and Muslims. O Lord! Protect our country from any strife or ordeal. O Lord! Protect our country from any ordeals. O Lord! Protect our country from any overt or covert strife. O Lord! Protect our country from any overt or covert strife. O Lord! Protect our country from any overt or covert strife. O Lord! Guide our leader, Muhammad VI, to the right way. O Lord! Help him to be pious and righteous. O God! Guide and show him the right way, and protect his Crown Prince, Muly Al-Hassan, and his brother, Muly Rachid, and all his royal family and nation. Verily, you all-powerful. O Allah, bless Muhammad and the family of Muhammad, and favor Muhammad and the family of Muhammad, and have mercy on Muhammad and the family of Muhammad, just as You blessed, favored, and had mercy on Ibrahim and the family of Ibrahim. You are truly the Most Praiseworthy and Noble.. Glorified be your Lord, the Lord of Honor and Power! (He is free) from what they attribute unto him! And peace be on the Messengers! And all the praises and thanks to Allah, Lord of the universe.

2.13 Data Analysis Method

The data were analyzed on the basis speech act theory, the theory of implicature, and politeness theory. Therefore, I adopted the schemes used by those theories. The schemes used are as follows:

- 1- Moods
 - a- The indicative mood: (kaana min ?awwali maa ba00ahu fi ?ashaabihi ruuha Al-?uxuwah: the first thing he spread among his companions and followers was the spirit of brotherhood)
 - b- The interrogative mood: (limaaðaa nanbuðu al-murru?aat: Why do we admonish honorable values?)
 - c- The imperative mood: (?unðuruu ?ilaa haaða al-ta3biir al-3aðiim: Look at this meaningful expression)
- 2- Functions: (address, order, etc)
- 3- Categories
 - a- Assertive: (yaquulu subhaanahu wa ta3aalaa fii bayaani ?afdaliyati Al-?aaxirati: God Almighty says about the priority of the Hereafter)

- b- Directive: (ʔunḏuruu ʔilaa haaḏa al-ta3biir al-3aḏiim: Look at this meaningful expression)
 - c- Expressive: maaḏaa yaḥduṡu li ʔummatin ʔimaamuhaa huwa sayyidunaa rasuulu al-laah: What is happening to a nation whose Leader is Muhammad (Peace and blessing be upon him)?)
- 4- Illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts
- a- Illocutionary act: The illocutionary act of this utterance, “ʔunḏuruu ʔilaa haaḏa al-ta3biir al-3aḏiim: Look at this meaningful expression, is order.
 - b- Perlocutionary act: The perlocutionary act of this utterance, “ʔinnamaa akluhu al-ttamru wa al-maaʔ: His food was nothing but dates and water.”, is that the audience become patient.
- 5- The intended and the unintended effect
- a- Intend effect: the intended effect of this utterance, “3aaša zahidan raadiya”, is to let people live an ascetic life.
 - b- Unintended effect: the unintended effect of this utterance, “3aaša zahidan raadiya”, might be to live a luxurious life and to fight to live such life.
- 6- Explicit and implicit performatives
- a- Explicit performative: “Al-laahumma ʔinnaa nasʔaluka al-fawza 3inda al-qaḏaaʔ”: “O Lord! We ask you to grant us victory in the judgment day”
 - b- Implicit performative: “ʔinna batša rabbika laṣadiid”: “Verily, the seizure (punishment) of your Lord is severe and painful”
- 7- The cooperative principle
- a- Maxims: the aim is to see the manifestation of maxims (quantity, quality, relation, manner) in the sermon.
 - b- Violation of maxims: the aim is to see the reason behind the violation of maxims.
- 8- Face threatening acts
- a- Negative face threatening act: (wa man kaana fii haaḏihi ʔa3maa fahuwa fi Al-ʔaaxirati ʔa3maa: But he who is blind in this life shall be blind in the Everlasting Life and will be further astray from the Path)
 - b- Positive face threatening act: (ṣabbahahum bidaayatan bi Al-ʔan3aam Al-latii laa tafham wa laa tudrik: At the beginning, he (God) likened them (unbelievers) to animals which do not understand or comprehend)
- 9- Politeness strategies
- a- Bald-on-record strategies: (kuunuu 3ibaada Al-lahi ʔixwanaa: Be brothers, O servants of Allah)
 - b- Positive politeness strategies: (liyaraa Al-3aaqilu kayfa ḥawwalat Al-dduniyaa ba3da Al-muslimiina ʔilaa ḏiʔaab wa akṡraham ʔilaa qut3aan: The wise observer can see how life changed some people to wolves and many others to herds of cattle)

- c- Negative politeness strategies: (falimaaḏaa naqtatilu 3alaa al-dduniyaa wa na3kifu 3alayhaa: Why do we fight over it and stick to it?)
- d- Off-record strategies: (ʔijtima3a fi al-hadiiḥi mutaḌaaḌaan hubbun wa kurh: Two opposites are stated in in this ḥadiḥ: love and hate)
- e- Don't do face threatening act strategy: (There is no example in the sermon)

10- Pragmatic devices

- a- Metaphor: (wa man kaana fii haaḥihi ʔa3maa fa huwa fi al-ʔaaxirati a3maa: But he who is blind in this life shall be blind in the Everlasting Life and will be further astray from the Path)
- b- Euphemism: (dunuwwi ʔajalihi: leave life soon)
- c- Allusion: (yanḥuru fiihim tilka al-durar wa tilka al-jawaahir: He made invaluable recommendations and pieces of advice)
- d- Simile: (yuuṣiku an tatdaa3aa 3alaykumu al-ʔumamu kamaa tatadaa3aa al-ʔakalatu ʔilaa qaṢatihaa: The people will soon summon one another to attack you as people when eating invite others to share their dish)
- e- Personification: (riqqan wa 3ubuudiyatan li al-dduniyaa Al-latii hiya fii haqiqatihaa la3ibun wa lahwun: They are slaves of life which is just a game)
- f- Antonymy: (wa al-dduniyaa luyatan ḌiḌḌu al-3uliyaa: Literally, Arabic “dunya” (life- the lowest) is the opposite of “the highest)
- g- Rhetorical questions: (limaaḏaa nabḏu al-muruuʔaat: Why do we admonish honorable values?)
- h- Oxymoron: (wa al-yaqiin huwa tamaamu al-yaqaḏati wa kamaalu al-intibaah: Death is ultimate awakening and perfect awareness)

2.14 Statistical analysis of data

Given the complex nature of the present study, which aims to investigate the different moods and functions, in addition to some pragmatic issues such as conversational implicature and politeness, Frequency analysis has been adopted for a descriptive and inferential end.

Frequency analysis was conducted in order to describe the different moods and functions in the sermon to verify the non-correspondence between mood and function. The same analysis was conducted to describe the different categories and illocutionary verbs attributed to them in order to know the dominant category and the reason behind that.

2.15 Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the different methodological steps followed in the collection and analysis of the study's data. I started by restating the objectives, the hypothesis and the questions of the data. Then, I listed the reasons that were behind choosing the Friday sermon under study. After that, I presented the research approaches used in dealing with the data, namely the quantitative and the qualitative approaches. I also presented the research instruments that included translation and Excel program. In addition, I introduced the situational variables which were divided into two types: external and internal. Finally, the

subjects (the Imam and the audience), procedure, data analysis and statistical analysis were presented. Bearing these considerations in mind, the following chapter will deal with the presentation of the results of the various analyses undertaken to answer the research questions asked in the general introduction.

Chapter Three: Results

3.1 Introduction

The present chapter is concerned with summarizing the findings of this work, whose aim is to investigate the different syntactic moods of a Friday sermon and the functions targeted by using those moods using a pragmatic approach. The data analyzed in this chapter is composed of utterances that the Imam utters in a selected sermon. Before dealing with the pragmatic side in the sermon, a brief introduction about the Friday sermon's discourse is presented. The utterances found in the sermon are divided according to moods, and then their functions specified. They are also classified according to Searle's taxonomy of speech acts. After that, explicit and implicit speech acts are detected. In addition, metaphorical speech acts and conversational implicatures are detected, too. Furthermore, utterances are tested against the cooperative principle and its maxims. Finally, the findings reveal the different politeness strategies used in the sermon and the different face threatening acts.

465 utterances have been counted in the sermon: 215 utterances in the first part of the sermon and 250 utterances in the second part of the sermon. These utterances will be analyzed pragmatically. Therefore, the analysis is meant to show the different moods in the sermon and whether there is a correspondence with their functions. It is also meant to show the different categories the utterances belong to and whether the Imam observes the cooperative principle when delivering the sermon. Finally, it is meant to discover the different face threatening acts existed in this sermon with the politeness strategies used by the Imam to minimize the threat of those acts.

3.2 The layout of the sermon

Before indulging in the presentation of the findings of this chapter, I would like first to present the layout of the Friday sermon I am working on. The sermon is divided to four parts namely the introduction, the first first part of the sermon, the second part of the sermon, and the conclusion.

The Imam starts the sermon with a short introduction in which he addresses the audience in the Name of God. He also glorifies God by showing his characteristics such as "ʔismihi Al-ʔasmaa": "His most splendid Name", "laysa duunahu muntahan wa laa waraaʔahu marmaa": "having neither beginning nor end" ...etc. He compliments the prophet and shows his characteristics too such as "ʔanfaSahum 3urban wa 3ujmaa": "a Messenger of pure descent from the best among Arabs and non-Arabs", "zakkaahu ruuḥan wa jismaa": "Allah purified him in both spirit and body" ... etc. The glorifying of God and the complementation of the prophet is done to show the serious talk he is going to say. The introduction lasts one minute and four seconds.

In the first sermon, the Imam introduces the topic and presents the first part of his talk. From my observation to many other sermons, the Imam always addresses the audience using specific expressions such as "ma3aashira Al-SSaalihiin": "O the righteous!", "ma3aashira Al-ʔixwa": "O brothers!", "ʔayyuha Al-muʔminuun": "O believers!"...etc. These expressions are used to separate between the introduction and the first sermon. In this sermon, the separation between the introduction and the first sermon is done with the use of the

expression “ma3aashira Al-SSaalihiin”: “O the righteous!” It is enclosed using a sentence in which the Imam asks God to make him and his audience among those who got reminded, and their work is purified. The first part of the sermon lasts 11 minutes and 12 seconds.

After finishing the first part of the sermon the Imam sits for a while that may lasts 10 second as happens in this sermon. Most of the time, the Imam starts the second sermon by praising God and praying upon the prophet. After that, he uses one of the specific expressions used to start the first sermon. The expression used in this sermon is “ma3aashira Al-SSaalihiin”: “O the righteous!” The Imam in the second part of the sermon delivers the second part of his speech. It is almost a continuation of the first one. That is to say they have the same topic. Sometimes, the Imam speaks about different topics in the first and the second part of the sermon. The second second part of the sermon lasts 11 minutes and 28 seconds. This means that it is almost the same length as the first part.

The concluding paragraph includes prayers to God to protect believers, show them the straightway and give them paradise....etc. It includes a special prayer to God to protect the king of the country and his family. It is enclosed by praying upon the prophet, his children and all his family. The conclusion is a bit longer than the introduction. It lasts two minutes and fifty seven seconds.

3.3 Salient features of the Friday sermon’s discourse

Discourse is defined by Crystal (2008, p. 148) as “a set of utterances which constitute any recognizable speech event (no reference being made to its linguistic structuring, if any), e.g. a conversation, a joke, a sermon, an interview.” It means instances of communication in the medium of language being spoken, written or even signed. Discourse can be considered as a particular perspective of the various elements of semiotics as moments of social practices. It views language as a social activity and as an instance of social practices. Discourse is multi-disciplinary in its approach. Perspectives from other disciplines are incorporated to help students and scholars from wide range of backgrounds to formulate their own views on discourse and to engage in their own discourse analysis (Classroom notes 2012). I will analyze the Friday sermon discourse using the following levels of analysis: lexical level, intonation in discourse, syntactical level and textual level.

3.3.1 The lexical level

The choice of words in a certain discourse is not done haphazardly especially if we are using a discourse that is addressed to public. Therefore, the words should be chosen carefully to achieve certain effects especially if we are talking about certain types of discourses which are always loaded with some ideology such as the religious discourse. Friday sermons have a religious discourse which is most of the time guided by a certain ideology. If the mosque, where the sermon is given, is under the supervision of the regime, the Imam should abide by certain guidance. If the mosque is under the supervision of a certain movement, such as Salafis, the Imam should deal with topics that the movement expects from him.

The Friday sermon I am working on is characterized by a series of abstract nouns which refer to unordinary objects. The choice of nouns here contributes in shaping a complex world⁴. The following are examples of nouns used in the Friday sermon under study:

- “Al-laah”: “God”
- “Al-rasuul”: “The prophet”
- “Raḥma”: “mercy”
- “Al-SSaalihiin”: “the righteous”
- “Al-Ḥuxuwwa”: “the brotherhood”
- “Al-muslimiin”: “the Muslims”
- “Al-muminiin”: “the believers”
- “Al-dduniya”: “the life”
- “Al-Ḥaaxira”: “the Hereafter”
- “waSaayaa”: “recommendations”

These are examples of the type of nouns existed in the Friday sermon which shows the complex world the sermon shapes. The sermon then is addressed to educated people and not to all categories of society.

The adjectives used in the sermon describe objects in terms of invisible attributes. Therefore, the adjectives used invoke a complex reality. The following are examples of adjectives used in the sermon:

- “hadiyan”: “guide”
- “swaaḥ”: “straight”
- “ḥaraam”: “forbidden”
- “Ḥaḍal”: “more astray”
- “Ḥa3Zam”: “the greatest”
- “Ḥakmal”: “the most perfect”
- “sirran”: “covert”
- “jahraa”: “overt”
- “Al-ddaniyya”: “the villainous”
- “fariid”: “unique”
- “fir3awniyya”: “pharaonic”
- “muḌirra”: “harm”

These adjectives are abstract and describe objects intangibly. These means that the sermon describes a complex reality in which the hearer is concerned with intangible things which need to be thought on deeply.

Most of the verbs used in the sermon are used in the simple past, some used in the past continuous and a few in the simple present. This signifies that the Imam is talking about presupposed things which are uncontroversial, and need not to be discussed. Therefore, what

⁴ Complex world means that the world the Friday sermon is shaping is complex. It needs certain level of education and reason to be understood. Complex world is opposed to simple world where things are simple and concrete. We shape simple world by using simple sentences such as the ones addressed to children.

the Imam says is true and has to be taken for granted. The following are examples of verbs used in the sermon:

- “wasi3a”: “encompassed”
- “ba3a0a”: “encompassed”
- “zakaa”: “purified”
- “ʔahassa”: “felt”
- “3aaša”: “lived”
- “šabbaha”: “likened”
- “yuðakkiru”: “was reminding”
- “ʔassasa”: “established”
- “yahdii”: “was guiding”

3.3.2 Discourse intonation in the sermon

Discourse is defined by Crystal (2008) as “a term used in linguistics to refer to a continuous stretch of (especially spoken) language larger than a sentence – but, within this broad notion, several different applications may be found. At its most general, a discourse is a behavioural unit which has a pre-theoretical status in linguistics: it is a set of utterances which constitute any recognizable speech event (no reference being made to its linguistic structuring, if any), e.g. a conversation, a joke, a sermon, an interview” (Crystal, p. 148). He defines intonation as “A term used in the study of suprasegmental phonology, referring to the distinctive use of patterns of pitch, or melody” (Ibid, p. 225). Similarly, Dorthy (2002, p. 31) defines intonation as “a term often used interchangeably with several other terms, in particular prosody and suprasegmentals” he continues to say that “intonation is often referred to in everyday language as speech melody or sentence melody terms that focus on pitch variations and modulations.” Dorthy (2002, p. 31) says that “in order to understand fully what an utterance means, one must go beyond traditional sentence grammar and include pragmatic explanations.” After defining discourse and intonation, we move now to see the functions of intonation in discourse particularly the illocutionary functions of intonations since illocutionary functions of intonation are what counts in this study. Dorthy (2002, p. 32) adopts the categorization of Halliday (1963) to tone types as tone is a key term in intonation. Tone “refers to the pitch change that characterizes the tonic segment of a tone group” (Dorthy 2002, p. 32). According to Halliday (1963), there are five tones: (1) falling-rising, (2) Falling, (3) rising, (4) rising-falling, (5) low-rising (presented by Dorthy (2002, pp. 33-34)). The following are examples of utterances of the five types of tones presented by Dorthy (2002, pp. 33-34):

- (136) // when I’ve finished Middlemarch // I shall read Adam Bede // (∨ = fall-rise)
- (137) // when I’ve finished Middlemarch // I shall read Adam Bede // (∖ = fall)
- (138) // REALLY? // (∧ = rise-fall)
- (139) // had he READ it? // (/ = rise)

Dorthy says that “in addition to making choices in the tone system, a speaker must also select relative pitch or key for each tone unit” (Ibid, p. 34). Pitch refers “to the varying

level or height of the sounds produced in speech” (Ibid, p. 34). There are three levels of pitch: high, mid and low.

The choice of tones and pitches is not done haphazardly by speakers in discourse. Speakers make meaningful choices to tones and speech. For example, as a response to the question *Where are the glasses?*, the use of simple rising tone in *in the CUPboard* implies *that’s where they always are*, whereas if the falling-rising tone is used in *in the CUPboard*, implies *why don’t you ever remember...?* Concerning pitch, Dorthy says that “selection of high or low key involves rising or lowering the pitch of the whole tone group relative to a pitch that can be established as the norm for the speaker concerned” (Ibid, p. 34). The functions of high or low pitches depend on their position in the utterance. In general, high pitch signals contrastive information while low pitch signals equivalent information. Intonation is among the illocutionary force identifying devices (IFIDs) that Searle (1969) talks about. It has a potent role in conveying the speakers’ intention of speech act. In the following sub-section, we see the role that intonation has with the illocutionary functions in the Friday sermon.

3.3.2.1 Illocutionary functions and intonation

Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) emphasise the idea that sentences have specific illocutionary force depending on context. Dorthy (2002, p. 60) claims that intonation is used to express the speaker’s intentional or illocutionary force. For example, in uttering a question such as “Why don’t you move to California?”, the intonation chosen will indicate whether the speaker is making a “genuine” inquiry (high pitch), a suggestion (low pitch) or an exhortation (level intonation rising slightly at the end), if someone says “It’s hot in here,” the intonation helps to express whether the speaker is making a simple statement, is grumbling or complaining, or is making an indirect request that someone opens the window.

In the sermon, the use of the falling tone indicates that the Imam is expressing certainty or giving commands and that the meaning is complete. For example, in the utterance (148) “*Hiya 3amadu[↗]haa al-latii la taquumu b[↗]id[↗]uunihaa*”: “They (principles) are its pillars without which it (brotherhood) cannot exist”, the two italicized words are the ones that contain the prominent stress and the ones that aligned with the falling intonation the utterance has. In this case, falling intonation is used as an IFID to indicate certainty of the statement expressed in the utterance. In the example (152) “*ʔakθiruu min ðikri haadimi al-[↗]lāððaa[↗]t*”: “Constantly remember the destroyer of pleasures (meaning death)”, the italicized word is the one aligned with the falling intonation since it is the one contains the prominent stress. In this case, falling intonation (in addition to other things such as structure) is used as an IFID to indicate command.

The rising tone in the sermon communicates uncertainty and lack of finality and it is mostly used with yes/no questions. In the example (213) “*ʔinna dimaaʔakum wa ʔamwaalakum wa ʔaraaḌakum haramun 3alay[↗]kum*”: “Indeed your blood, property and honor are forbidden to be violated”, the Imam communicates lack of finality. In this case, the prophet wants to add something else which is expressed in the following utterance. The prophet does not communicate uncertainty since he expresses declaration in this utterance.

Therefore, the rising intonation is used as an IFID in this utterance to indicate lack of finality. In the example (154) “*ParaḌiitum* bi al-ḥayaati al-dduniyaa mina *al-ḥaxira*”: “Are you pleased with the life of this world rather than the hereafter”, God does not communicate uncertainty, but He expresses reprimanding. In this case, the rising tone is associated with the structure rather than the illocutionary force. In the example (156) “*Ḥawa min qilatin naḥnu ya rasuula al-laah*”: “Will that be because of our small numbers at that time?”, in addition to structure, intonation expresses uncertainty. Rising tone, in this example, expresses reprimanding, too.

The form of intonation pattern whether its end-point rises or falls, as Brown et al. (1980), has a close relationship with the form of illocutionary force of an utterance, whether it functions as a statement, question, or command.

In the sermon, statements and commands are associated with a falling tone. For example, the utterance (142) (a statement) “*al-quwwa ḌiḌu al-waḥan*”: “Strength is against weakness”, is associated with a falling tone. Likewise, the utterance (151) (a command) “*Wa kuunuu 3ibaada al-laahi Ḥixwaanaa*”: “Be brothers, O servants of Allah”, is associated with a falling tone. However, questions are associated with a rising tone if they are of the yes/no questions type. If the questions are of the Wh-questions type, they are associated with a rising tone. The utterance (156) “*Ḥawa min qilatin naḥnu ya rasuula al-laah*”: “Will that be because of our small numbers at that time?”, is associated with a rising tone since it is of the yes/no questions type. While, the utterance (223) “*maaḏaa yaḥduḡu liḤummatin Ḥimaamuhaa huwa sayyidunaa rasuulu al-laah*”: “What is happening to a nation whose leader is Muhammad (Peace and blessing be upon him)?”, is associated with a falling tone since it is of the wh-questions type.

I have not found any risin-falling tone or falling-rising tone in the sermon. I think this is due to the type of the text which is not a conversation. There is only one speaker in the sermon: the Imam. This means that there is a one way interaction in which there is only one speaker.

In short, intonation is aligned with illocutionary force, syntactic structure, or both of them. Alignment of intonation with illocutionary force does not imply a one-to-one relationship such that for every distinct illocution there is a distinct intonational marking.

3.3.3 The syntactical level

Language structure constructs social structure. Language, then, reflects social structure. If, for example, we want to focus on the agent and give him importance, we give him an initial position. If we want to legitimize an act and make it acceptable, we use nominalization. If we want to construct a simple ordinary world, we use simple sentences. Thus, syntax is a way of categorizing the external world and the reality around us.

In the sermon, the Imam seems to be narrating even if the discourse in the sermon is persuasive. The Imam uses this way to highlight the power, authority and responsibility of the agents in the utterances such as in the following utterance:

(140) *yuʔassisu li al-ʔuxuwwa*

verb.pres.cont- prep- def.art- N.sing

(He (PBBU) laid the foundations of brotherhood)

in which the verb is transitive which gives the utterance dynamism. The doer –the subject of the sentence- occurs in an initial position. It is foregrounded; therefore, it is given importance and power. The sentence, in general, is in the active form. It focuses on the doer. Thus, it maximizes the agency of the prophet.

The use of nominalization in the sermon occurs in high frequency. Nominalization creates new culturally important categories. It legitimizes actions and gives them the appearance of operating with a scientific basis. There are plenty examples in the sermon:

(141) *ʔiḥtilal Al-dduniya dawaxil Al-quluub*

N- def.art- N- N plur- def.art- N plur

(the creeping of desires and life to the inner of heart)

(142) *Al-quwwa ʔiḍu Al-wahan*

Def.art- N- adj- def.art- N

(Strength is against weakness)

(143) *Al-zzaaʔil laa qiimata lahu fii qawaamiis Al-3uZmaaʔ*

Def.art- N.sing- neg- N.sing- prep- pro- prep- N.plur- def.art- N.plur

(The great do not concern themselves with ephemeral matters)

In these utterances (141), (142), (143) the action is converted into an event and the agency is hidden. Therefore, the focus is on the act and not on the doer or the patient. The hearer might not even notice the absence of agent and patient. There is an ideology behind using nominalization. It gives the utterance the value of rules. Thus, what is said is true, universal and uncontroversial.

The type of the sentences used in the sermon reflects the reality constructed. Most of the sentences are complex; therefore, they represent a complex reality. Some events become subservient to others. These events then are mere circumstances that function as adverbials which has no autonomy. There are plenty examples which shows the complex reality constructed in the sermon. Consider the following example:

(144) *wa lamma ʔaḥassa Salla Al-laahu 3alayhi wa sallam bi dunuwwi ʔajalihi wa qurbi raḥiilihi ʔilaa rabbih (event 1) kaana min ʔa3Zami maa xatama bihi da3wtahu al-majiida al-dda3wa ʔilaa al-ʔuxuwwa (event 2)*

When he (Peace and blessing be upon him) felt that he would die and leave life soon, among the greatest things that he ended his mission with was his call for brotherhood

The utterance (144) is an example in point. It is a piece of discourse that consists of one complex sentence. This sentence segments reality using two variables: sequence and salience. As far as sequence is concerned, event (1) precedes event (2) both in text and reality. Salience is achieved by highlighting event (2) at the expense of event (1). Syntactically speaking, event (2) is the main clause in this structure, while event (1) is subordinated to it via subordination. In short, event (2) is highlighted and promoted, while event (1) is demoted and made dependent.

The sermon includes simple sentences as well as compound sentences. These two types of sentences are few in the sermon when compared with complex sentences.

3.3.4 The textual level

The textual level is concerned with the texture. Texture considers the interaction of cohesion and coherence with other aspects of text organization. The text is considered as a linguistic message either spoken or written which is seen as a message coded in its auditory or visual medium (Halliday&Hassan 1976, p.1). It is not a static object but a dynamic phenomenon. It is something experienced in time and space. In order to decode a text, it is necessary for a hearer or a reader to segment it into units or parcels of information.

3.3.4.1 Cohesion in the sermon

To understand the term cohesion, we need first to make some reflections on some notions namely, text and texture. “The word text is used in linguistics to refer to any passage, spoken or written, of whatever length, that does form a unified whole” (Halliday&Hassan 1976, p.1). This means that anyone who reads a passage which is more than one sentence in length, he can understand whether the passage forms a unified whole or a collection of unrelated sentences. We can infer from this that there are some features which distinguish a text from a collection of unrelated sentences. These features are what provide cohesion in the text. Cohesion “refers to relations of meaning that exist within the text, and that defines the text” (Ibid, p. 4). A text “drives its texture from the fact that it functions as a unity with respect to its environment” (Ibid, p. 2). Linguistic features which contribute to the semantic unit of a text are what give it a texture. Consider this example as provided by Halliday&Hassan (1976, p.3):

(145) Wash and core six cooking apples. Put them into a fireproof dish.

In sentence (145), the word *them* in the second sentence refers back to *six cooking apples* in the first sentence. Texture, in the sentence (145), is provided by the cohesive relation between *them* and *six cooking apples*. Therefore, the two sentences in (145) are interpreted as a whole and hence constitute a text.

Cohesion is expressed through the strata organization of language. Language can be explained as a multiple coding system comprising three levels of coding: 1) the level of semantics (meaning), 2) the level of lexicogrammar (form), the level of phonology and graphology (expressions) (Ibid, p.5). At the level of lexicogrammar, there is no clear distinction between vocabulary and grammar. General meaning is expressed through grammar while specific meanings are expressed through vocabulary. Cohesion then is of two types: grammatical and lexical. Grammatical cohesion includes reference, ellipsis, and substitution. Conjunction is a cohesive device that is considered a borderline between grammar and vocabulary. Lexical cohesion is fully lexical; that is to say, grammar plays no role in this type of cohesion. It is worth noting that some grammatical cohesion is expressed in intonation. An example is provided by Halliday and Hassan (1976, p. 6):

(146) did I / hurt your / FEELINGS //

(147) -I / didn't / MEAN / to // (mean is associated with a rising-falling tone)

The sentence (146)) coheres in two ways: 1) via ellipsis, with *I didn't mean to* presupposing *hurt your feelings*, 2) via conjunction, the adversative meaning 'but' being expressed by the tone rising-falling. Cohesion depends on meaning and structure. It is a semantic relation that is realized through the lexicogrammar system (Ibid, p.7).

In most of languages there are items that have the property of reference such as pronouns, indefinite articles, and demonstratives in English. This means that they make reference to some other items in their interpretations. There are three types of reference namely anaphora (the form of presupposition, pointing back to some previous items), cataphora (the form of presupposition pointing forward to some following items), and exophora (the information required for interpreting some element in the text is not to be found in the text at all, but in the situation). To show cohesion and coherence in the Friday sermon under study, consider the following passage:

معاشر الصالحين، إن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم حين أرسله ربه هاديا يهدي إلى سواء الصراط، كان من أول ما بثه في أصحابه ومتبعيه روح الأخوة، روح الصدق، روح الوفاء، وكل هذه الصفات والمبادئ هي أسس الأخوة، وهي عمدها التي لا تقوم بدونها، ولما أحس صلى الله عليه وسلم بدنو أجله وقرب رحيله إلى ربه، كان كذلك من أعظم ما ختم به دعوته المجيدة، الدعوة إلى الأخوة، فقد وقف (ص) في حشود المسلمين في صعيد عرفات وهو يوصيهم وينثر فيهم تلك الدرر وتلك الجواهر والنفائس من الكلم والوصايا

Ma3aašira Al-SSalihiin-(1) ?inna rasuula al-laahi Sallaa Al-laahu 3alayhi wa sallam ĥiina ?arslahu rabbuhu haadiyan yahdii ?ilaa sawaa?i al-SSiraat (2) kaana min ?awwali maa ba00ahu fii ?aShaabihi wa muttabi3ihi ruuĥa al-?uxuwwa ruuĥa al-SSidq ruuĥa al-wafaa? (3) wa kullu haaġihi al-SSifaat wa al-mabadi? hiya ?usus al-?uxuwwa (4) wa hiya 3amaduhaa al-latii laa taquumu biduunihaa (5) wa lamma ?aĥassa Sallaa al-laahu 3alayhi wa sallam bi dunuwwi ?ajalih wa qurbi raĥiilihi ?ilaa rabbih (6) kaana min ?a3Zami maa xatama bihi da3watahu al-majiida al-dda3wa ?ilaa al-?uxuwwa (7) fa qad waqafa Sallaa al-laahu 3alayhi wa sallam fii ĥušuudi al-muslimiin fii

Sa3iiDi 3arafaat (8) wa huwa yanθuru fiihim tilka al-ddurar wa tilka al-jawaahir wa al-nnafaaʔis mina al-kalimi wa al-waSaayaa (9)

(O the righteous! Indeed, when the Messenger of Allah (Peace and blessing be upon him) was sent by God as a guide to the straight way, the first thing he spread among his companions and followers was the spirit of brotherhood, sincerity and faithfulness. All these features and principles constitute the foundations of brotherhood. They are its pillars without which it cannot exist. When he (Peace and blessing be upon him) felt that he would die and leave life soon, among the greatest things that he ended his mission with was his call for brotherhood. He (Peace and blessing be upon him) stood in front of the crowd of Muslims in the Mount of Arafat and made invaluable recommendations and pieces of advice.)

Sentence number	Cohesive device	Types of Cohesion	The supposed item
(2)	‘Pinna’ : ‘Indeed’	Lexico grammatical	(1)
(2)	‘hiina’ : ‘when’	Lexico grammatical	
(2)	‘hu’ : ‘him’	Grammatical reference	‘rasuul’ : ‘prophet’ (2)
(2)	‘rabb’ : ‘Lord’	Lexical collocation (synonymy)	‘Al-lah’ : ‘God’ (2)
(2)	‘haadiyan’ : ‘guide’	Lexical collocation	‘rasuul’ : ‘prophet’ (2)
(2)	‘Siraat’ : ‘way’	Lexical collocation	‘haadiyan’ : ‘guide’ (2)
(3)	‘hu’ : ‘him’	Grammatical reference	‘rasuul’ : ‘prophet’ (2)
(3)	‘hi’ : ‘his’	Grammatical reference	‘rasuul’ : ‘prophet’ (2)
(3)	‘muttabi3iih’ : ‘followers’	Lexical collocation	‘ʔaShabih’ : ‘companions’ (3)
(3)	‘ruuh’ : ‘spirit’	Lexical repetition	‘ruuh’ : ‘spirit’ (3)
(4)	‘wa’ : ‘and’	Lexico grammatical	(3)
(4)	‘kullu haaðihi al-SSifaat wa al-mabadiʔ: ‘All these features and principles’	Lexical collocation	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’, ‘al-SSidq’ : ‘sincerity’, ‘al-wafaaʔ’ : ‘faithfulness’ (3)
(4)	‘hiya’ : ‘it’	Grammatical reference	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’, ‘al-SSidq’ : ‘sincerity’, ‘al-wafaaʔ’ : ‘faithfulness’ (3)
(4)	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’	Lexical repetition	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’ (3)
(5)	‘wa’ : ‘and’	Lexico grammatical	(4)
(5)	‘hiya’ : ‘it’	Grammatical reference	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’, ‘al-SSidq’ : ‘sincerity’, ‘al-wafaaʔ’ : ‘faithfulness’ (3)
(5)	‘ʔamdu’ : ‘foundation’	Lexical collocation	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’, ‘al-SSidq’ : ‘sincerity’, ‘al-wafaaʔ’ : ‘faithfulness’ (3)

			‘faithfulness’ (3)
(5)	‘al-latii’ : ‘which’	Grammatical reference	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’, ‘al-SSidq’ : ‘sincerity’, ‘al-wafaaʔ’ : ‘faithfulness’ (3)
(5)	‘haa’ : ‘it’	Grammatical reference	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’, ‘al-SSidq’ : ‘sincerity’, ‘al-wafaaʔ’ : ‘faithfulness’ (3)
(6)	‘wa’ : ‘and’	Lexico grammatical	(5)
(6)	‘lamma’ : ‘when’	Lexico grammatical	
(6)	‘Al-laah’ : ‘God’	Lexical repetition+ lexical collocation (synonymy)	‘Al-laah’ : ‘God’ (2), ‘rabb’ : ‘Lord’ (2)
(6)	‘hi’ : ‘him’	Grammatical reference	‘rasuul’ : ‘prophet’ (2)
(6)	‘qurb’ : ‘proximity’	Lexical collocation (synonymy)	‘dunuw’ : ‘proximity’ (6)
(6)	‘rahiil’ : ‘exit’	Lexical collocation	‘ʔajal’ : ‘time’ (6)
(6)	‘hi’ : ‘him’	Grammatical reference	‘rasuul’ : ‘prophet’ (2)
(6)	‘rabb’ : ‘Lord’	Lexical collocation (synonymy) + lexical repetition	‘Al-laah’ : ‘God’ (2), ‘rabb’ : ‘Lord’ (2)
(7)	‘xatama’ : ‘eneded’	Lexical collocation (antonymy)	‘ʔawwal’ : ‘first’ (3)
(7)	‘da3wa’ : ‘call’	Lexical repetition	‘da3wa’ : ‘call’ (7)
(7)	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’	Lexical repetition	‘al-ʔuxuwwa’ : ‘brotherhood’ (3), (4)
(8)	‘hušuud’ : ‘crowd’	Lexical collocation	‘ʔaShabi’ : ‘companions’, ‘muttabi3iih’ : ‘followers’ (3)
(8)	‘muslimiin’ : ‘Muslims’	Lexical collocation (hyponymy)	‘ʔaShabi’ : ‘companions’, ‘muttabi3iih’ : ‘followers’, ‘hušuud’ : ‘crowd’ (3), (8)
(9)	‘him’ : ‘them’	Grammatical reference	‘muslimiin’ : ‘Muslims’ (8)
(9)	‘tilka’ : ‘those’	Grammatical deictic(cataphora)	‘al-ddurar’ : ‘pearls’, ‘al-jawaahir’ : ‘jewels’, ‘al-nnafaaʔis’ : ‘precious things’ (9)
(9)	‘al-jawaahir’ : ‘jewels’	Lexical collocation (synonymy)	‘al-ddurar’ : ‘pearls’ (9)
(9)	‘al-kalim’ : ‘recommendations’	Lexical collocation	‘al-waSaayaa’ : ‘Commendments’ (9)


This passage shows that the prophet called for brotherhood and established its foundations. Following the prophets recommendations, the Imam calls for brotherhood and reminds people by what the prophet said. This passage is loaded with ideology, especially if we relate the topic of the sermon to what was happening in the Arab world. There were and still wars and fighting all over the Arab world. So, the Imam triggers the ideology that we

should not make a revolution in Morocco. He triggers ideology under the title of brotherhood. He exploits religion to send specific messages.

3.4 The different moods and Functions found in the sermon

3.4.1 Moods

There are four moods used in the sermon namely indicative, interrogative, imperative and subjunctive. The indicative mood is the most used one by 373 utterances: 197 utterances in the first part and 186 utterances in the second part. The imperative mood is expressed in 54 utterances: 10 utterances in the first part and 44 utterances in the second part. The interrogative mood is expressed in 22 utterances: 8 utterances in the first part and 14 utterances in the second part. Finally, the subjunctive mood is expressed in 6 utterances -all of them in the first part. This statistics is presented in the following graph.



Graph.1 presents the number of utterances for each mood. The dominant mood is the indicative mood because the Friday sermon is a narrative text on the basis of the literal meaning of the utterances. The Imam informs the audience about certain facts and tells them stories. It is well-known that the religious text is persuasive in that it tries to convince the audience to change their behaviors and do what the Imam says. The question here is why the use of indicative mood, while the aim of the sermon is to get the audience to do something? The possible answer is that we might get the intended effect if we use indirect speech acts in some discourses such as the religious one better than if we use direct speech acts. The imperative mood is the second mood that is more frequently used in the sermon. This is justifiable by the fact that a great part of the sermon is dedicated to pleading. The Imam pleads God to promote his life and the believers' life. He also pleads God to give all Muslims paradise. The third mood used in the sermon in terms of the number of utterances is the interrogative mood. This is because in the sermon the people do not speak, thus the Imam

asks rhetorical questions which are normally few instead of questions that enquire answers. The less frequently used mood is the subjunctive. In short, we expect to have the imperative mood to be the dominant one based on the nature of the Friday sermon which has as a whole a directive function. However, we discover that the dominant mood is the indicative which is not compatible with the functions of the utterances of the sermon. This lets us propose that moods have no one-to-one relationship with utterances since they can be used to express different functions in the language using the same utterance. This claim is supported by Ausin (1962) who claims that mood can be used to achieve different functions such as command, permission, concession ...etc (Ausin 1962, p. 99). Some examples of these different moods are the following:

a- Examples of The indicative mood

(148) Hiya 3amaduhaa al-latii laa taquumu biduunihaa

Pro- N.sing- pro- def.art- pro- neg- verb.pres- prepo- pro

(They are its pillars without which it cannot exist)

(149) Kaana kaḏaalik min ʔa3Zami maa xatama bihi da3watahu al-majiida al-dda3wa ʔilaa al-ʔuxuwwa

Verb.past- pro- prep- adj- pro- verb.past- prepo- pro- N.sing- prepo- def.art- adj- def.art- N.sing- prepo- def.art- N.sing

(Among the greatest things that he ended his mission with was his call for brotherhood)

(150) Al-nnasu niyaam faʔiḏaa maatuu ʔintabahuu

Def.art- N.plu- V.pres- prep- pro- V.pres- pro- V.pres- pro

(People are sleeping -right now,- when they die, they will pay attention)

b- Examples of the imperative mood

(151) Wa kuunuu 3ibaada al-laahi ʔixwaanaa

Prep- V.imp- N.plu- def.art- N.sing- N.plu

(Be brothers, O servants of Allah)

(152) ʔakḥiruu min ḏikri haadimi al-laḏḏaat

Verb.imp- prep- V- N.sing- def.art- N.plu

(Constantly remember the destroyer of pleasures (meaning death))

(153) ?unḏuruu ?ilaa haaḏaa al-tta3biir al-3aZiim

V.imp- prepo- pro- def.art- N.sing- def.art- adj

(Look at this meaningful expression)

c- Examples of the interrogative mood

(154) ?araḏiitum bi al-hayaati al-dduniyaa mina al-?axira

Aux- verb.past- prep- def.art- N.sing- adj- prep- def.art- N

(Are you pleased with the life of this world rather than the hereafter?)

(155) Fa kayfa bi ?aZamihim

Wh.wor- prep- adj- prep

(Let alone the greatest among them?)

(156) ?awa min 9illatin nahnu yaa rasuula al-laah

Aux- prep- adj- pro- O- N.sing- def.art- N.sing

(Will that be because of our small numbers at that time?)

d- Examples of the subjunctive mood

(157) fa tafṣaluu

Conj- Verb.fut

(Lest you lose courage)

(158) wa li tahSiini haaḏihi al-?uxuwwat

prep- conj- verb.pres- pro- pro- def.art- N.sing

(to strengthen this brotherhood)


(159) laa tastahippu ?an tubnaa 3alayhaa al-3alaa9aat

neg- verb.pres- prep- verb.pres- prep- pro- def.art- N.plu

(It does not deserve to be taken as a basis to establish our relationships)

3.4.2 function

Concerning functions, there exist different functions that can be associated to one mood. Therefore, there is no correspondence between mood and function. The indicative mood is associated with 21 functions. The imperative mood is associated with 3 functions. The interrogative mood is associated with 4 functions. The subjunctive mood is associated with 3 functions. These results are presented in the following graph:



Graph.2 represents the number of functions for each mood. It is clear that each mood is associated with different functions. This supports the hypothesis that there is no correspondence between mood and function. Non-correspondence between mood and function is raised by Austin (1962) who draws the attention to the fact that one utterance may have different functions depending on the context in which the utterance is used. The use of one utterance implies the use of one mood; therefore, if the utterance is associated with different functions, one mood is definitely associated with different functions, too. The following examples show this non-correspondence:

a- The functions of the indicative mood

1- Address

(160) Bismihi Al-ʔasmaa

Pre- N.sing- prep- def.art- adj

(In the Name of Allah who is alone in possessing His most splendid Name)

2- Warn

(161) Wa haððara min Ǝiddihaa wa huwa al-ʔixtilaaf wa al-ttanazu3

Prep- verb.past- prep- N.plu- prep- pro- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.plu

(he admonished the opposite values, namely disagreement and conflict)

3- Ask

(162) Yad3u ?ilayhaa

Verb.pres- prep- pro

(he called for it (brotherhood))

4- Inform

(163) Hiya 3amaduhaa al-latii la taquumu biduunihaa

Pro- N.sing- pro- def.art- neg- verb.pres- prepo- pro

(They (principles) are its pillars without which it (brotherhood) cannot exist)

5- Tell

(164) Yanθuru fiihim tilka al-ddurar wa tilka al-jawaahir wa al-nnafaa?is mina al-kalim wa al-waSSayaa

Veb.past.cont- prep- pro- pro- def.art- N.plu- prep- pro- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.plu- pro- def.art- N.plu

(he made invaluable recommendations and pieces of advice)

6- Forbid

(165) ?inna dimaa?akum wa ?amwaalakum 3alaykum haraam kahurmati yawmikum haaðaa fi šahrikum haaðaa

Adv- N.plu- pro- prep- N.plu- pro- prep- pro- verb.pres- prep- N.sing- N.sing- pro- pro- prep- N.sing- pro- pro

(Indeed, your blood, property and honor are forbidden to be violated; they are as scared as this day, in this month)

7- Argue

(166) Dalla 3alaa ðaalika min xilaali wahyi rabbih

Verb.past- prep- pro- prep- prep- N.sing- N.sing- pro

(he proved that (the outcomes of the difference and the disagreement) via his God's revelation)

8- Belittle

(167) Wa ma3luumun ʔanna al-lahwa wa al-la3iba laa yastahwii ʔillaa al-ʔatfaal

Prep- N- pro- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- neg- verb.pres- conj- def.art- N.plu

(It is well-known that games seduce children only)

9- Entice

(168) ʔinna al-laaha ma3a al-SSaabiriin

Adv- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.plu

(Surely, Allah is with the patient)

10- Remind

(169) wa yuḏakiruhum bi ʔaayi al-kitaab

Prep- verb.pres- pro- prep- N.plu- def.art- N.sing

(he used to remind them through the verses of the Holly Book (Quran))

11- Reprimind

(170) Fa 3attaluuhaa

Prep- verb.past pro

(They disactivated them (the faculties of perception))

12- Explain

(171) Wa al-wahanu manšaʔuhu wa ʔaSluhu hubbu al-dduniyaa

Prep- def.art- N.sing- N.sing- prep- N.sing- verb.pres- def.art- N.sing

(Weakness is instigated by the love of the present life)

13- Illustrate

(172) šaʔnuhum ma3a al-dduniyaa kašaʔni al-ssafiinati ma3a al-maaʔ

N.sing- pro- prep- def.art- N.sing- conj- N.sing- def.art- N.sing- prepo- def.art- N.sing

(Their relationship with life is just like the relationship of the ship with water)

14- Claim

(173) wa ʔiiqaa3 al-furqa bayna al-naas huwa maZharun min maZaahiri al-ʔisti3laaʔ

Prep- gerund- def.art- N.sing- perp- pro- N.sing- prep- N.plu- def.art- N.sing

(Separating people is an aspect of hegemony which is among the characteristics of the Pharaohs)

15- Prioritize

(174) Wa al-ʔaaxiratu xayrun wa ʔabqaa

Prep- def.art- N.sing- adj- prep- adj

(The hereafter is better and more lasting)

16- Thank

(175) al-ḥamdu li al-laahi rabbi al-3alamiin

def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- N.sing- def.art- N.plu

(and all praises and thanks to Allah, Lord of the universe)

17- Advise

(176) ʔinna kulla fardin yantamii ʔilaa haaḏihi al-ʔumma 3alayhi ʔan yuraaji3a nafsah

Adv- pro- N.sing- verb.pres- prep- pro- def.art- N.sing- prep- pro- prep- verb.pres- N.sing- pro

(Every member who belongs to this nation (Islamic Community) should review his behavior)

18- lament

(177) ʔmma badaʔat al-mabaadiʔ tatahaawaa

conj- verb.past- def.art- N.plu. verb past

(just after that time, principles started to disintegrate)

19- Promise

(178) Wa sayujannabuhaa al-ʔatqaa

Prep- verb.fut- pro- def.art- N.sing

(And Al-Muttaqun (the pious) will be far removed from it (hell))

20- Negate

- (179) ʔinna al-waḥšiyya al-latii fii 3aalami al-yawm laa yumkinu ʔabadan ʔan takuuna fii qawaamisi man yantasibuuna ʔilaa ʔummati al-ʔislaam

Adv- def.art- N.sing- def.art- pro prp- N.sing- def.art- N.sing- neg- verb.pres- adv- conj- verb.pres- prep- N.plu- prep- verb.pres- prep- N.sin- def.art- N

(The barbarism that the world witnesses today cannot be associated to those who belong to the Islamic Community)

21- Answer

- (180) qaala laa

verb.past- neg

(He replied: No)

22- Threaten

- (181) ʔinna batša rabbika lašadiid

Adv- N.sing- N.sing- pro- adj

(Verily, the seizure (punishment) o your Lord is severe and painful)

23- Compliment

- (182) Haaḏaa šaʔnu al-3uZamaaʔ

Pro- N.sing- def.art- N.plu

(It is the case of the great figures)

24- Result

- (183) Hatta Saarat bihaaḏihi al-SSuura min al-ttazyiif wa al-fawḌaa al-3aamma

Conj- verb.past- prep- pro- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- def.art- adj

(that is has reached this situation)

b- The functions of the interrogative mood

1- Negate

(184) Hal haaḍihi al-xayriyya al-muṣaar ʔilayhaa fii haaḍihi al-ʔaaya tatanaasabu ma3a waaqi3 al-ʔumma al-yawm?

aux- pro- def.art- N.sing- def.art- N.sing- prep- pro- prep- ro- def.art- N.sing- verb.pres- prep- def.art- N.sing- def.art- N.sing

(Is the supremacy indicated in this verse corresponds to the reality of the Muslim nation today?)

2- Question

(185) ʔawa min qilatin naḥnu ya rasuula al-laah

Aux- prep- N.sing- pro- O- N.sing- def.art- N.sing

(Will that be because of our small numbers at that time?)

3- Reprimand

(186) limaaḍaa nabḍu al-murruʔaat

Wh-word- verb.pres- def.art- N.plur

(Why do we admonish honorable values?)

4- Confirm

(187) Fakayfa biʔa3Zamihim

prep- wh.word- prep- adj

(Let alone the greatest among them?)

c- The functions of the imperative mood

1- Order

(188) ʔakḥiruu min ḍikri haadimi al-laḍḍaat

Verb.imp- prep- verb.pres- N.sing- def.art- N.plu

(Constantly remember the destroyer of pleasures (meaning death))

2- Plead

(189) Al-lahumma ʔa3izza al-ʔislaama wa al-muslimiin

Def.art- N- verb.pres- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.plu

(O Lord! Help Islam and Muslims)

3- Pray

(190) Salla al-lahu 3alayhi wa sallam

Verb.imp- def.art- N.sing- prep- pro- prep- verb.imp

(May Allah praise His Messenger)

d- The functions of the subjunctive

1- Warn

(191) Fatafšaluu

Conj- verb.pres

(lest you lose courage)

2- Inform

(192) Wa litahSiini haaðihi al-ʔuxuwwa

Conj- verb.pres- pro- def.art- N.sing

(In order to strengthen this brotherhood)

3- Ask

(193) Laa tastaḥiqqu ʔan tubnaa 3alayhaa al-3alaaqaat


Neg- verb.pres- prep- verb.pres- prep- pro- def.art- N.plu

(It does not deserve to be taken as a basis to establish our relationships)

It is clear from 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 that there is no correspondence between mood and function since one mood can be associated with different functions such as the indicative mood which is associated with 23 functions in this sermon. Likewise, one function can be associated with different moods such as the function of negating which is associated to the indicative and the interrogative moods in the sermon. Some functions are associated to only one mood such as the function of ordering which is associated to the imperative mood only.

3.5 Explicit and implicit performatives in the sermon

Based on the distinction made by Austin (1962) between explicit performatives (the act is made clear when we use the explicit performative formula: I (hereby) V (where V is a performative verb used performatively, as in the following example “I (hereby) promise to lend you 1000 Dhs”) and implicit performatives (the performative utterances that do not include the performative formula and their illocutionary force is thus unclear), I intend to divide the utterances in the Friday sermon. Most of the utterances found in the Friday sermon are realized as implicit performatives. Searle (1975) claims that most of utterances we tend to use as interactants are implicit. 211 utterances are implicit in the first part of the sermon and no utterance is explicit. In the second part of the sermon, 248 utterances are implicit whereas 6 utterances are explicit. Therefore, 459 utterances are implicit while 6 utterances are explicit in the whole sermon. These results are presented in the following graph.



Graph.3 shows the dominance of the implicit performatives over the explicit performatives in the Friday sermon. According to Searle (1975), Grice (1975) and B&L (1987), speakers use implicit performatives rather than explicit performatives to be polite or to imply certain meaning by raising conversational implicatures. Some examples of the explicit and the implicit performatives found in the Friday sermon are the following:

a- Examples of the explicit performatives

(194) Al-laahumma ?innaa nas?aluka al-fawza 3inda al-qaḌaa?

Def.art- N.sing- adv- verb.pres- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing

(O Lord! We ask you to grant us victory in the judgment day)

(195) Wa nas?aluka na3imman laa yanfaḏ

Prep- verb.pres- N.sing- neg- verb.pres

(We ask you for blessings never ceasing)

(196) Al-laahumma ʔinnaa nasʔaluka ʔan tu3izza al-ʔslaama wa al-muslimiin

Def.art- N.sing- adv- verb.pres- prep- verb.pres- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.plu

(O Lord! Help Islam and Muslims)

b- Implicit performatives

(197) Kullu haaḏihi al-SSifaat wa al-mabaadiʔ hiya ʔusus al-ʔuxuwwa

Pro- pro- def.art- N.plu- prep- N.plu- pro- N.plu- def.art- N.sing

(All these features and principles constitute the foundations of brotherhood)

(198) ʔinna batša rabbika lašadiid

Adv- N.sing- N.sing- pro- adj

(Verily, the seizure (punishment) of your Lord is severe and painful)

(199) Wa al-ttariix xayru šaahid


Perp- def.art- N.sing- adj- N.sing

(This is proved by history)

3.6 The different categories of illocutionary acts performed in the sermon

To account for the different categories of speech acts in the sermon, it is worth mentioning that speech acts need to be categorized in two ways: a categorization of utterances according to their literal meaning (the meaning which the sentence has out of context) and a categorization of utterances according to their intended meaning (the meaning the utterance has in context). Concerning the literal meaning, all the five categories of speech acts presented by Searle (1975) exist in the sermon: assertive, directives, commissives, expressive and declaratives. 334 utterances are assertive: 165 utterances found in the first part of the sermon and 169 utterances found in the second part of the sermon. 119 utterances are directives: 40 utterances found in the first part of the sermon and 79 found in the second part of the sermon. 6 utterances are commissives: 3 utterances found in the first part of the sermon and 3 found in the second part of the sermon. 4 utterances are expressive: all of them are in the second part of the sermon. 2 utterances are declaratives: both of them are in the first part of the sermon. Concerning the utterance meaning, all the five categories of speech acts presented by Searle (1975) exist in the sermon, too. 177 utterances are assertive: 101 utterances found in the first part of the sermon while 76 found in the second part of the sermon. 197 utterances are directives: 103 utterances found in the first part of the sermon while 94 found in the second part of the sermon. 5 utterances are commissives: 3 utterances

found in the first part of the sermon while 2 utterances found in the second part of the sermon. 82 utterances are expressives: 28 utterances found in the first part of the sermon while 54 found in the second part of the sermon. 2 utterances are declaratives: both of them are in the second part of the sermon. These results are presented in the following graph:



Graph.3 shows the number of illocutionary acts that are associated to each category at two levels, namely literal meaning and utterance meaning. At the level of the literal meaning, assertive category is the dominant one in the sermon by 334 illocutionary acts. This is normal since the Imam narrates about what the prophet and his companions were doing in their lives. The second most used category in the sermon is the directive by 119 illocutionary acts. This is justifiable by the idea that the ultimate aim of the sermon is to get the audience to change their behaviors in real life. If we look at the sermon, the parts in which the Imam uses the utterances that are directives are the introduction, the conclusion and the questions. Questions are directives in nature since they enquire the hearer to answer them. Concerning the introduction, the Imam uses directive utterances to get the attention of the audience. The uses of directives in the conclusion are not addressed to the audience, but to God to accept the prayers of the Imam. Therefore, they are ritual acts. The other three categories are not frequently used in the sermon. 6 utterances are used as commissives and all of them are performed by God in the Quranic verses. 4 utterances are expressive and they are either compliment or thanks to God or to the prophet (Muhammed peace blessings be upon him). 2 utterances are declaratives and they are both performed by God in the Quranic verses.

There are five categories of illocutionary acts at the level of utterance meaning. The most dominant category is the directive by 197 illocutionary acts. The function of the sermon is to get the audience to do some behaviors in real life. Therefore, the dominance of the directive illocutionary acts in the sermon is justifiable. The second most used category is assertive by 177 illocutionary acts. When these utterances are used, the literal meaning is the same as the utterance meaning in most of the utterances. In these cases, the meaning is simple and the Imam does not raise any conversational implicature such as in this utterance ‘ʔijutama3a fii al-hadii0i mutaDaaddaan’: ‘two opposites are stated in this Hadith: love and hate.’ In this case, the Imam means what he literally says. The third most used category is the expressive by 82 illocutionary acts. In this case, the Imam shows his psychological state in the utterances he uses. There is a respectable number of utterances which are expressive. This is justifiable by the use of the Imam to the enticement and intimidation utterances to achieve his intended effects. The left two categories are not used too frequently in that 5 utterances have illocutionary acts that are commissives and 2 utterances have illocutionary acts that are declaratives. The illocutionary acts performed in the utterances belong to these two categories (commissives and declaratives), is the same in both the literal meaning and in the utterance meaning. The following are examples of the utterances which include illocutionary acts that belong to the different categories found in the sermon:

a- Examples of the illocutionary force categories on the basis of the literal meaning of the utterance

1- Assertive category

(200) Al-3uðamaaʔ laa yaðbaħuun

Def.art- N.plur- neg- verb.pres-

(Great figures do not murder)

(201) 0umma faʔinna kulla muta3alliġin bi Al-dduniyaa raayibin fiihaa huwa naaqiSu Al-3aqli ʔin lam yakun faaqidah

Adv- prep- pro- pro- N.ing- prepo- def.art- N.sing- N.sing- prepo- pro- pro- adj- def.art- N.sing- conj- neg- verb.pres- adj-pro

(Therefore, anyone who loves and clings to the present life has a deficient mind, if he has any at all)

(202) wa al-ssababu ħubbu al-dduniyaa

Prepo- def.art- N.sing- verb.pres- def.art- N.sing

(The reason is the love of life)

2- Directive category

(203) Ja3alani al-lahu wa ʔiyaakum min man ḏakara fanafa3athu al- ḏḏikraa

Verb.imp- def.art- N.sing- prepo- pro- pro- prep- pro- verb.pres- prepo- verb.pres-
pro- def.art- N.sing

(May Allah help us benefit from the word of Allah)

(204) hal al-dduniyaa bihaaḏaa al-mahalli al-ʔasnaa hattaaf3ala fii al-quluubi haaḏihi al-
ʔaf3aal

Aux- def.art- N.sing- prepo- pro- def.art- N.sing- def.art- adj- adv- verb.pres- prepo-
def.art- N.plur- pro- def.art- N.plur

(Is life so important that it takes its toll on hearts in such a way?)

(205) maaḏaa tarakta liʔahlik

wh.word- verb.pres- prep- N.sing

(What did you leave for your family?)

3- Commissive category

(206) Wa sayujannabuha al-ʔatqaa

Prep- verb.fut- pro- def.art- N.sing

(And Al-Muttaqun (the pious) will be far removed from it (Hell))

(207) Wa lasawfa yarḏaa

Prep- prep- aux.fut- verb.fut

(He surely will be pleased (when he enters paradise))

(208) Fasawfa yalqawna ʔayyaa

Prep- aux.fut- verb.fut- N.sing

(so they will be thrown in Hell)

4- Expressive category

(209) Al-ḥamdu li al-laahi rabbi al-3aalamiin

Def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- N.sing- def.art. N.plu

(All praises and thanks to Allh, Lord of the universe)

(210) subḥaana rabbika rabbi al-ʕizzati ʕamma yaSifuun

verb.pres- N.sing- pro- N.sing- def.art- N.sing- prep- N.sing- pro

(Glorified be your Lord, the Lord of Honor and Power! (He is free) from what they attribute unto Him!)

(211) wa salaamun ʕalaa al-mursaliin

prep- verb.pres. prep- def.art- N.plu

(And peace be on the Messengers!)

5- Declarative category

(212) ʔinna al-muʔminuuna ʔixwa

Adv- def.art- N.plu- N.plu

(The believers are brothers indeed)

(213) ʔinna dimaaʔakum wa ʔamwaalakum wa ʔaraaʕakum ḥaramun ʕalaykum

Adv- N.plu- pro- prep- N.plu- pro- N.plu- pro- verb.pres- prep- pro- prep- N.sing- N.sing- pro- pro- prep- N.sing- pro- pro

(Indeed your blood, property and honor are forbidden to be violated)

b- Examples of the illocutionary force categories on the basis of the intended meaning of the utterance

1- Assertive category

(214) šabbahahum bidaayatan bi al-ʔanʕaam al-latii laa tafham wa laa tudrik

Verb.past- pro- adv- prep- def.art- N.plur- def.art- pro- neg- verb.pres- prep- neg- verb.pres

(At the beginning, he (God) likened them (unbelievers) to animals which do not understand or comprehend)

(215) laa mawta fi al-ʔaaxirati wa laa fanaaʔa fiihaa

Neg- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- neg- N.sing- prep- pro

(There is no death or evanescence in the Hereafter)

(216) šaʔnuhum ma3a al-dduniyaa kašaʔni al-ssafiinati ma3a al-maaʔ

N.sing- pro- prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- N.sing- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing

(Their relationship with life is just like the relationship of the ship with water)

2- Directive category

(217) ʔawa min qillatin nahnu ya rasuula al-laah

Aux- prep- adj- pro- O- N.sing- def.art- N.sing

(Will that be because of our small numbers at that time?)

(218) ʔunḏuruu ʔilaa haḏaa al-tta3biir al-3aZiim

Verb.im- prep- pro- def.art- N.sing- def.art- adj

(look at this meaningful expression)

(219) Ma3aašira al-SSaalihiin

N.pul- def.art- N.plu

(O the righteous!)

3- Commissive category

(220) Nuwwaffi ʔilayhim ʔa3maalahum fiihaa

Verb.pres- prep- pro- N.plu- pro- prep- pro

(We shall pay in full (the wages of))

(221) Man kaana yuriidu ḥarḥa al-dduniya nazid lahu fii ḥarḥih

Pro- verb.pres- verb.pres- N.sing- def.art- N.sing- verb.fut- prep- pro- prep- N.sing-
pro

(Whoever desires (by his deeds) the reward of the Hereafter, We give him increase in his rewards)

(222) Wa man kaana yuriidu ħarṯa al-duniyaa nuutihi minhaa

Prep- pro- verb.pres- verb.pres- N.sing- def.art- N.sing- verb.fut- prep- pro

(and whoever desires the reward of this world (by his deeds) we give him thereof (what is decreed for him))

4- Expressive category

(223) maaḏaa yaḥduṯu li ʔummatin ʔimaamuhaa huwa sayyidunaa rasuulu al-laah

Wh.word- verb.pres.cont- prep- N.sing- N.sing- pro- pro- N.sing- pro- N.sing- def.art- N.sing

(What is happening to a nation whose Leader is Muhammad (Peace and blessing be upon him)?)

(224) faʔayyu ʔaqlin haaḏaa al-laḏii yataʔallqu bi al-fanaaʔ

prep- pro- N.sing- pro- def.art- verb.pres- prep- def.art- N.sing

(So is it reasonable for the mind to love evanescence?)

(225) ʔaraḏiitum bi al-ḥayaati al-dduniya mina al-ʔaxira

Aux- verb.pres- prep- def.art- N.sing- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing

(Are you pleased with the life of this world rather than the Hereafter?)

5- Declarative category

(226) ʔinna al-muʔminuuna ʔixwa

Adv- def.art- N.plu- N.plu

(The believers are brothers indeed)

(227) ʔinna dimaaʔakum wa ʔamwaalakum wa ʔaraaḏakum ḥaramun ʔalaykum

Adv- N.plu- pro- prep- N.plu- pro- N.plu- pro- verb.pres- prep- pro- prep- N.sing- N.sing- pro- pro- prep- N.sing- pro- pro

(228) (Indeed your blood, property and honor are forbidden to be violated)

In the Friday sermon under study, there exist the five categories of illocutionary acts that Searle (1968) comes up with in his article “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts.” The categorization of the illocutionary acts, performed in the utterances uttered in the Friday sermon, is based on both the literal meaning and the utterance meaning. Since the utterance meaning is the intended meaning by the speaker, it is the only one to be taken into consideration.

3.7 The perlocutionary effects of the sermon

Using the two formulas “in” and “by” suggested by Austin (1962) to differentiate between the illocutionary acts and the perlocutionary acts, it is possible to count the illocutionary acts, while it is impossible to count the perlocutionary acts in the Friday sermon. This is because perlocutionary acts are consequential effects upon feelings, thoughts and actions of the audience. We know that feeling, and thought are inner actions which we cannot see, hear or touch. Therefore, perlocutionary acts are uncontrollable.

In the following example:

(229) Kaana ?awwalu maa ba00hu fii ?aShaabihi wa muttabi3iihi ruuh al-?uxuwwa ruuh al-SSidq ruuh al-wafaa?

verb.past- num- pro- verb.past- prep- N.plu- prep- N.plu- N.sing- def.art- N.sing-
def.art- N.sing – def.art- N.sing

(The first thing he spread among his companions and followers was the spirit of brotherhood, sincerity and faithfulness)

we can say that in saying “the Imam says that the first thing he spread among his companions and followers was the spirit of brotherhood, sincerity and faithfulness”, the Imam reports what the prophet did. However, if we say that by saying “the Imam says that the first thing he spread among his companions and followers was the spirit of brotherhood, sincerity and faithfulness”, we cannot say that the Imam makes them believe in what he has said. This is because we may achieve different effects such as the belief in what the Imam says, the disbelief in what the Imam says, the mocking at what the Imam says ...etc.

In the example (218) “?unḏuruu ?ilaa haḏaa al-tta3biir al-3aZiim”: “look at this meaningful expression”, we can say that in saying “The Imam orders the audience to look at this meaningful expression”, the Imam orders the audience to think deeply on that expression. However, if we say that by saying “The Imam orders the audience to think deeply on that expression”, we cannot say whether the audience did really think about it. The audience may think about it, neglect it ... etc.

In the example (204) “hal al-dduniyaa bihaaḏaa al-maḥalli al-ʔasnaa hattaa taf3ala fii al-quluubi haaḏihi al-ʔaf3aal”: “Is life so important that it takes its toll on hearts in such a way?”, we can say in saying “Is life so important that it takes its toll on hearts in such a way?” the Imam reprimands the audience about the value they give to life. However, by saying “Is life so important that it takes its toll on hearts in such a way?” we cannot say whether the audience has felt guilty. They may feel guilty, may not care, may love life more ... etc.

3.8 The intended and the unintended perlocutionary effects in the sermon

It is possible to count illocutionary acts but it is impossible to count the perlocutionary acts. Therefore, we cannot count the intended and the unintended perlocutionary effects. We can expect the perlocutionary effects which might be many possible ones, but are they going to be performed or not? We cannot decide. For example, in the utterance (219) “ma3aašira aL-SSaalihiin”: “O the righteous!” the intended effect is that the listeners give their attention to the Imam. Is this intended effect achieved or not? The answer is that we cannot decide. Some people may pay attention some may not. Other people may not even hear and some others may be deaf. Sometimes, some unintended perlocutionary effects may be achieved instead of the intended ones. Consider this example:

(230) fa al-dduniyaa 3aqlan wa naqlan laa tastaḥiqqu an yuqaatala min ʔajlihaa bayna al-3uquul

Prepo- def.art- N.sing- adv- prepo- adv- neg- verb.pres- pro- verb.passive- prep- prep- pro- prepo- def.art- N.plu

(Thus, using both reason and the word of God, life does not deserve to be fought about between wise people)

In the utterance (230), the possible intended effects might be that the listeners stop fighting about life. They may focus on the literal meaning and then believe in what the Imam says. These effects may be achieved and may not, in that people may continue fighting about life, and may disbelieve in the statement expressed in the utterance. As unintended effects, the listeners may not like what the Imam says and then the result may be achieved in the opposite way such as mocking at the Imam. They may say for example “if we should not care about life, what are we living for then?” This if we assume that the audience react in the same way; however, the audience would not have the same reaction, thus the unintended effects that might be achieved can be unlimited and depends on each person’s situation. Consider this example:

(231) wa laa tanaaza3uu

prep- neg- verb.pres

(And do not dispute (with one another))

In the utterance (231), the intended effect might be that the listeners do not dispute one another. Whether this effect achieved or not, we cannot decide because we need to go with

each listener and see how he or she behaves after the sermon. To what extent is this possible? This is a difficult question to answer. Concerning the unintended effects, the listeners may behave totally in the opposite way of what the speaker expects them to behave. They may for example fight just after going out of the mosque.

In short, possible intended and unintended effects are uncontrollable. We may expect the intended effects based on the illocutionary force performed in the utterance, but we cannot guarantee that perlocutionary act we have expected will be performed or not.

3.9 Metaphorical speech acts in the sermon

Metaphor is defined by Crystal (2008, p. 98) as “a process of understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another.” Cruse (2002, p. 106) says that “metaphor involves a relation of resemblance or analogy, although this is not explicitly stated.” Metaphor, then, is the use of certain words or expressions in order to understand another terms or expressions. It is the case in which some features of certain item are attributed to another item. In the Friday sermon under study, the Imam uses metaphorical speech acts in order to achieve his intended effects. There are 76 metaphorical speech acts in the sermon. These metaphorical speech acts are distributed equally in the two part of the sermon: 33 in the first part of the sermon and 33 in the second part of the sermon. The following are some examples of these types of speech acts:

(232) Wa man kaana fii haaḍihi ṭa3ma fa howa fi al-ṭaaxirati ṭa3maa

Prep- pro- verb.pres- prep- pro- verb.pres- prep- ro- prep- def.art- N.sing- verb.pres

(But he who is blind in this life shall be blind in the Everlasting Life and will be further astray from the right path)

In this example (232), the Imam refers to the people who do not do what God has asked them to do as blind people. He does not mean by blind the lost of sight. He means by blind being astray from the right path that God has asked people to follow.

(233) Yanṯuru fiihim tilka al-ddurar wa al-jawaahir mina al-kalimi wa al-waSaayaa

Verb.pres- prep- pro- pro- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.plu

(He made invaluable recommendations and pieces of advice)

In this utterance (233), the Imam resembles the speech uttered by the prophet to pearls and jewels to show its precious value. The Imam, thus, gives his utterance power to achieve his intended effect.

In the example (199) “wa al-ttariixu xayru šaahid”: “This is proved by history”, the Imam attributes some human quality (witness) to a concrete item which is history. The Imam intends to make history an argument to support what he says in order to achieve his intended effects.

The Imam uses the metaphorical speech acts instead of simple speech acts in order to increase the frequency of achieving his intended effects.

3.10 Conversational implicatures raised in the sermon

Implicature, according to Grice (1975), refers to the implications which can be deduced from the form of an utterance using certain cooperative principles that are used in order to make the conversation efficient and acceptable. The speaker, in conversational implicature, does not only mean what he literally says but he means something more. It is the job of the hearer to infer the primary meaning of the utterance on the basis of the inferential strategies suggested by Grice (1975). In the Friday sermon under study, 250 utterances are used by the Imam to raise conversational implicatures: 134 conversational implicatures are raised in the first part of the sermon and 116 conversational implicatures are raised in the second part of the sermon. The following are some examples in which the speaker raises conversational implicatures:

In the example (181) “ʔinna batša rabbika lašadiid”: “Verily, the seizure (punishment) o your Lord is severe and painful”, the God states that his seizure is severe. Does God want only to state that? I do not think so. I think that He wants to threaten the people who do not abide by what He says in order to let them do so. In this case, a conversational implicature is raised (which is to threaten the hearer) by God in this utterance and it is left by the hearer to infer what God implies in the utterance on the basis of the inferential strategies.

(234) Wa laqad ɗaraʔnaa lijahannama kaθiiran mina al-jinni wa al-ʔins

Prep- adv- verb.past- prep- N.sing- pro- prep- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.plu

(And surely, we have created many of the jinn and mankind for hell)

In this example (234), God does not intend only to inform people and jinn that he has created many of the jinn and mankind for hell, but also to warn them so as to abide by what he says. God, in this utterance (234), raises a conversational implicature and He lets the hearer to infer what the conversational implicature is about.

The utterance (224) “faʔayyu 3aqlin haaɗaa al-laɗii yata3allqu bi al-fanaaʔ”: “So is it reasonable for the mind to love evanescence?”, the Imam does not intend to ask the question to get an answer; however, he asks the question to raise a conversational implicature which is possibly to reprimand his audience for loving evanescence.

There are many conversational implicature raised in the sermon -by God, the prophet (PBBU), and the Imam- for the hearer to infer using the inferential strategies.

3.11 The observance of the cooperative principle in the sermon

It is observed in the sermon that the maxim and sub-maxims of the cooperative principle are violated in a way or another. These violations are committed by the Imam, since he is the only one speaks in the sermon, while the listeners do not have the right to answer,

comment, or even to speak. These violations are not done by the Imam because he does not observe the cooperative principle, but because he wants to raise conversational implicatures. He does that to achieve the effects he intends in the utterances he performs. It is, possibly, the suitable way to be used to achieve those effects. Let's consider that he does not violate the maxims, he consequently does not raise any conversational implicature. Is he going to achieve the effects he intended? This is a difficult question. To provide an answer, let's propose that the Imam uses the following utterances to achieve the same effects which is to let the audience stop killing people without reason by way of warning them. Consider this example:

(235) I warn you to kill a person without reason.

(236) God says "If anyone killed a person not in retaliation of murder, or (and) to spread mischief in the land –it would be as if he killed all mankind" (Al-maaʿida, verse 32)

Which one of these utterances will achieve the intended effect if it is used? Normally, the second one because of many reasons: firstly, the Imam uses indirect speech act. Secondly, he violates the maxim of manner in which he says ambiguous things. He says that God (but not him (the Imam) who says not to kill a person without reason. Based on these considerations the Imam loads the utterance with certain forces that lead to the achievement of the intended effect. Using the first utterance, which is a direct speech act, the Imam may not even achieve his intended effect. This utterance might be considered as all utterances that you hear everyday and do not make you feel anything. Let's give some examples which show the violations of maxims in the Friday sermon under study:

a- The violation of the quantity maxim

In the example (219) "Ma3aašira al-SSaalihiin": "O the righteous!", the quantity maxim is violated in the sense that the contribution of the Imam is less informative than is required. Some part of the utterance is deleted which is "I (hereby) address you" which has to come after the uttered sentence. I assume that the Imam is observing the cooperative principle; therefore, he does not violate the maxim of quantity aimlessly. He possibly implies some meaning in what he says. The possible meaning he might raise is that he asks them to give their whole attention to what he is going to say.

(237) li yantaqila Saahibuhaa min maqaami al-bašariyyati ʔilaa haḏiiḏi al-bahiimiyya wa laqad ḏaraʔnaa li jahannama kaḏiiran mina al-jinni wa al-ʔins lahum quluubun laa yafqahuuna bihaa wa lahum ʔa3yunun laa yubSiruuna bihaa wa lahum ʔaaḏaanun laa yasma3uuna bihaa ʔulaaʔika ka al-ʔan3aami bal hum ʔaḏal

(Therefore, the carrier of such heart shifts from the rank of sublime humanity to the bottom of animalistic realm "And surely, We have created many of the jinn and mankind for hell. They have hearts wherewith they understand not, and they have eyes wherewith they see not, and they have ears wherewith they hear not (the truth). They are like cattle, nay even more astray")

In this example (237), the Imam violates the maxim of quantity in that he says more information than is required. The required information is that the carrier of such heart shifts from the rank of sublime humanity to the bottom of animalistic realm which is expressed in the first utterance in the example. What comes after is added in the sake of more support to the idea expressed in the first utterance.

b- The violation of the quality maxim

(238) al-lōii laysa dunahu muntahan wa laa waraaʔahu marmaa

Pro- adv- adv-pro- N.sing- prep- neg- adv- pro- N.sing

(having neither beginning nor end)

In the example (231), the Imam does not have adequate evidence about what he claims. He has a deep belief that God has neither beginning nor end as all believers do. However, he has not got the ability to verify whether his claim is true or false. Therefore, the Imam claims something for which he lacks adequate evidence. He implies that this truth is uncontroversial and does not need any evidence.

(239) wa al-yaqiin huwa tamaamu al-yaqaḏa wa kamaalu al-ʔintibah

Prepo- def.art- pro- adv- def.art- N.sing- prep- adv- def.art- N.sing

(Death is ultimate awakening and perfect awareness)

In the example (239), the speaker claims something for which he lacks adequate evidence. He cannot prove that after death, there is an ultimate awakening and perfect awareness, even he deeply believes in that. Therefore, he implies that this truth is uncontroversial and does not need any evidence.

In these two examples, it is clear that the Imam violates the quality maxim by providing information for which he lacks adequate evidence. Can we say that the Imam does not observe the CP in this sermon? I do not think so. He definitely observes the CP, thus there is some reason behind violating the maxim in these cases as has been explained.

c- The violation of the relation maxim

The relation maxim is not violated in the sermon. There is nothing mentioned in the sermon which is not relevant to it. No utterance is out of subject in the sermon. Therefore, the Imam observes this maxim throughout the sermon.

d- The violation of the manner maxim

(240) Al-laahumma ʔaSlih ʔahwaalanaa

Def.art- N.sing- verb.imp- N.plur

(O Allah, we seek Your favor to raise our status)

The Imam in the utterance (240) violates the maxim of manner in that it is ambiguous. The speaker does not specify in what way he wants God to raise the status of all believers. He then asks God to raise the status of all believers using the way he wants since there is a complete belief that God will choose the best way ever.

3.11.1 Violation of maxims

In the sermon, the Imam fails to observe the cooperative principle in various ways. This failure leads to three types of violation namely violate, clash and flout.

a- Violate

As we have seen in the example (238) “al-lōii laysa dunahu muntahan wa laa waraaʔahu marmaa”: “having neither beginning nor end”, the Imam violates the maxim of quality by failing to say what is required. He fails to say something for which he has adequate evidence.

b- Opt out

There is no utterance in the sermon in which the Imam opts out of obeying the CP and the maxims altogether. He does not refuse to talk or to give the sermon to the audience.

c- Clash

(241) Wa maʔluumun anna al-l3iba wa al-lahwa laa yastahwii ʔillaa al-ʔatfaal

Prep- verb.passive- adv- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- neg- verb.pres- conj- def.art- N.plu

(It is well-known that games seduce children only)

If we look at the example (241), we see clearly the clash between maxims. In this example, the Imam violates the maxim of quality in favour of the maxim of relevance. Therefore, to be relevant the Imam says something for which he has no adequate evidence. He says that games seduce children only; however, if we look at reality we may discover that games seduce adults too. So, in order to be relevant to the topic of the sermon the Imam says something which might not be true.

d- Flout

I think that the Imam does blatantly all the violations in the sermon in order to raise conversational implicatures. For example, the Imam in the utterance (241) blatantly violates the maxim in order to let the audience understand that life is trivial (like a game) and the Hereafter is the only thing deserves to work for. Likewise, in the example (238) “al-lōii laysa dunahu muntahan wa laa waraaʔahu marmaa”: “has neither beginning nor end”, the Imam blatantly violates the maxim of quality by providing information for which he has no adequate evidence. He does so to compliment God by way of saying that God is perfect and what he

says is true and uncontroversial. In the utterance (160) “Bismihi Al-ʔasmaa”: “In the Name of Allah who is alone in possessing His most splendid Name”, the Imam violates the maxim of quantity by providing less information than is required (he uses the pronoun “hi”: “Him” which refers to God) to indicate that God does not need to be defined. In general, the Imam violates the CP maxims in order to let the audience think of other meanings which are more than what is said.

The CP is observed in the sermon and any violation of its maxims is a way to imply some meaning. Therefore, the Imam, in the sermon, lets the audience think about some meaning by exploiting the maxims of the CP.

3.12 Politeness and its manifestations in the sermon

As the sermon is addressed to audience in a particular occasion and a particular constitution, it is normal that politeness manifests in such event. Politeness manifests in the sermon via the use of both positive and negative face threatening acts and also via the use of politeness strategies in order to minimize the threat of those threatening acts. In the following, I will presents examples from the sermon that exhibits the use of the face threatening acts and the strategies used to minimize their effects.

3.12.1 Face threatening acts in the sermon

There are two types of face threatening acts: negative face threatening acts and positive face threatening acts. Negative face threatening acts as has been mentioned threaten the face of the interlocutor by way of obstructing his freedom of action. These acts may damage both the hearer’s negative face and the speaker’s negative face. Positive face threatening acts threaten the face by indicating that the speaker does not care about the addressee’s feelings, wants ...etc. Like negative face threatening acts, these acts may damage both the hearer’s positive face and the speaker’s positive face. Negative face and positive face are threatened in various ways in the sermon. The following examples show the different ways of these threats.

3.12.1.1 Negative face threatening acts

a- Damage to the hearer’s negative face

The acts performed in the examples (143) “al-zzaaʔil laa qiimata lahu fii qawaamiis Al-3uZmaaʔ”: “The great do not concern themselves with ephemeral matters”, (151) “Wa kuunuu 3ibaada al-laahi ʔixwaanaa”: “Be brothers, O servants of Allah”, (213) “ʔinna dimaaʔakum wa ʔamwaaalakum wa ʔaraaʔakum haramun 3alaykum”: “Indeed your blood, property and honor are forbidden to be violated” and (232) “Wa man kaana fii haaʔihi ʔa3ma fa howa fi al-ʔaaxirati ʔa3maa”: “But he who is blind in this life shall be blind in the Everlasting Life and will be further astray from the right path”, are negative face threatening acts. They are acts which put pressure on the hearer to do or not to do an act. The utterance (143) puts pressure on the hearer so as not to do the act of getting interested in the ephemeral matters. The utterance (151) is an act that put pressure on the hearer so as to do the act of being brothers. The utterance (213) is an act that put pressure on the hearer so as not to do the

act of violating the blood, property and honor of his brothers. The utterance (232) is an act that put pressure on the hearer so as not to do what God says.

b- Damage to the speaker's negative face

The acts that damage the speaker's negative face are the ones that exhibit the submission of the speaker to the power of the hearer. The utterances that show these types of acts are addressed to the audience but the submission in these acts are not to the audience but to God. For example in the following utterance:

(242) Al-muxtaSSi bi al-mulki al-ʔa3azzi al-ʔahmaa

Def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- adj- def.art- adj

(He is the Owner of unconquerable might)

the speaker addresses his listeners in the name of God to whom he shows submission. He shows his submission by specifying the God's characteristics such as "Al muxtaSSi bi Al-mulki al-ʔa3azzi Al-ʔahmaa: Owner of unconquerable might." This type of damaging the speaker's negative face might be a new type added to those specified by B&L. Another act of this type can be shown in the following example:

(243) wa al-SSalaatu wa al-ssalaamu 3alaa ʔašrafi al-bariyya wa sayyidi al-bašariya

Prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- adj- def.art- N.sing- prep- N.sing-
def.art- N.sing

(Salutations and blessings be upon the most noble and the Master of all mankind)

In the utterance (243), the speaker uses some words which show his submission to the prophet who is not the addressee, but it is a way of mitigating the negative face threatening act. The words used that show his submission are "ʔašrafi : the most noble", "sayyidi": "the Master".

3.12.1.2 Positive face threatening acts

a- Damage to the hearer's positive face

The acts that damage the hearer's positive face are of many types as has been mentioned in the first chapter. The following examples show the types found in the sermon. In the utterance (244):

(244) Šabbahahum bidaayatan bi al-ʔan3aam al-latii laa tafham wa laa tudrik

Verb.past- pro- adv- prep- def.art- N.plu- def.art- pro- neg- verb.pres- pro- neg-
verb.pres

(At the beginning, He (God) likened them (unbelievers) to animals which do not understand or comprehend)

the speaker indirectly criticizes the ones among his audience who love life. This act shows that the speaker has negative evaluation of the hearer's desire face. Therefore, in this case the speaker damages the positive face of the ones who love life and do not use their minds to choose the best for themselves. In this case, the Imam implies that some people of his audience who love life and do not use their minds are unreasonable and wrong.

Some other acts found in the sermon threat both negative and positive face. For example, in the utterance (234) "Wa laqad ġaraʔnaa lijahannama kaθiiran mina al-jinni wa al-ʔins": "And surely, we have created many of the jinn and mankind for hell", the Imam uses a verse in the Holly Qur'an to threaten those who do not use their minds, eyes and ears in order to think, to hear and to see the truth.

b- Damage to the speaker's positive face

There are acts that damage the speaker's positive face. Among the acts found in the sermon are the ones that directly damage the speaker's positive face. The utterance (242) "Al-muxtaSSi bi al-mulki al-ʔa3azzi al-ʔahmaa": "He is the Owner of unconquerable might" and (243) "wa Al-SSalaatu wa Al-ssalaamu 3alaa ʔašrafi Al-bariyya wa sayyidi al-bašariya": "Salutations and blessings be upon the most noble and the Master of all mankind" are of this type. The Imam in (242) compliments God by showing his characteristics. The problem in this utterance is that it is not addressed to God but it is addressed to the audience in the mosque. Likewise, in (243) the Imam compliments the prophet by showing his characteristics. The same problem occurs also in this utterance. The way out is that, as I have suggested, it is another type of face threatening acts.

The last type found in the sermon is the one in which acts show that the speaker is in some sense wrong and unable to control himself. This is done as a way of confession to God that human beings are sinners, so the Imam, and in the name of all the present people, asks God to forgive them all. For example:

(245) Al-laahumma rudda binaa ʔilayka raddan jamiilaa

Def.art- N- verb imp- prepo- pro- prepo- pro- N- adv

(May Allah mend our intentions?)

In this utterance (245), in the name of all believers the Imam confesses that they are sinners and he asks God to forgive them and to show them the right path. In this act, the Imam shows that he and all believers are wrong. Therefore, he is damaging his positive face by way of confessing.

3.12.2 Politeness strategies used in the sermon

In any interaction participants tend to use some strategies to minimize the threat of the face threatening acts. Similarly, the Imam in the sermon uses different strategies to minimize the threat of the acts expressed in his utterances. I have mentioned in the first chapter and according to B&L that the speaker takes into consideration the relative weightings of at least

three wants: a- the want to communicate the content of FTA_x, b- the want to be efficient and urgent, c- the want to maintain H's face to any degree. Therefore, unless (b) is greater than (c), S will want to minimize the threat of his FTA. Based on the weightings of these wants, the following politeness strategies are used in the sermon:

3.12.2.1 Bald-on-record strategies

Using this type of strategies, the speaker makes it clear to the hearer what communicative intention led him to do the act. He does not attempt to minimize the FTA that threatens the hearer's face. For example, in the utterance (151) "Wa kuunuu 3ibaada al-laahi ʔixwaanaa": "Be brothers, O servants of Allah", the prophet speaks as if maximum efficiency is very important. He orders his followers to be brothers. Another example is found in the following utterance:

(246) Wa laa tanaaza3uu

Prep- neg- verb.pres

(And do not dispute)

in which God warns the audience. In this verse, God asks the believers not to dispute with one another.

3.12.2.2 Positive politeness strategies

By using these strategies, the speaker saves the hearer's face by wanting his wants. The sermon contains strategies of this type. The Imam uses these strategies via using in group identity markers like in the utterance (219) "Ma3aaʃira al-SSaalihiin": "O the righteous! in which he uses the word "al-SSaalihiin: the righteous". Another positive politeness strategy used in the sermon is the intensifying of the hearer's interest like in the following example:

(247) faqad waqafa (Salla al-lahu 3alayhi wa sallam) fii huʃuudi al-muslimiin fi Sa3iiḌi 3arafaat wa huwa yuuSiihim wa yanḡuru fiihim tilka Al-durar wa tilka Al-jawaahir wa al-nafaaʔis mina al-kalimi wa al-waSaayaa

Prep- adv- verb.past- (verb.imp- def.art- N- prep- pro- prep- verb.imp)- prep- N.plu- def.art- N.plu- prep- N.sing- N.sing- prep- pro- verb.past.cont- pro- prep- verb.past.cont- prep- pro- pro- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.plu- prep- def.art- N.plu

(He (Peace and blessing be upon him) stood in front of the crowd of Muslims in the Mount of Arafat and made invaluable recommendations and pieces of advice)

In this example, the Imam intensifies the hearers' interest by way of depicting reality to them. Using this way, the imam saves his face.

Another type existed in the sermon of the positive politeness strategies is that the speaker fulfills H's want for some X. For example:

(248) liðaalikum yaquulu subḥaanahu wa ta3aalaa fii bayaanii ʔafḌaliyati al-ʔaakhira

Prep- pro- pro- verb.pres- N- pro- prep- verb.pres- prep- N.sing- adj- def.art- N.sing

(God Almighty says about the priority of the Hereafter)

In this example (248), the Imam shows that the Hereafter is better and more lasting than the present life. Therefore, he saves his face by showing that working for the Hereafter is for the audience's benefit.

Another positive politeness strategy used in the sermon is that the Imam presupposes familiarity with the audience by using familiar address form like “al-SSaalihiin”: “the righteous” in the utterance (219) “ma3aašira al-SSaalihiin”: “O the righteous!”. He also uses a strategy in which he includes himself and the audience in the activity like in this example:

(249) fa ʔiðaa maa ʔaxḌa3naa masʔalata al-dduniyaa ʔilaa al-3aql ʔadraknaa ʔannahaa laa tastahiqqu ʔan tu3bad

Prep- pro- adv- verb.pres- N.sing- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- verb.pres- adv- pro- neg- verb.pres- conj- verb.passive

(Therefore, it stands to reason that the present life is not worth worshipping)

Another strategy used called personal-center switch where the Imam speaks as if his audience knowledge is equal to his knowledge, for example:

(250) liyaraa al-3aaqilu kayfa ḥawwalat al-dduniyaa ba3Ḍa al-muslimiina ʔila ḏiʔaab wa ʔakḏraham ʔilaa qut3aan

Prep- verb.pres- def.art- N.sing- adv- verb.past- def.art- pro- def.art- N.plur- prep- N.plu- prep- pro- pro- prep- N.plu

(The wise observer can see how life changed some people to wolves and many others to herds of cattle)

In this utterance (250), the Imam refers to the audience as wise people who can see and understand what happens. All wise people in, this case, can understand what happens.

The use of the demonstrative “haaḏaa”: “this” in stead of “ḏaak”: “that” in the utterance (251) shows the use of the strategy which is called place switch in which the use of the proximal rather than distal demonstratives, where both of them are acceptable.

(251) wa haaḏaa Al-ʔimaamu 3aliy

Prep- pro- def.art- N.sing- N...

(Ali, the Imam,...)

The last positive strategy found in the sermon is the one in which the Imam seeks agreement with the audience by looking for those aspect of topics on which it is possible to agree and sticking to them like in the following example:

(252) haaḏaa šaʔnu al-kummal fa kayfa bi ʔakmalihim

Pro- N.sing- def.art- N.plu- prep- wh.word- prep- N.sing- pro

(It is the case of the perfect, let alone the most perfect among them?)

The listed examples show the positive politeness strategies used by God, the prophet or the Imam in the sermon. They are various and exist in different places in the sermon. Therefore, these strategies are used whenever needed in the sermon.

3.12.2.3 Negative politeness strategies

Negative politeness strategies are used by the speaker to save the hearer's negative face. They are attempts to let the hearer acts in freedom and to let his attention unimpeded (B&L 1978, p.134). These strategies are done to show respect towards hearers. Likewise the positive politeness strategies, negative politeness strategies are various and fall under different types.

The first negative politeness strategy I would like to mention is to be conventionally indirect. The utterance (253) is an example of this strategy in which the Imam asks a question as a critical challenge to himself and to the hearer.

(253) fa limaaḏaa naqtatilu 3alaa al-dduniyaa wa na3kifu 3alayhaa

Prep- pro- verb.pres.cont- prepo- def.art- N.sing- prep- verb.pres.cont- prep- pro

(Why do we fight over it and stick to it?)

The second negative politeness strategy is the use of hedges which is fall under the strategy of no presuming or assuming. For example, the use of “min ʔawwali”: “the first thing” in the utterance (254) as a hedge to what the Imam says is more true and complete than might be expected.

(254) kaana min ʔawwali ma baḏḏahu fii ʔaShaabihi wa muttabi3ihi ...

Verb.past- prep- N.sing- adv- verb.past- pro- prep- N.plu- prep- N.plu- pro ...

(The first thing he spread among his companions and followers)

Another negative politeness strategy is the use of hedges on the illocutionary force such as in utterance (255):

(255) fa kayfa biʔakmalihim

prep- wh.word- prep- N.sing- pro

(Let alone the most perfect among them?)

in which the Imam modifies the illocutionary force by adding the expression “fa kayfa”: “let alone”. Another way is the use of hedges that are addressed to Grice’s maxims as in the utterance (256):

(256) wa ma3luumun ʔanna al-la3iba laa yastahwii ʔilla al-ʔatfaal

pre- verb.passive- adv- def.art- N.sing- neg- verb.pres- pre- def.art- N.plu

(It is well-known that games seduce children only)

in which the Imam adds the word “ma3lumun”: “well-known”.

Impersonalize S and H is another negative politeness strategy used in the sermon such as in the following utterance:

(257) riqqan wa 3ubuudiyatan li al-dduniya

N.sing- prep- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing

(They are slaves of life)

in which the speaker and the hearer are impersonalized. It is not specified who is the slave of life. The use of the passive is also used as a strategy under this type like in the utterance (256).

Another negative politeness strategy is to state the FTA as a general rule as in the utterance (258):

(258) wa kamaa taquulu al-hikmatu ʔawwalu wasiilatin li taḥqiqi ʔaḥlaamik huwa an tastayqiḍa mina al-nnawm

Prepo- conj- verb.pres- def.art- N.sing- pro- N.sing- prep- verb.pres- N.plu- pro- pro-adv- verb.pres- prep- def.art- N.sing

(There is a wise saying which reminds us that “The first way to make your dreams come true is to wake up)

Five negative politeness strategies are used in the sermon to save both the audience negative face and the Imam negative face. In this type of strategies, the speaker uses either conventional expressions or hedges with illocutionary force in order to save face.

3.12.2.4 Off record strategies

Off record strategies are used to let the speaker an out via using an utterance that may have different interpretations. Using this way, the speaker does not commit himself to one specific interpretation of the act. Therefore, the speaker avoids the responsibility for doing the FTA. Among the strategies that fall under this type is the invitation of conversational

implicatures such as in the utterance (256) “wa ma3luumun ʔanna al-la3iba laa yastahwii ʔilla al-ʔatfaal”: “It is well-known that games seduce children only”, in which the Imam gives hints to the audience that the games seduce only children by a way of telling them to focus on the most important things. Another off record strategy used in the sermon is the use of association clues as in the following utterance:

(259) ʔijtama3a fi al-hadiiθi mutaḌaaḌaan hubbun wa kurh hubbun li al-dduniya wa kurhun li al-xuruuji minhaa bi sababi al-mawt

Verb.past- prep- def.art- N.sing- N.dual- N.sing- prep- N.sing- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- pro- prep- N.sing- def.art- N.sing

(Loving life and hating leaving it due to death. Two opposites are stated in in this Hadith: love and hate)

where the use of “hubbun li al-dduniya”: “loving life” and “kurh li al-xuruuji”: “hating leaving it” are association clues to ask the audience to hate life and love death.

In the utterance (242) “Al-muxtaSSi bi al-mulki al-ʔa3azzi al-ʔahmaa”: “He is the Owner of unconquerable might”, the Imam uses the understatement strategy by providing less information than is required. He, thus, invites the audience to infer why he does so. In this utterance, he provides less information to imply that God does not need to be introduced. In the example (260):

(260) Wa laqad Ḍaraʔnaa li jahannama kaθiiran mina al-jinni wa al-ʔins lahum quluubun laa yafqahuuna bihaa wa lahum ʔa3yunun laa yubSiruuna bihaa wa lahum ʔaaḌaanun laa yasma3uuna bihaa

Prep- adv- verb.past- prep- N.sing- adj- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.plu- prep- pro- N.plu- neg- verb.pres- prep- pro- prep- prep- pro- N.plu- neg- verb.past- prep- pro- prep- prep- pro- N.plu- neg- verb.pres- prep- pro

(We have created any of the jinn and mankind for hell. They have hearts wherewith the understand not, and they have eyes wherewith the see not, and they have ears wherewith the hear not)

God uses the overstate strategy by providing more information than is required in order to convince the audience that what He says is true and non-controvertial and to warn them by the dangerous results if they do not use their minds.

The Imam in the sermon uses metaphors as a strategy that falls under off record type. Among the metaphors used in the sermon are the ones existed in the utterance (233) “Yanθuru fiihim tilka al-ddurar wa al-jawaahir mina al-kalimi wa al-waSaayaa”: “He made invaluable recommendations and pieces of advice”. In this utterance, the Imam uses “durar”: “pearls”, “jawaahir”: “jewels”, “nafaaʔis”: “precious things” to refer to the valuable speech said by the prophet. He, therefore, violates the quality maxim.

Another strategy that belongs to off record types and used in high frequency in the sermon in comparison with the other strategies, is the use of rhetorical questions. In this case, the Imam asks question to which he inquires no answer. What he does is to implicate something such as reprimanding like in the following utterance:

(261) faʔayyu 3aqlin haaḏaa al-laḏii yata3allaqu bi al-fanaaʔ wa yakrahu al-ḥaqiiqa wa hiya al-zzawaalu wa al-rraḥiilu ʔilaa al-laah

prep- wh.word- N.sing- pro- def.art- pro- verb.pres- prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- verb.pres- def.art- N.sing- prep- pro- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- def.art- N

(So, is it reasonable for the mind to love evanescence and hate the truth which is the return to God?)

The Imam, in this utterance, reprimands the audience for loving life. Using this strategy, the Imam violates the quality maxim by being insincere in asking the questions.

The Imam uses the strategy of being vague by using euphemism such as in the following utterance:

(262) wa lamma ʔahassa Salla al-laahu 3alayhi wa sallam bi dunuwwi ʔajalihi wa qurbi rahiilih

Prep- adv- verb.past- verb.imp- def.art- N- prep- pro- prep- verb.past- prepo- adv- N.sing- prep- adv- N.sing- pro

(When he (Peace and blessing be upon him) felt that he would die and leave life soon)

The euphemism used is the expression “qurbi rahiilih: leaving soon” which refers to death. In this way, the Imam uses the euphemism as a respect to the prophet and the hearer at the same time because he is talking about someone who is exceptional in the view of the hearers.

Another off record strategy used in the sermon is overgeneralization such as in the following utterance (253) “fa limaaḏaa naqtatilu 3alaa al-dduniyaa wa na3kifu 3alayhaa”: “Why do we fight over it and stick to it”. In this case, the Imam asks the audience to stop fighting and caring about life using generalized advice.

In short, seven strategies that fall under off record strategy type are used in the sermon. Using these strategies, the Imam violates some Gricean maxims in order to invite the hearer to infer what is implied.

3.12.3 Conclusion

It is clear from the examples given that politeness has its impact on the way the Imam uses his utterances. This impact is shown through the various strategies used in order to save

both the Imam's face and the audience's face. The only politeness strategy that is not used in the sermon is the fifth one which is *don't do the face threatening act*. If the Imam chose not to do the face threatening acts, he would not deliver the sermon at all.

3.13 Rhetorical devices exploited in the sermon

The Friday sermon I am working on is full of pragmatic devices. These devices empower the Imam to convince the audience of what he says. He also uses them to add strength to the illocutionary force of the utterances in order to achieve the intended perlocutionary effects. In this sermon, the pragmatic devices are used to make comparisons, to criticize, to persuade ... etc. The devices found in the sermon are: metaphor, simile, euphemism, allusion, antonymy, personification, overgeneralization, oxymoron and rhetorical questions.

3.13.1 Metaphor

Using this device, the Imam implies some meaning by making comparison between two things that have some characteristics in common. For example in (232) “wa man kaana fii haaḏihi ṭa3maa fa huwa fi Al-ṭaaxirati ṭa3maa”: “But he who is blind in this life shall be blind in the Everlasting Life and will be further astray from the Path”, the Imam shows that the people who do not use their minds to see the truth in the present life will be unhappy and will not enjoy their times in the Hereafter (Al-SSaabuunii 1980, p. 164). Thus, he uses the characteristics of the blind to those who do not use their minds.

3.13.2 Simile

This device is used to make comparison using words such as “like” and “as” in English. The Imam, quoting the prophet (PBBU), makes comparison using words in Arabic such as “ka”: “as”, “kamaa”: “as” as in the following utterance where the use of “kamaa”: “as” shows the simile:

(263) yuuṣiku ṭan tatdaa3aa 3alaykumu al-ṭumamu kamaa tatadaa3aa al-ṭakalatu ṭilaa qas3atihaa

Verb.pres- adv- verb.pres- prep- pro- def.art- N.plu- conj- verb.pres- def.art- N.plu- prep- N.sing- pro

(The people will soon summon one another to attack you as people when eating invite others to share their dish)

The prophet (PBBU) uses simile to show the catastrophic situation of Muslim nations in the future. He shows the way the other nations would deal with Muslims. As the prophet (PBBU) said, the other people will attack Muslims just as hungry people do when they are invited to a meal.

3.13.3 Euphemism

Using euphemism, the Imam uses polite and indirect expression to replace words and phrases considered to be harsh and impolite. An example of this device exists in the utterance (262) “wa lamma ?ahassa Salla al-laahu 3alayhi wa sallam bi dunuwwi ?ajalihi wa qurbi rahiilih”: “When he (Peace and blessing be upon him) felt that he would die and leave life soon”, in which the Imam replaces the word “mawt”: “death” by the expression “dunuwwi ?ajalih”: “leave life soon”.

3.13.4 Allusion

The Imam refers briefly to a certain reference which has a specific significance. In the utterance (233) “Yanθuru fiihim tilka al-ddurar wa al-jawaahir mina al-kalimi wa al-waSaayaa”: “He made invaluable recommendations and pieces of advice”, the Imam refers to the value of the prophet speech by naming them as jewels and pearls. He uses the words “durar”: “pearles”, “jawaahir”: “jewels” to refer to the value of the speech of the prophet Mohammad (PBBU). He also refers to life by the wing of a mosquito in the following utterance to show its real position as a worthless thing:

(264) law kaanat al-dduniya tusaawii 3inda al-laahi janaaha ba3uuDatin maa saqaa minha kaafiran šarbata maa?

Conj- verb.past- def.art- N.sing- verb.pres- prep- def.art- N.sing- N.sing- neg- verb.past- prep- pro- N.sing- N.sing- N.sing

(If, in the view of Allah, it equaled the wing of a mosquito, he would not allow a disbeliever to have access to its drinking water)

3.13.5 Personification

This device is used as a way to give something, idea or animal human attributes. An example in which this device used in the sermon is the following:

(265) riqqan wa ?ubuudiyatan li al-dduniyaa al-latii hiya fii haqiqatihaa la3ibun wa lahwun kamaa waSafahaa al-qur?aan

N.sing- prep- N.sing- prep- def.art- N.sing- def.art- pro- pro- prep- N.sing- pro- N.sing- prep- N.sing- conj- verb.past- pro- def.art- N.sing

(They are slaves of life which is just a game as described by the Holy Quran)

Where the Imam used the words “riqqan”: “being salve”, “3ubuudiyatan”: “being slave” to life. Life here is considered as a human being to whom people become slaves.

3.13.6 Antonymy

Antonymy is used to show the opposites of certain words in order to overestimate a person, thing or idea or in order to underestimate a person, thing or idea. In the following

utterance, the Imam uses the word “al-dduuniyaa”: “life- the lowest” with its opposites “al-3uliyaa”: “the highest” to underestimate life:

(266) wa al-dduniyaa luyatan Ɓiddu al-3uliyaa

Prep- def.art- adj- adv- N.sing- def.art- adj

(Literally, Arabic “al-ddunya” (life- the lowest) is the opposite of “the highest”)

3.13.7 Rhetorical questions

Rhetorical questions in the sermon are used in high frequency. They are used to rise certain view points and to imply certain meanings. Using those questions, the Imam does not invite the audience to answer them but to think about certain meaning he is implying in them. The following examples shows the use of this pragmatic device:

(267) li maaɗaa naqtatilu 3alaa al-dduniyaa wa na3kifu 3alayhaa

Prep- pro- verb.pres.cont- prep- def.art- N.sing- prep- verb.pres.cont- prep-pro

(why do we fight over life and stick to it?)

(268) li maaɗaa nabɗu al-muruu?aat

Prep- pro- verb.pres- def.art- N.plu

(Why do we admonish honorable values?)

These are two rhetorical questions which invite people to think about the value people give to life and to think about the admonishing of honorable values.

3.13.8 Oxymoron

Oxymoron is a figure of speech that combines between two contradictory terms. The Imam uses this device to let people think of life after death. The following example shows the use of this device:

(269) wa al-yaqiin huwa tamaamu al-yaqaɗa wa kamaalu al-ʔintibaah

Prep- def.art- N.sing- pro- adj- def.art- N.sing- prepo- adj- def.art- N.sing

(Death is ultimate awakening and perfect awareness)

In this example, the Imam combines between “al-yaqin”: “death” and “al-ʔintibah”: “awareness” in order to show the importance of life after death and that the Hereafter is what deserves working for.

3.14 Conclusion

We have seen in this chapter that the sermon’s layout is composed of an introduction in which the Imam glorifies God and compliments the prophet. It is a way to say that a serious

talk will be given. The layout is also composed of two parts which they are separated by the sitting of the Imam for a while. In the two parts, the Imam introduces the topic in which he talks about brotherhood. The last part in the layout is the conclusion in which the Imam asks God to protect the country, the king and his family and all Muslims. He also asks God to pray upon the prophet and his family.

As far as the discourse of the sermon is concerned, it is analysed at four levels: lexical, phonological, syntactical and textual. At the lexical level, the Imam chooses his words that serve the aim of the sermon. Most of these words are abstract; therefore, they are compatible with the complex reality the sermon is shaping. At the phonological level, we have seen that intonation plays an important role as and IFID in determining the illocutionary acts performed in the utterances. At the syntactic level, the Imam uses complex sentences in order to reflect the complex reality he is treating in the sermon. At the textual level, the sermon is characterized by the use of cohesive devices such as lexical collocation, deictics, repetition ... etc. These cohesive devices relate sentences to one another and serve the unity of the topic. Two other sides in discourse (which are not the concern of this study) need to be analysed in the sermon namely power and ideology⁵.

Four moods are found in the sermon namely the indicative mood, the imperative mood, the interrogative mood and the subjunctive mood. The dominant mood is the indicative. These moods are associated with different functions. As for the explicit and the implicit performatives in the sermon, it is found that most of utterances in the sermon are implicit (459 utterances) and few are explicit (6 utterances). The explicit utterances are used only when the Imam pleads God. All of the explicit utterances are in the conclusion.

To know the illocutionary acts categories found in the sermon, I looked at utterances at two levels: literal meaning and utterance meaning. Using the sentence literal meaning, five illocutionary acts categories found namely, assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarative. Using the utterance meaning, five illocutionary acts categories found in the sermon namely, assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarative. At the level of the literal meaning, the assertive category is the dominant, while at the level of the utterance meaning the directive category is the dominant.

Concerning the perlocutionary effects, it is impossible to count them. This is because the perlocutionary effects are uncontrollable. We may expect the intended effects but we cannot guarantee whether they will be achieved or not.

Many metaphorical speech acts are found in the sermon. Those speech acts are used metaphorically in order to achieve the speaker's intended effects. Concerning conversational implicatures, plenty are found in the sermon. Like metaphorical speech acts they are used to achieve the intended effects since they are more effective in achieving the intended effects than saying things using direct speech acts.

⁵ Power and ideology are two aspects of discourse which need an exhaustive analysis in a Friday sermon. This will be the concern of further research.

In the sermon, all the maxims are violated. This does not mean that the Imam does not observe the cooperative principle. This violation is done to raise conversational implicatures. Therefore, the CP is observed in the sermon and any violation of its maxims is a way to imply some meaning.

Politeness manifests in the sermon through the use of face threatening acts and the use of politeness strategies to minimize those threatening acts. Both positive and negative threatening acts are found in the sermon. All types of politeness strategies are used to minimize the threat of those acts except one type namely *don't do the face threatening act*. This type of strategy is irrelevant in the sermon since if it is applied there would be no sermon at all. The other types of strategies used are on record strategies, positive politeness strategies, negative politeness strategies and off record strategies.

Many rhetorical devices are used by the Imam to achieve the intended effects. The Imam uses metaphor, simile, illusion, personification, rhetorical questions, antonymy, oxymoron and.

In general, the sermon is rich in terms of data. I hope I could cover some aspects concerning the pragmatic side.

Chapter Four: Discussion

4.1 Introduction

The present chapter is devoted to a discussion of the main findings of the current study in the light of the theoretical framework raised in the review of literature. The non-correspondence between mood and function of the Arabic sentences is discussed first. The idea that a Friday sermon falls under a single act, namely the act of sermonizing, is discussed second. The third idea to be discussed is whether we can compute the number of illocutionary acts and the number of perlocutionary acts performed by the Imam in the sermon. Whether the Imam has achieved his goals (both illocutionary and perlocutionary), during and after the delivery of the sermon in relation to the securing of the uptake is dealt with forth. The fifth point to be discussed is the observance of the cooperative principle and its maxims by the Imam in the sermon. Finally, I will discuss the notion of politeness and its role in the sermon.

4.2 The non-correspondence between the forms and functions of the Arabic sentences used in the sermon

The results presented in the previous Chapter showed quite clear the non-correspondence between the forms and functions of the Arabic sentences used in the sermon. The indicative mood was found to be associated with 24 functions (address, illustrate, tell, forbid, remind, ask, warn, advise, compliment, argue, entice, reprimand, belittle, threaten, promise, explain, answer, claim, prioritize, thank, lament, negate, result), the imperative mood was associated with three functions (pray, order, plead), the interrogative mood was associated with four functions (reprimand, confirm, question, negate), and the subjunctive mood was associated with three functions (warn, inform, ask). In the other side, one function can be expressed using multiple moods such as the functions of negating and reprimanding which are expressed in the sermon using the indicative mood and the interrogative mood. The fact of non-correspondence between form and function is mentioned by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) who claim that there is no one-to-one correspondence between forms and functions in that we can use the same sentence in a certain mood to express different functions. The following examples are presented by Austin (1962, p. 7):

(270) It's going to charge! (a warning)

(271) It's going to charge? (a question)

(272) It's going to charge!? (a protest)

The way to identify an illocutionary force from the other depends on context and IFIDs as Austin (1962) and Searle (1975) claim. In the examples (270), (271) and (272), and in addition to context, it is the tone of the voice, cadence and emphasis (an IFID) which make the hearer identifies one illocutionary force from the other as Austin claims. In the sermon, we find different utterances which belong to the same mood but they have different functions. For example, the utterances (173) “ʔinna al-wahšiyya al-latii fii 3aalami al-yawm laa yumkinu ʔabadan ʔan takuuna fii qawaamiisi man yantasibuuna ʔilaa ʔummati al-ʔislaam”: “The barbarism that the world witnesses today cannot be associated to those who belong to the Islamic Community” and (181) “ʔinna batša rabbika lašadiid”: “Verily, the seizure (punishment) o your Lord is severe and painful”, are both in the indicative mood, but they have different functions. The utterance in (173) has the function of negating, while the

utterance in (181) has the function of threatening. As I have mentioned before, one function can be associated to multiple moods. The utterances (170) “Fa 3attaluuhaa”: “they deactivated them (the faculties of perception)” and (186) “limaaḏaa nabḏu al-murruḥaat”: “Why do we admonish honorable values?” are cases in point. The utterance in (170) is in the indicative mood, while the utterance in (186) is in the interrogative mood, but both of them express the function of reprimanding.

It is clear from the examples given from the sermon that there is no one-to-one correspondence between moods and functions of the Arabic sentences used in the sermon. Therefore, the hypothesis of the non-correspondence between moods and functions proposed in the general introduction is confirmed.

4.3 Friday sermon as a single speech act

There are many reasons for considering the Friday sermon under study as a single speech act. To begin with, The Friday sermon is delivered by an Imam in a mosque to some audience. During the delivery of the sermon, there is no interaction between the Imam and his audience. That is, he delivers the sermon at once. It is a one way interaction in which the Imam delivers the whole sermon in one turn. Secondly, the function of the Friday sermon under study as a whole is to guide people and to remind them. Therefore, there is a specific function behind the delivery of a Friday sermon. All the speech acts performed in the Friday sermon works for the major function of the sermon which is to guide and/or to remind people (these two functions can be gathered as explained in the first chapter in one function: the function of sermonizing). Thirdly, there is the unity of the theme in the sermon. The theme of the sermon is about the value people give to life. The Imam in the sermon belittles life and prioritizes the Hereafter; thus, he asks people to work for the Hereafter since it is the one which lasts, and to stop fighting about the trivial life they are living since it is ephemeral. All the speech acts performed in the sermon come under the umbrella of the whole function of the sermon (guidance and reminding). For example, in the utterance (193) “Laa tastahiqqu ʔan tubnaa 3alayhaa al-3alaaqaat”: “It does not deserve to be taken as a basis to establish our relationships,” the Imam says that life does not deserve to be taken as a basis to establish our relationships. In this utterance, the Imam does not only want to inform us that life is not a solid basis on which we can build our relationships, but he also asking us not to build our relationships on it. The Imam considers life as trivial and flat; therefore, it is not a solid ground on which we can build our relationships. In relation to the same idea expressed in the utterance (193), the Imam in the utterance (171) “Wa al-wahanu manṣaʔuhu wa ʔaSluhu ḥubbu al-dduniyaa”: “Weakness is instigated by the love of the present life,” explains that life is the reason behind people’s weakness. Therefore, the care of life is the source of all troubles people face. Another utterance, which support the same idea that all utterances in the sermon come under the umbrella of guidance and reminding, is the one expressed in (176) “ʔinna kulla fardin yantamii ʔilaa haaḏihi al-ʔumma 3alayhi ʔan yuraaʔi3a nafsah”: “Every member who belongs to this nation (Islamic Community) should review his behavior.” In the utterance (176), the Imam advises all the people to review themselves; thus, if anyone has taken something which is not his/hers or has done anything wrong should pay back and ask God to

forgive him/her. The Imam says that people should do that in this life before they die and move to the Hereafter.

As I have said in the first chapter, I adopt the following definition for the verb to sermonize: to make a religious speech known, especially in a church or a mosque aiming to persuade people to do something, to accept, support or follow a belief, a method, etc. Since this definition indicates that the verb to ‘sermonize’ has an illocutionary point which is that by sermonizing a speaker gets a hearer to do something, the illocutionary force of sermonizing comes under the category of directives. Therefore, by considering the Friday sermon under study as a single speech act, it is a speech act that has an illocutionary force which belongs to the category of directives.

We can consider a Friday sermon, which is performed by the Imam, as a single speech act. This speech act has an illocutionary act, namely sermonizing. On the basis of the definition of to ‘sermonize’ which is adopted in this sermon, the illocutionary act of sermonizing belongs to the category of directives. The Friday sermon under study includes several speech acts; therefore, it includes several illocutionary verbs. These verbs, as has been shown in the third chapter, belong to the different categories of illocutionary acts. In this sense, the sermon includes several speech acts that come under one speech act which is sermonizing. Thus, the hypothesis -that a Friday sermon falls under a single act, namely the act of sermonizing- proposed in the general introduction is confirmed.

4.4 Explicit versus implicit performatives in the sermon

Using the explicit formula presented by Austin (1962): I (hereby) V (where V is a performative verb used performatively, as in the following example “I (hereby) promise to lend you 1000 Dhs”), it is clear that, in the sermon, the majority of utterances are implicit while the explicit performatives are very few if we consider them at all. The explicit performatives in this sermon exist only in the conclusion. They are ritual acts which are used by most of Imams to close their sermons. An example of the explicit performatives performed in the sermon is expressed in (193) “Al-laahumma ?innaa nas?aluka al-fawza 3inda al-qaDaa?”: “O Lord! We ask you to grant us victory in the judgment day,” where the Imam is asking God to grant believers victory in the judgement day using the performative verb ‘nas?al’: ‘we ask’ which is used performatively in this utterance. It is worth mentioning that the word ‘Al-laahumma’: ‘O Lord’ in this utterance plays the role of ‘hereby’ in this utterance. Since the speech acts that are uttered using the explicit formula are ritual acts, their role in the sermon is marginal.

An example of the implicit performatives is (199) “Wa al-ttariix xayru šaahid”: “This is proved by history”, where the illocutionary force performed is informing while there is no existence to the verb ‘to inform’ in the utterance. The overwhelming use of the implicit performatives has its arguments in the theoretical framework adopted in this study. Searle (1975) says that most of our speech acts are indirect (implicit) where he defines indirect speech acts as “a sentence that contains the illocutionary force indicators for one kind of illocutionary act can be uttered to perform, in addition, another type of illocutionary act” (Searle 1975, p. 265). In the example (181) “?inna batša rabbika lašadiid”: “Verily, the

seizure (punishment) o your Lord is severe and painful,” God performs the act of threatening. Threatening then is the primary act performed in the utterance by way of informing people that His seizure is severe and painful. Searle (1975) also says that the chief motivation of indirectness (implicitness) is politeness. In the example (261) “faʔayyu 3aqlin haaḏaa al-laḏii yata3allaqu bi al-fanaaʔ wa yakrahu al-ḥaqiiqa wa hiya al-zzawaalu wa al-rraḥiilu ʔilaa al-laah”: “So, is it reasonable for the mind to love evanescence and hate the truth which is the return to God?” The Imam asks a rhetorical question to reprimand those who hate the truth instead of reprimanding them directly. Another reason for using implicit performatives is raising conversational implicatures as claimed by Grice (1975). An example, where the Imam raises conversational implicature is (234) “Wa laqad ḏaraʔnaa lijahannama kaḥiiran mina al-jinni wa al-ʔins”: “And surely, we have created many of the jinn and mankind for hell.” In the utterance (234), God does not intend only to inform people and jinn that he has created many of the jinn and mankind for hell, but also to warn them so as to abide by what he says. God raises a conversational implicature and people need to infer it based on the inferential strategy suggested by Grice (1975). In short, there is an overuse of implicit performatives in the sermon in comparison with the use of explicit performatives.

4.5 The illocutionary acts and the perlocutionary acts performed in the sermon

Based on the definitions given to the illocutionary acts and the perlocutionary acts, we can deduce that illocutionary acts can be counted in the sermon, while we cannot count the perlocutionary acts. This is for the simple reason that, illocutionary acts are conventional while the perlocutionary acts are not as Austin (1962) claims. Since that the illocutionary act of any speech act is known based on context and conventionality, we can count how many illocutionary acts are in a certain speech. The problem raised concerning illocutionary acts is the securing of the uptake which Austin (1962) says that it is necessary for the happy performance of whatever speech act. So, our ability of counting the illocutionary acts performed in the Friday sermon under study obliges us to assume that the uptake is secured. To what extent is this possible? This is a very difficult question to answer. Let’s assume that the Imam uses a clear heard voice and understood utterances, is this enough for the security of the uptake? If we follow Austin (1962) who claims that the speaker is the only responsible for securing the uptake, the Imam has successfully secured the uptake since in the sermon under study; he uses clear heard voice and understood utterances. However, many people who were present in the mosque when the Imam was delivering the sermon might have some problems in getting what the Imam had been saying: they might be deaf, might not understand Classical Arabic by which the sermon was delivered, may be absent-minded ... etc. If we assume that some people had some problems in grasping what the Imam had been saying, the illocutionary acts were not performed successfully at least to those people who had problems. Therefore, the locutionary and the illocutionary acts which have not been got by those who have problem are not performed successfully at least when we talk about this type of audience. We come to the conclusion that a successful performing of locutionary and illocutionary acts necessitates the securing of the uptake on the part of both the Imam and the believers. Can we say that the Imam has not performed successfully locutionary and

illocutionary acts if some believers have problems in getting what he has said? We cannot say that of course. What we can say is that the locutionary and the illocutionary acts performed by the Imam are not successfully performed in relation only to those who have problem in getting what the Imam has said. However, in relation to those who have no obstacles in getting what the Imam says, we can say that the Imam performs successfully the locutionary and illocutionary acts.

I assume that the locutionary and illocutionary have been successfully performed. Thus, 465 utterances have been counted in the sermon: 215 utterances in the first part of the sermon and 250 utterances in the second part of the sermon. Since any meaningful utterance has a certain illocutionary act that is conventional, we can say that 465 illocutionary acts have been performed in the sermon: 215 illocutionary acts in the first part of the sermon and 250 illocutionary acts performed in the second sermon.

The perlocutionary acts are the intended effects and the unintended effects the speaker achieves by uttering a certain speech act. As I have mentioned in the third chapter, these acts are uncontrollable since they are consequential effects upon feelings, thoughts and actions of the hearer. For example, by uttering (218) “ʔunḏuruu ʔilaa haḏaa al-tta3biir al-3aZiim”: “look at this meaningful expression,” we cannot say whether the people who were present in the mosque have been thought deeply about the meaningful expression referred to in the utterance. We cannot say that because thinking deeply is an inner act. Thinking deeply is the intended effect by the Imam. However, there are unintended effects which might be achieved such as neglecting the utterance. Besides, there are hundreds of people presented during the delivery of the sermon; therefore, hundreds of effects might be achieved when the Imam uttered the utterance. We can confidently say that we cannot count the perlocutionary acts. What is possible for us is to account the possible perlocutionary effects on the basis of the meaning of the utterances and the contexts in which they have been performed. Thus, the possible intended effect that might be achieved by uttering the utterance (218) is that people think deeply about the expression referred to in the utterance. In general, illocutionary acts are countable while perlocutionary acts are uncountable; therefore, it is impossible to count the effects. What is possible is to guess the possible intended effects on the basis of the utterance and the context in which the acts are performed.

4.6 The categories of illocutionary acts performed in the sermon

Searle (1975) claims that there are five categories of illocutionary acts namely, assertive, declarative, commissive, expressive and declarative. All these categories are found in the Friday sermon under study on the two levels considered during the categorization of the illocutionary acts performed: the level of literal meaning and the level of utterance meaning.

The dominant category, at the level of literal meaning, is the assertive by 334 illocutionary acts. On the basis of the literal meaning of the utterances performed in the sermon, we can say that the Imam is informing us about what God, the prophet (PBBU), and the prophets' companions have said and done. Therefore, the dominance of the assertive category at the literal meaning is justifiable. The second most used category is the directive. This is because most of the ritual acts performed in the sermon belong to the directive

category. These ritual acts exist in a great number in the sermon by 100 utterances. Most of these ritual acts exist in the introduction and the conclusion. The illocutionary acts belong to the commissive category are very few (6 illocutionary acts). They are all performed either by God or by the prophet (PBBU) and all of them have the same illocutionary force of promising. The expressive illocutionary acts are very few (4 illocutionary acts). They are all performed in the second part of the sermon and they have the illocutionary force of either thanking or praising. The declarative category is the less used one by 2 illocutionary acts. These illocutionary acts are performed by God and they have the illocutionary force of declaration. When God says to something to exist it exists. An example is (213) “ʔinna dimaaʔakum wa ʔamwaalakum wa ʔaraaʔakum haramun ʔalaykum”: “Indeed your blood, property and honor are forbidden to be violated,” where blood, property and honor were to be forbidden to be violated when this verse had been said by God.

On the basis of the utterance meaning, all the categories presented by Searle (1975) are found in the sermon. The dominant one is the directive category by 197 illocutionary acts. This is justifiable if we assume that the main function of the sermon is to get people to change their behaviours in their life. The second most used category is the assertive. As have been mentioned in the third chapter, most of the utterances belong to this category have one meaning which is expressed in both the literal meaning and the utterance meaning such as in the example (215) “laa mawta fi al-ʔaaxirati wa laa fanaaʔa fiihaa”: “There is no death or evanescence in the Hereafter,” where the Imam informs his audience that there is no death or evanescence in the Hereafter. Therefore, the meaning expressed in the literal meaning is the one intended by the Imam. However, there are some utterances which are assertive at the level of the utterance meaning and at the level of the literal meaning but on the two levels they have different illocutionary forces. For example, in the utterance (214) “ʕabbahahum bidaayatan bi al-ʔanʕaam al-latii laa tafham wa laa tudrik”: “At the beginning, he (God) likened them (unbelievers) to animals which do not understand or comprehend”, the illocutionary force the utterance has at the level of literal meaning is informing, while the illocutionary force the utterance has at the level of the utterance meaning is belittling.

Concerning the category of expressive, it is expressed in 82 utterances at the utterance meaning. This is justifiable since in many utterances in the sermon the Imam either entices the people to do certain behaviour or intimidates them so as not to do certain behaviour. Most of the illocutionary acts expressed in the utterances at the utterance meaning and that belong to the commissive category are the same as the ones expressed in the literal meaning except one. The utterance expressed in the example (208) “Fasawfa yalqawna ʔayyaa”: “so they will be thrown in Hell” is the exceptional utterance which has the illocutionary force of promising at the literal meaning while it has the illocutionary force of warning at the utterance meaning.

As far as the declarative category is concerned, the two utterances that have the illocutionary acts and belong to this category at the literal meaning are the same at the utterance meaning. God, in those two utterances, brought the state of affairs represented in the propositions expressed into existence. For example in (226) “ʔinna al-muʔminuuna ʔixwa”: “The believers are brothers indeed,” God declares that believers are brothers; therefore, believers have become brothers when God utters this utterance.

The problem raised during the categorization of the illocutionary acts expressed in the utterances performed in the sermon, is that some illocutionary forces can belong to more than one category. The illocutionary forces that can belong to two categories are threatening and warning. These two illocutionary forces made a deficit in the taxonomy of illocutionary acts since they can be categorized either as directives or commissives. In the example (181) “ʔinna batša rabbika lašadiid”: “Verily, the seizure (punishment) o your Lord is severe and painful,” God threatens people by severe and painful punishment so as to do what he asked them to do. In this case, threatening belongs to the directive category. However, if I threaten someone in uttering the following utterance:

(273) I’ll kick you out.

I am committing myself to kick you out. Therefore, the illocutionary force of threatening can be both directive and commissive. This fact is considered as a deficit in Searle (1975)’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Consider the example (191) “Fatafšaluu”: “Lest you lose courage,” in this example, God warns believers that they will lose courage if they fight between eachother. Therefore, God warns them to stop them from fighting. Thus, in this utterance, the illocutionary force warning belongs to the directive category. However, in the following example:

(274) I will kill you, if you touch my wife

the speaker warns the hearer. In this case, the speaker commits himself that he will kill the hearer if he touches his wife. Thus, warning belongs to the commissive category. Besides, we can say that in warning the hearer, the speaker asks the hearer not to touch his wife. In this case, warning belongs to the directive category.

In short, all the categories presented by Searle (1975) are found in the sermon. The dominant categories are the directive category and the assertive category at both the literal meaning and the utterance meaning, in addition to the expressive category at the utterance meaning. In categorizing the illocutionary acts, it is discovered that there is a deficit in the taxonomy of illocutionary acts presented by Searle (1975) in that the two illocutionary acts warning and threatening can belong to two categories namely directive and commissive.

4.7 The observance of the CP in the sermon

As have been mentioned in the third chapter, the Imam observes the cooperative principle, which is proposed by Grice (1975), in the sermon. The cooperative principle is composed of four maxims namely quantity, quality, manner and relation. The Imam, in the sermon, raises conversational implicatures using two ways: the first way, he directly and deliberately observes the maxims such as in the the example (202) “wa al-ssababu hubbu al-dduniyaa”: and the reason is the love of life.” In this example, he directly and deliberately means that the reason behind what have been expressed in the previous utterances is the love of life. The second way is when the Imam balantly violates the maxims in order to raise certain conversational implicatures. An example in which the Imam balantly violates a maxim in order to raise certain conversational implicature is (241) “Wa ma3luumun anna al-l3iba wa al-

lahwa laa yastahwii ʔillaa al-ʔatfaal”: “It is well-known that games seduce children only.” In this example, the Imam violates the maxim of quality in favour of the maxim of relevance. Therefore, to be relevant the Imam says something for which he has no adequate evidence. He says that games seduce children only; however, if we look at reality we may discover that games seduce adults, too. So, in order to be relevant to the topic of the sermon the Imam says something which might not be true. In this case, the hearer (the audience) still assumes that the speaker (the Imam) is being cooperative and then infers that he is trying to say something distinct from the literal meaning, he can then work out, using the inferential strategies proposed by Grice (1975), that the speaker probably meant to belittle those who are seduced by life. We can say then that the cooperative principle is observed in the sermon. Therefore, the hypothesis, that the CP is observed in the sermon, proposed in the general introduction is confirmed.

4.8 The role of politeness in the sermon

It seems that politeness plays a great role in the delivery of the Friday sermon under study. In this sermon, face (the public self image one wishes to claim) is lost, maintained and enhanced. The notion of politeness manifests in the sermon via the use of both positive and negative face threatening acts suggested by B&L (1978), in addition to the politeness strategies used to minimize the threat of those threatening acts.

The threatening of the positive face in the sermon causes two types of damages: damage to the audience positive face and damage to the Imam’s positive face. The audience positive face is damaged in the sermon by an indirect criticism to the audience. In this criticism, the Imam shows a negative evaluation of the hearer’s desire face. This is shown in the example (244) “Šabbahahum bidaayatan bi al-ʔan3aam al-latii laa tafham wa laa tudrik”: “At the beginning, He (God) likened them (unbelievers) to animals which do not understand or comprehend”. The Imam also damages the audience face by using a verse in Qu’ran. In this verse (example (234) “Wa laqad ɔaraʔnaa lijahannama ka0iiran mina al-jinni wa al-ʔins”: “And surely, we have created many of the jinn and mankind for hell”), God threatens those who do not use their minds to distinguish between what is permitted and what is not in life. The Imam’s positive face is damaged in many utterances in the sermon especially by confessing and thanking. Most of the examples which show this type of damage are addressed to God either by confession, from the Imam, that he and his audience are sinners and consequently he is asking for forgiveness, or by thanking God.

The threatening of the negative face in the sermon causes two types of damages: damage to the audience negative face and damage to the Imam’s negative face. The audience negative face is damaged by putting pressure on the audience so as to do a certain act. This type of damage manifests in many utterances in the sermon such as in the example (143) “al-zzaaʔil laa qiimata lahu fii qawaamiis Al-3uZmaaʔ”: “The great do not concern themselves with ephemeral matters,” in which the Imam asks the audience to belittle what is ephemeral. The Imam’s negative face is damaged when he exhibits submission to the power of the hearer such as in the example (242) “Al-muxtaSSi bi al-mulki al-ʔa3azzi al-ʔahmaa”: “He is the Owner of unconquerable might,” where the Imam shows his submission by saying that God

has unconquerable might. As I have mentioned in the the third chapter, the speaker addresses his listeners in the name of God to whom he shows submission. He shows his submission by specifying the God's characteristics such as "Al muxtaSSi bi Al-mulki al-ʔa3azzi Al-ʔahmaa: Owner of unconquerable might." This type of damaging the speaker's negative face might be a new type added to those specified by B&L. I suggest it as a new type since the speaker (the Imam) addresses his listeners by showing his submission to God but not to them even if they are the addressed ones and not God.

This damage to the speaker's positive face and negative face and to the hearer's positive face and negative face is being minimized using different politeness strategies. These strategies are listed in B&L's book about politeness "*Universals in Language Usage: Politeness Phenomena: an Essay in Questions and Politeness: strategies in social interaction*" (1987). There are four types of strategies used in the sermon to minimize the threat of the face threatening acts namely, bald-on-record strategies, positive politeness strategies, negative politeness strategies and off-record strategies. The only type of strategies that are not used is *don't do facte threatening acts*.

Bald-on-record strategies are used when the speaker wants to make it clear for the hearer what communicative intention led him to do the act. Most of the utterances, in which this type of strategies used, are uttered either by God or by prophet. Only few utterances in which this type of strategies used are uttered by the Imam. This is justified by the idea that God is the creator of all human beings so He does not need to minimize the threat of the acts since He practices His power over them and He wants to make it clear what intention He wants to communicate. An example in which this strategy is used is (246) "Wa laa tanaaza3uu": "and do not dispute." In this utterance God warns people not to dispute lest they lose courage. The utterances uttered by the prophet also show the use of bald-on-record strategies. This is because he wants to make it clear what intention he wants to communicate. An example in which this strategy is used is (151) "Wa kuunuu 3ibaada al-laahi ʔixwaanaa": "Be brothers, O servants of Allah!" In this example, the prophet orders believers to be brothers and servants of God. The Imam uses this type of strategy in few utterances. An example is (153) "ʔunḏuruu ʔilaa haaḏaa al-tta3biir al-3aZiim": "Look at this meaningful expression," Where he orders his audience to think deeply in the meaningful expression uttered in the following utterance. In this case, the Imam speaks as if maximum efficiency is very important.

Using positive politeness strategies, the speaker saves the hearer's face by wanting his wants. In the sermon, many utterances show the use of this type of strategies. It is the Imam who mostly uses this type of strategy since he aims to save the audience's face. An example in which this type of strategy is used is (219) "Ma3aašira al-SSaalihiin": "O the righteous!" in which he uses the word "al-SSaalihiin: the righteous" as an ingroup identity marker. Other strategies that belong to the positive politeness strategies and used in the sermon are intensifying the hearer's interest, fulfilling H's want for some X, presupposing familiarity with the hearer, using personal-center switch ... etc.

The negative politeness strategies are used in the sermon in order to save the hearer's negative face. These strategies are used by the speaker as an attempt to let the hearer act in freedom and let his attention unimpeded. The Imam is the one who mostly uses this type of strategies in the sermon. The negative politeness strategies used in the sermon are: be conventionally indirect, no presuming or assuming, use of hedges on the illocutionary force, impersonalize S and H, and state the FTA as a general rule. An example in which the Imam uses this type of strategies is (257) "riqqan wa 3ubuudiyatan li al-dduniya": "They are slaves of life." In this example, the Imam impersonalizes himself and his hearers as a way to minimize the threat of the negative face threatening act expressed in the utterance.

The last type of strategies used in the sermon is off-record strategies. Using these strategies, the speaker lets an out for himself by using an utterance that may have different interpretations. That is to say, he avoids responsibility for doing the FAT expressed in an utterance. The Imam is the one who mostly uses this type of strategies. Seven strategies of this type used in the sermon. These strategies are the invitation of conversational implicatures, the use of association clues, the use of under state strategy, the use of overstate strategy, the use of metaphors, the use of rhetorical questions, and the use of overgeneralization. An example in which this type of strategy is used is (261) "fa?ayyu 3aqilin haaḏaa al-laḏii yata3allaqu bi al-fanaa? wa yakrahu al-haqiiqa wa hiya al-zzawaalu wa al-rrahiilu ?ilaa al-laah": "So, is it reasonable for the mind to love evanescence and hate the truth which is the return to God?" In this example, the Imam uses a rhetorical question as an off-record strategy to minimize the threat of the face threatening acts expressed in the utterance which is reprimanding.

Politeness manifests in the sermon through the use of positive face threatening acts and negative face threatening acts. It also manifests through the use of politeness strategies in order to minimize the threat of the FTAs expressed in the utterances used in the sermon. Therefore, the hypothesis that politeness manifests in the sermon is confirmed.

4.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that in the Friday sermon under study there is no one-to-one correspondence between moods and functions of the Arabic sentences. This proved by the fact that one mood can have different functions while one function can be expressed by different moods. A Friday sermon is considered as a single speech act for many reasons as has been shown. This speech act has the function of guiding and/or reminding (I have gathered them in the function sermonizing), therefore it (the sermon as a single speech act) has the illocutionary force of sermonizing which belongs to the directive category. It is also found that implicit preformatives are the major performatives used in the sermon while explicit performatives are very few and are merely used as ritual acts. It is also found that for the successful performance of locutionary and illocutionary acts the uptake needs to be secured on the part of both the speaker and the hearer. All the five categories of illocutionary acts presented by Searle (1975) are found in the sermon. However, two illocutionary forces namely warning and threatening make a deficit in this taxonomy. As I have explained, these two illocutionary forces can be categorized either as directives or as commissives. This

depends on the context in which the utterances which have those illocutionary forces performed. The Imam observes the cooperative principle in the sermon either directly or by raising conversational implicatures. Finally, we have seen that politeness manifests in the sermon through the positive and the negative politeness exist in the sermon, in addition, to the politeness strategies used to minimize the threat of those FTAs.

General conclusion

5.1 Introduction

In this section, I restate the main objectives of the study. After that, I summarize the methodology adopted. In addition, I present the results the study came up with very briefly. Furthermore, I present the limitations of the study. Finally, I give some implications for further research on the basis of this study.

5.2 Restatement of objectives

The aim of the present study was to investigate the phenomenon of non-correspondence between moods and functions of the Arabic sentences used in a sermon. This study also aimed at exploring the idea that the various speech acts that are performed in a Friday sermon fall under a single speech act, namely the act of sermonizing, which in turn falls under the category of directives. Furthermore, it was aimed in this study to check whether the successful performance of locutionary and perlocutionary acts necessitates the securing of the uptake on the part of both the Imam and the believers. Another aim of the study was to investigate whether the participants in a Friday sermon observe the cooperative principle and whether the notion of politeness is relevant to the Friday sermon context. Finally, the study aimed to list the possible perlocutionary effects intended by the Imam by delivering the sermon.

5.3 Summary of the methodology

In order to achieve the objectives stated above, both quantitative and qualitative approaches were adopted. The quantitative approach was used to answer some of the questions in the study on the basis of some statistics. An example of the questions that I needed statistics to provide an answer for is whether there is a non-correspondence between moods and functions of the Arabic sentences used in the sermon. The qualitative approach was used to make some subjective assessment of the utterances used in the sermon based on the context where they have been performed.

A number of instruments were used. The study made use of translation. The Friday sermon under study was translated from Classical Arabic to Modern English. Excel program was used in order to transform tables into graphs. These tables included the number of utterances found in the sermon with the moods they are associated to. They also included the number of functions expressed in the sermon with categories they belong to. Furthermore, the tables included the number of explicit and implicit performatives performed in the sermon.

The variables that had an impact on the choice and delivery of the Friday sermon were of two types: external and internal. External variables included time, place and subjects. Internal variables included moods used in the sermon, the illocutionary acts performed in the utterances, the categories of illocutionary acts performed, the observance of the CP in the sermon and politeness. Data classification procedure included all the steps followed in realizing this study.

5.4 Summary of the results

- 1-** What are the syntactic moods that are used in a Friday sermon, and what functions do they serve in the relevant context?

Four moods counted in the sermon namely the indicative, the imperative, the interrogative and the subjunctive. Each mood is associated with a number of functions. The indicative mood is associated with 24 functions: address, illustrate, tell, forbid, remind, ask, warn, advise, compliment, argue, entice, reprimand, belittle, threaten, promise, explain, answer, claim, prioritize, thank, lament, negate, result. The imperative mood is associated with three functions: pray, order, plead. The interrogative mood is associated with four functions: reprimand, confirm, question, negate. The subjunctive mood is associated with three functions: warn, inform, ask. These results show that there is no one-to-one correspondence between moods and functions of the Arabic sentences used in a sermon.

- 2-** Is it the case that the speech acts performed in a Friday sermon fall under a single speech act, namely, sermonizing?

On the basis of the listed reasons in the fourth chapter, we can say that there are many speech acts performed in a Friday sermon that fall under a single speech act. This speech act is sermonizing. Sermonizing has the function of getting some people to do something, to accept, support or follow a belief, a method, etc. Therefore, it belongs to the directive category. In short, a Friday sermon is a single speech act that has the function of getting some people to do something, to accept, support or follow a belief, a method, etc. The illocutionary force of this speech acts falls under the category of directive.

- 3-** Is it possible to compute the number of illocutionary acts and of perlocutionary acts performed by the Imam in and by delivering a Friday sermon?

It is proved in the sermon that we can count the illocutionary acts if we assume that the uptake is secured. We can count them on the basis of the utterances and the context in which the utterances are used. Concerning the perlocutionary acts, it is found that it is impossible to count them since they are uncontrollable. They are uncontrollable because the speaker may intend something but achieve something else. What is possible for us is to count the possible perlocutionary acts. We can do that on the basis of the utterances and the context in which they are used.

- 4-** Is it possible to verify whether or not the Imam has achieved his goals (both illocutionary and perlocutionary), during and after the delivery of his sermon?

Since the sermon is a one way interaction (the Imam is the only speaker in the sermon), it is difficult to verify whether the Imam has achieved his goals either the illocutionary or the perlocutionary goals. There are hundreds of believers were present in the mosque when the Imam was delivering the sermon. Some of those believers may have some problems in getting what the Imam had been saying. If we want to check whether the Imam has achieved his illocutionary and perlocutionary goals, we need to study each case (believer) alone. If we assume that we can study each case alone, we can verify whether the

illocutionary goals have been achieved if we guarantee that the uptake is secured. However, we cannot verify whether perlocutionary goals have been achieved since they are inner acts. The problem raised is that it is difficult to study each case alone since to follow some one in his everyday life to see whether the illocutionary and perlocutionary goals intended by the Imam in a Friday sermon have been achieved or not, is a difficult matter if not impossible.

- 5- What evidence could there be to suggest that the Imam has succeeded in achieving the intended illocutionary goals and perlocutionary effects?

This question is related to the question number (4) in that what have been said in answering question (4) can be said to answer this question. What I can add is that we can verify whether the illocutionary goals have been achieved by asking some questions -related to the understanding of the issue which the Imam was dealing with in the sermon- to the believers. This would be done to check whether the uptake is secured. If we guarantee that the uptake is secured, we can guarantee that the illocutionary goals have been achieved. However, there could be no evidence in order to suggest that the Imam has succeeded in achieving perlocutionary goals since these goals are inner acts.

- 6- To what extent do the participants in a Friday sermon observe the cooperative principle and its maxims?

It is found in the sermon that participants in a Friday sermon observe the cooperative principle and its maxims. As far as the Imam is concerned, the cooperative principle and its maxims are observed in two ways. In the first way, the Imam observes the cooperative principle and its maxims directly and deliberately. In some utterances he means what he literally says without giving more or less information than is required; he believes that those utterances are true; and he says them in relation to the topic of the sermon without any ambiguity, perplexity, and he does that in a concise ordered way. In the second way, the Imam observes the cooperative principle by raising conversational implicatures in some utterances. He does that by blatantly violating a maxim or some maxims of the cooperative principle. In short, the cooperative principle and its maxims are observed in the sermon. As far as the believers are concerned, they observe the cooperative principle by simply being present in the mosque to listen to the sermon.

- 7- Is the notion of politeness (in all its manifestations) relevant to the Friday sermon context?

In the sermon, I have found that both positive face threatening acts and negative face threatening acts do exist. It is also found that some politeness strategies are used in the sermon in order to minimize the threat of those acts. The politeness strategies used are on-record strategies, positive politeness strategies, negative politeness strategies and off-record strategies. The only kind of strategies that is not used is *don't do FTA* since if this kind of strategies is used, there would be no sermon at all. Therefore, the notion of politeness is relevant to the Friday sermon context.

5.5 Limitations of the study

This study is by no means immune of infelicities. The first limitation to be mentioned is related to the identification of the utterances in the sermon. This limitation comes from the fact that in some utterances there were three speakers: one narrates from the other. Consider the following example:

(275) Wa yuḏakkiruhum biʔaayi al-kitaab ʔinnamaa al-muʔminuuna ʔixwa

Prep- verb.past.cont- pro- prep- N.plu- def.art- N.sing- adv- def.art- N.plu- N.plu

(He used to remind them them through the verses of the Holly Book (Quran) “The believers are brothers indeed”)

In this example (275), the Imam informs the audience that the prophet used to remind them using the verses of the Hooly Book (Qur’an) in which God says that beleievrs are brothers indeed. Therefore, there are three possible levels of analysis which creates a real problem when dealing with the utterance at the pragmatic level. The second limitation has to do with the identification of the illocutionary and the perlocutionary goals achieved in and by delivering the sermon. This is because it is very difficult to study each case (believer) alone or to follow each believer alone to check whether such goals haven successfully performed or not. The third limitation has to do with the limited information provided by the context of the sermon. This is because what we have is a videoed sermon in which the camera is focused on the Imam and do not show the believres and their behaviors when listening to the sermon.

5.6 Implications for further research

Given what has been said so far, future research has to try to circumvent the above mentioned limitations. Future research should study more than one sermon to check the results found in this study. Another suggestion is to take some believers and check to what extent an Imam in a Friday sermon will have achieved the intended illocutionary and perlcutionary acts.

The third suggestion concerns the level of analysis of the utterances. It is suggested that utterances should be investigated at the syntactical level as well as the pragmatic one to see whether there is any impact of syntax on the pragmatic realizations of utterances.

There is a need for a cirtical discourse analysis to Friday sermons especially the manifestation of the two notions power and ideology. Such research will show the role that power and ideology play in Friday sermons.

Reaserchers are also called to make a comparision between sermons that are delieverd in mosques and sermons that are delivered in churches. This might bring some insights on the religious orientation to people in the two religions (Islam and Christianity).

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